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If multinational enterprises (MNEs) can contribute to the economic and social development 
of the countries where they operate, they may, at the same time, be directly or indirectly 
involved in human rights violations or environmental damage. Over the last two decades, 
MNEs have increasingly faced liability claims in their home countries for abuse occurring 
during their activities in host countries. For the purpose of this thesis, the legal phenomenon 
referred to above is called ‘transnational litigation against MNEs’. While it originally 
emerged as a tort law phenomenon in common law countries, however, it has recently 
developed considerably in European civil law countries under various forms. 
 
This thesis aims to understand the emergence and the socio-legal characteristics of 
transnational litigation against MNEs in European civil law countries, particularly in France 
and the Netherlands. It combines legal comparative and qualitative research methods, and is 
grounded in various socio-legal theories, such as access to justice and social movements.  
 
This thesis is divided in three main parts: 1) the response of public international law and 
host States to corporate abuse and demands for justice; 2) the legal, procedural, and 
institutional opportunities and obstacles to gain access to justice in France and the 
Netherlands; and 3) the interplay between social movements, cause lawyering and legal 
mobilization, as well as the effectiveness of transnational claims against MNEs to achieve 
justice, corporate accountability, and trigger legal and policy reforms. 
 
This thesis concludes that transnational litigation against MNEs is not solely a tort law 
phenomenon limited to common law countries. Litigators in European civil law countries 
have creatively used the opportunities offered by their legal systems to bring claims against 
MNEs. If success in obtaining remedies and holding MNEs to account has been limited, 
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The belief that corporate benevolence and social responsibility can and should be achieved 
through market forces, to the point where government regulation becomes unnecessary, is 
premised on a dangerous diminishment of the importance of democracy.1 
 Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power 
 
This thesis explores the emergence and the socio-legal characteristics of litigation against 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) before their home country courts for human rights abuse 
and environmental damage occurring in host countries. In particular, it focuses on the legal, 
procedural, and institutional opportunities and obstacles faced by foreign victims to gain 
access to remedies in two European countries of civil law tradition, namely France and the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, this thesis examines the broader context in which this litigation is 
embedded. It discusses the role of various actors of the corporate accountability movement in 
the emergence of the claims at stake. It also questions the benefits of using legal mobilization 
not only to help victims gain access to remedies but also to hold MNEs to account and trigger 
legal and policy reform for improved regulation of transnational business activities. 
 
1 Background 
Following World War II, MNEs have emerged as the main actors in the globalization of the 
economy.2 As a result of increased foreign investment, they dominate economic activity 
worldwide and operate in all sectors.3 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Constable 2004) 151. 
2
 Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Asser Institute Lectures on International Law: Some Aspects of the Transnational 
Corporation in International Law’ (1980) 27 Netherlands International Law Review 79, 80. 
3
 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 
(2nd edn, CUP 2002) 183; Michael Kerr and Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: 
International Strategies and Regimes’ in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Christopher Weeramantry (eds), 




It is important to provide for a definition of MNEs. There is a multitude of types of business 
entities operating across borders and, consequently, various expressions exist to mention 
them (multinational corporations, transnational corporations, etc.).4 Different definitions may 
focus on the type of foreign investment (direct/portfolio), the nature of operations 
(transnational/multinational), or the extent of the managerial control.5 In its 2011 Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) provides for a flexible definition of MNEs:  
 
These enterprises usually comprise companies or other entities established in more 
than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various 
ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise 
may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be 
private, State or mixed.6  
 
The OECD’s definition of MNEs is the one used in this thesis. This definition insists on ‘the 
ability to coordinate activities between enterprises in more than one country.’7 It is broad 
enough to encompass various legal forms of undertakings while emphasizing the notion of 
direct investment. 8  MNEs may cover various relationships, including between a parent 
company and its subsidiaries, between a contractor and a subcontractor, or in the context of 
joint ventures. 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Ebbesson argues, ‘There is no general agreement on how to label the various forms of transboundary 
economic organization, and neither does the given distinction reveal the diversity of corporate structures. 
Rather, the difficulty in terming and defining them reflects the multitude of structures and relationships.’ Jonas 
Ebbesson, ‘Transboundary Corporate Responsibility in Environmental Matters: Fragments and Foundations for 
a Future Framework’ in Gerd Winter (ed), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: 
Perspective from Science, Sociology and the Law (CUP 2011) 200-201. 
5
 For a discussion of definitions, see Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises & the Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2007) 5-9. 
6
 ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 2011 Edition’ (OECD 2011) 17. 
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International organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), 9  and academics have 
criticized the harmful impacts of MNE activities on humans and the environment, especially 
in developing countries.10 The case of the oil industry in Nigeria provides a clear example of 
poor environmental practices by MNEs resulting in severe environmental destruction and 
human rights abuses.11 For example, intensive use of gas flaring has resulted in severe air 
pollution and acid rain. Continuous oil spills have also contaminated land and water, 
destroying important natural resources and the livelihood of local communities. In turn, the 
impact of oil pollution on local communities in the Niger Delta has been severe and has 
resulted in health problems, polluted drinking water, and unproductive soils and ponds.12 In 
addition to violations of the right to a clean environment, constant abuses of other human 
rights, such as the rights to property and to life, have been reported.13 In general, the worst 
cases of corporate-related human rights abuses occur in countries where governance 
challenges are greatest. According to the United Nations (UN), the risk of business-related 
harm is especially high in low-income countries, in conflict-affected or post-conflict 
countries, and in countries where the rule of law is weak and levels of corruption high.14 
 
                                                 
 
9
 In this thesis, the expression CSOs includes various actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
trade unions, and faith-based organizations. However, it excludes business actors. 
10
 UNHRC, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-
Related Human Rights Abuse’ (23 May 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5/Add.2. See also Brandon Prosansky, 
‘Mining Gold in a Conflict Zone: The Context, Ramifications, and Lessons of AngloGold Ashanti's Activities 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2007) 5 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 236; 
Priscilla Schwartz, ‘Corporate Activities and Environmental Justice: Perspectives on Sierra Leone’s Mining’ in 
Jonas Ebbesson and Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (CUP 2009); ‘The True 
Cost of Chevron: An Alternative Annual Report’ (The True Cost of Chevron 2009, 2010, 2011). The Business 
and Human Rights Resource Centre also publishes daily information on reported cases of corporate abuse. See 
‘Home’ (Business and Human Rights Resources Centre) <http://business-humanrights.org/en> accessed 30 
November 2015. 
11
 Joshua Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy of Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment’(1997) 15 Boston University International Law Journal 261; Jedrzej 
Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities (LIT 2000); 
‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’ (UNEP 2011). 
12
 Alison Shinsato, ‘Increasing the Accountability of Transnational Corporations for Environmental Harms: the 
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria’ (2005) 4 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 186, 192. 
13
 ‘Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrosity’ (Friends of the Earth 
Nigeria & Climate Justice Programme 2005). 
14
 UNHRC, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (7 April 2008) UN 
Doc A/HRC/8/5, para 16. 
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In various cases, victims of business-related abuses have sought to obtain redress in the 
country where the abuse took place. However, they have faced various legal, procedural, and 
political obstacles, such as inadequate regimes of liability or procedural rules. In poor 
countries, MNEs may provide the State with its main source of income, thus creating a 
situation where States are reluctant to regulate corporate activities. Furthermore, judicial 
institutions may be less reliable, as a result of severe delays in legal proceedings or 
corruption. The MNE’s subsidiary may also become financially insolvent, preventing victims 
from obtaining financial compensation.15 Moreover, the political situation of the host country 
may be unstable, already creating a risk of State abuse of human rights and a lack of real 
legal protection.16 
 
In order to have access to remedy, and to hold MNEs liable for the human rights abuse and 
environmental damage occurring in the context of their global business activities, victims 
have brought liability claims against MNEs directly in their home countries. Over the last 
twenty years, an increasing number of claims have been brought for human rights abuse or 
environmental damage occurring in foreign countries (host countries) against MNEs in the 
country where they are headquartered or have their main business activity (home country).17 
In this thesis, this legal phenomenon will be referred to as ‘transnational litigation against 
MNEs.’ 
 
The character of transnational claims against MNEs varies considerably, ranging from tort 
suits for environmental pollution caused by oil spills to criminal proceedings alleging forced 
labour, or contractual liability claims for violations of international law. In addition, they 
raise complex legal questions and require overcoming important procedural obstacles. To 
date, few of these claims have resulted in a court ruling in favour of the plaintiffs. 
Nonetheless, the number of transnational claims against MNEs is increasing and expanding 
to more countries. 
                                                 
 
15
 Kerr and Cordonier Segger (n 3) 141. 
16
 Hari Osofsky, ‘Learning From Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights’ 
(2005) 24 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 71, 75. 
17
 Kerr and Cordonier Segger (n 3) 140. 
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Until recently, transnational litigation against MNEs was mainly concentrated in developed 
countries of common law tradition, most notably in the United States (US) and England.18 
Historically, it started in these countries in the 1980s-1990s. In the US, foreign victims 
brought the first tort claims against MNEs under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)19 for violations 
of international customary law or international treaties to which the US was a contracting 
State. At the same time, the first tort claims based in common law were brought against 
MNEs in England. In these proceedings, plaintiffs raised the tort liability of the parent 
company for damage arising out of its subsidiary’s activities in foreign countries, often under 
the law of negligence.  
 
Since the turn of the 21st century, transnational litigation against MNEs has gained in 
importance in European countries of civil law tradition, including France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland. For example, Total, a French oil and gas MNE, faced 
various criminal lawsuits in France and Belgium for gross human rights abuses which had 
taken place in Myanmar in the 1990s.20 In 2013, an NGO filed a tort claim in Sweden against 
Boliden Mineral AB, a Swedish company, for dumping 20,000 tonnes of mining toxic waste 
in Chile in the 1980s.21 In Germany, a senior manager of Danzer, a timber trading company, 
faced a criminal lawsuit for failing to prevent its Congolese subsidiary from participating in 
State-sponsored violence against civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).22 In 
Switzerland, Nestlé, a food MNE, faced a criminal lawsuit for the murder of a trade unionist 
in Colombia.23 
 
                                                 
 
18
 See Saman Zia-Zarifi, ‘Suing Multinational Corporations in the US for Violating International Law’ (1999) 4 
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 81; Peter Muchlinski, ‘Corporations in International 
Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos Cases’ (2001) 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1; Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart 
Publishing 2004). 
19
 28 USC § 1350 (1789) Alien’s Action for Tort. 
20
 Benoît Frydman and Ludovic Hennebel, ‘Translating Unocal: The Liability of Transnational Corporations for 
Human Rights Violations’ in Manoj Kumar Sinha (ed), Business and Human Rights (SAGE 2013). 
21
 Rasmus Kløcker Larsen, ‘Foreign Direct Liability Claims in Sweden: Learning from Arica Victims KB v. 
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Overall, there is an increasing trend for MNEs to face liability claims in the national courts of 
European countries over human rights abuses and environmental damage taking place in 
developing countries.24 Despite the difference in the nature of these claims, they share a 
common aim, which is to hold parent companies of MNEs liable for the negative impacts of 
their global activities. These claims represent ‘the flip side of foreign direct investment,’25 as 
they target the parent company ‘as the apparent “orchestrator” of company-wide investment 
standards and policies.’26 
 
2 Aims, scope, hypothesis and research questions 
This section presents the aims, scope, hypothesis, and research questions which led this 
research. 
 
2.1 Aims  
In general, this thesis aims to understand the emergence and the socio-legal characteristics of 
transnational litigation against MNEs in Europe, with a specific focus on civil law countries. 
More precisely, it has three main objectives. The first objective is to identify the factors 
which have led to the emergence of this specific type of litigation in home countries. In 
particular, this thesis assesses the responses of the international community and of host States 
to situations of corporate human rights abuse and environmental damage, and to demands for 
justice. The second objective is to assess how the substantive and procedural laws applying 
to transnational litigation against MNEs in France and the Netherlands create opportunities 
and challenges for foreign victims of business-related abuse to gain access to remedies before 
domestic courts. The third objective is to understand the socio-legal dimension of 
transnational claims against MNEs in Europe. This thesis questions the interplay between the 
development of these claims and the existence of cause lawyers and social movements. It 
identifies how legal mobilization against MNEs in European home countries is used by 
various actors with competing interests, and the potential conflicts that may arise. Ultimately, 
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this thesis focuses on ‘the manner in which law and courts are used as social control 
mechanisms’27 of corporate activities. 
 
2.2 Scope 
The scope of this thesis focuses on the study of transnational claims against MNEs in 
European civil law countries, in particular France and the Netherlands. It also explores the 
role of social movements and cause lawyers in the emergence of this type of litigation and 
their use of legal mobilization as a political strategy to achieve corporate accountability 
reform. 
 
2.2.1 Transnational litigation against MNEs 
In the existing scholarship on transnational litigation against MNEs, authors use various 
expressions to talk about claims alleging the liability of corporate actors in the context of 
foreign investment, including ‘foreign direct liability litigation’ and ‘transnational human 
rights litigation.’ 
 
Ward was the first author to use the expression ‘foreign direct liability’ (FDL). She described 
it as follows: 
 
The parent companies of an increasing number of multinational corporate groups in 
the extractive and chemical industries have found themselves in their home courts 
defending against ‘foreign direct liability’ – legal actions in which foreign citizens 
(mostly from developing countries) have claimed damages for the negative 
environmental or health impacts of the group’s foreign direct investment.28  
 
Ward distinguishes between liability claims at domestic level raising ‘the direct 
responsibilities of corporations under international law’ (eg the ATS in the US) and other 
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domestic claims raising the liability of parent companies in home country courts.29 However, 
she suggests that both types of litigation question the contribution and the adequacy of 
existing international or national legal frameworks to solve issues of transnational corporate 
accountability.30 Other authors have used the same expression,31 most notably referring to tort 
claims brought directly against the parent company of an MNE before its home country 
courts for its involvement in activities occurring in foreign countries. As a result, other types 
of claims, such as criminal or civil complaints, have rarely been regarded as FDL litigation. 
Other authors have used the expression ‘transnational human rights litigation,’ especially in 
the context of tort claims for violations of international human rights law under the ATS in 
the US. 
 
In this thesis, the use of both expressions was excluded. First, the expression ‘FDL litigation’ 
appears to focus primarily on the issue of corporate liability, therefore minimizing other 
significant aspects, such as access to justice, social movements, and transnational law. While 
corporate liability is of importance here, the perspective adopted in this study is broader, and 
the abovementioned concepts are equally important to the socio-legal understanding of 
transnational litigation against MNEs. In addition, FDL refers to the liability of the parent 
company of an MNE for its own acts or omissions.32 Nonetheless, in many cases, plaintiffs 
have raised not only the liability of the parent company but also that of its subsidiaries, 
partners, or other companies under its control. In the latter situation, the concept of FDL is, 
therefore, inadequate. Moreover, literature on FDL litigation has focused excessively on tort 
proceedings, thus neglecting claims brought under criminal law and other specialized areas 
of civil law. However, plaintiffs who have brought claims outside of tort law have usually 
sought to achieve similar aims, namely to obtain remediation for the damage suffered and to 
hold the parent company accountable for abuses which occurred abroad. Second, the 
expression ‘transnational human rights litigation’ was also excluded, as it focuses mainly on 
claims alleging direct violations of international human rights law. If plaintiffs have alleged 
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the violation of international rules, they have relied mainly on the application of domestic 
law to punish transnational corporate abuse. Besides, plaintiffs have sought compensation not 
only for human rights abuse but also for environmental damage. Therefore, the sole focus on 
human rights is inadequate in the context of this thesis. 
 
The expression ‘transnational litigation against MNEs’ emphasizes the cross-border 
dimension of the litigation. Indeed, claims are brought in the home country where the MNE 
is headquartered, or has its principal place of business, whereas the damage resulting from 
the human rights abuse or the environmental damage occurs in the host country where the 
MNE’s activities occur. Furthermore, the transnational nature of legal claims against MNEs 
echoes that of the economic activities of the same actors across borders. It also highlights the 
contemporary challenges created by economic globalization, particularly foreign investment, 
to classical theories of the domesticity of law, State sovereignty, and international law. 
Ultimately, the expression ‘transnational litigation against MNEs’ takes into account the 
diversity of the legal strategies used by litigators to gain access to remedies, shed light on 
corporate abuse, and demand legal and policy reform. 
 
2.2.2 Corporate accountability 
This thesis explores the use of legal mobilization as a strategy to achieve corporate 
accountability. It is not concerned with the search for corporate responsibility through private 
regulation and other types of soft-law instruments.33 As a result of linguistic constraints 
imposed by the English language, and to represent various legal realities, this thesis 
distinguishes between the concepts of corporate responsibility, liability, and accountability.34  
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Responsibility refers to ‘a moral obligation to behave correctly towards or in respect of’ 
something or someone. Thus, corporate responsibility imposes a moral, and not a legal 
obligation, upon companies.35 Liability evokes ‘the state of being legally responsible for 
something.’ 36  As a result, corporate liability implies a legal obligation upon companies. 
Accountability refers to the fact or condition of being ‘required or expected to justify actions 
or decisions.’37 Therefore, corporate accountability is a wider concept than corporate liability. 
It encompasses ‘the idea that those accountable should be answerable for the consequences 
of their actions’ and refers to legal and non-legal risks.38  
 
Furthermore, this thesis pays attention to the role of social movement actors, including CSOs 
and cause lawyers, in the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs and in shaping 
it as a political strategy to achieve corporate accountability. In this thesis, this litigation is 
primarily seen as a strategic type of legal mobilization, which borrows characteristics of both 
traditional litigation (help victims gain access to remedies) and public interest litigation 
(achieve legal and policy reform). This is particularly visible in the way each claim is 
strategically chosen by litigators, not only for its chances to obtain remedies, but also for its 
opportunities to highlight demands for corporate accountability and trigger legal and policy 
reform. However, to date, scholars have neglected the broader social dimension of 
transnational litigation against MNEs.39 In particular, few authors have explored the role of 
social movement actors in the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs and its 
shaping as a political project, in particular in Europe.40 
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2.2.3 Legal strategies in civil law countries 
This thesis focuses on the analysis of transnational litigation against MNEs in two European 
civil law countries, namely France and the Netherlands. However, it emphasizes the study of 
France, due to an increase in the number of claims against MNEs before the French courts, as 
well as relevant legislative developments, in recent years.  
 
France and the Netherlands were chosen as case studies for two main reasons. First, the 
increase in the number of claims brought against MNEs in these countries provides sufficient 
material to draw conclusions on the accessibility of their legal systems by victims of 
corporate abuse. Second, France and the Netherlands are European countries of civil law 
tradition. They share a common legal history, which has influenced the shaping of their 
current legal system to some extent.41 Therefore, it is instructive from a comparative law 
perspective to assess the similarities and differences in the way these countries treat 
transnational claims against MNEs. It also allows for a better understanding of whether this 
type of litigation has developed its own characteristics in civil law countries. 
 
Until recently, transnational litigation against MNEs has been predominantly practised in 
common law countries.42 Therefore, most of the existing scholarship has largely focused on 
litigation under the ATS in the US43 and tort-based claims in England44 and other common 
law countries (eg US, Canada, or Australia).45 Nonetheless, transnational litigation against 
MNEs has developed considerably in European civil law countries since the turn of the 21
st
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century. One consequence is that, during the time of this research, scholars and CSOs have 
shown a growing interest in claims brought in countries outside the common law tradition.46 
However, a comparative study focusing exclusively on transnational claims against MNEs in 
civil law countries is, to this day, lacking. Furthermore, the existing scholarship has mainly 
focused on the study of tort claims. As a result, the study of criminal and other types of civil 
proceedings has been neglected. 
 
Scholars have generally assumed that transnational litigation against MNEs is a legal 
phenomenon limited to, or only possible in, common law countries.47 However, such an 
assumption is factually incorrect, as it neglects the fact that transnational litigation against 
MNEs can take on various shapes. Whereas litigators in common law countries tend to 
favour the use of tort claims, litigators in civil law countries use a wider array of legal 
strategies, due to the legal tradition and the culture of their jurisdiction, existing statutory 
constraints and opportunities, and conventional litigation practice. There is a need to better 
understand the diversity of the legal strategies used by litigators in civil law countries to, 
ultimately, have a more complete picture of the strategic nature of transnational litigation 
against MNEs. 
 
2.2.4 The European dimension 
France and the Netherlands are two European countries whose legal and procedural 
frameworks are, to a certain extent, influenced by the existence of common institutions and 
rules in Europe. Since the end of World War II, various regional organizations, such as the 
EU (European Union), the Council of Europe (CoE), or the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE), have contributed to the development of a common legal and policy 
framework, which is now shared by a majority of countries in Europe.  
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In the context of this thesis, it is important to understand how the existence of a common 
European framework has influenced the development and the orientation of transnational 
litigation against MNEs. For instance, the EU has enacted several regulations which govern 
the jurisdiction of courts in, and the law applicable to, civil and commercial cross-border 
disputes.48 What has been the effect of those regulations on procedural and substantive issues 
arising from transnational claims against MNEs in European countries? Furthermore, the 
CoE established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to supervise the application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)49 in States Parties. This regional 
mechanism is seen by many as one of the most efficient human rights systems in the world. 
As such, do the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR provide effective protection against 
human rights violations in the context of MNE activities abroad? In addition, the UNECE 
adopted the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention),50 which guarantees, 
amongst various objectives, the right of access to justice in environmental matters. Does this 
mechanism provide any opportunities for foreign plaintiffs to gain access to remedies in 
European home countries for environmental pollution caused by MNEs?  
 
These regional organizations have also created an institutional framework which shapes, to a 
certain extent, the action, at both national and regional levels, of CSOs based in European 
countries. Transnational litigation against MNEs is indissociable from the corporate 
accountability movement, which uses legal mobilization to demand increased regulation of 
corporate activity by traditional public actors. Therefore, how does the European institutional 
framework influence the development of transnational claims against MNEs in European 
countries? 
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2.3 Hypothesis and research questions 
On the basis of an initial literature review, the following hypothesis was developed for the 
purpose of this thesis: transnational litigation against MNEs is typically a tort-based legal 
phenomenon and it is characteristic of common law countries where legal tradition and 
culture, as well as legal and procedural frameworks, are more permissive of this type of 
litigation. At the same time, transnational litigation against MNEs is less likely to develop or 
be successful in civil law countries where legal tradition and culture, as well as legal and 
procedural frameworks, impede or limit this type of litigation.  
 
In order to test this hypothesis, meaning to challenge the idea that transnational litigation 
against MNEs is a phenomenon exclusively found in common law countries, this thesis aims 
to answer the following research questions:  
- Which factors trigger the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs in home 
countries? In particular, what is the role of legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks 
at international and regional levels, as well as in host countries, in the development of 
such litigation? 
- What are the substantive and procedural legal frameworks governing transnational claims 
against MNEs in France and the Netherlands? Do such frameworks create or limit the 
opportunities for foreign victims of corporate abuse to gain access to remedies in those 
countries? 
- What is the role played by social movements and cause lawyers in the emergence and the 
shaping of transnational litigation against MNEs in Europe? Which aims do they pursue 
and to which extent does legal mobilization contribute to the achievement of these aims? 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this thesis rests on various socio-legal and comparative law 
theories and concepts, namely globalization and transnational legal processes; legal tradition, 





3.1 Globalization and transnational legal processes 
Transnational litigation against MNEs is directly linked to the debate on corporate 
accountability in the context of globalization.51 Generally, authors disagree on the nature and 
the novelty of globalization, as well as its normative values and processes.52 De Sousa Santos 
insists on the fact that globalization comprises a very broad set of phenomena and 
dimensions and, as a result, there is not ‘one sole entity called globalization, instead there are 
globalizations.’53 The existing legal scholarship offers various definitions of the concept of 
‘globalization.’ Twining defines it as economic, political, social, and cultural processes that 
‘tend to create and consolidate a unified world economy, a single ecological system, and a 
complex network of communications that covers the whole globe, even if it does not 
penetrate to every part of it.’54 Other authors insist on the fact that national frontiers are 
becoming irrelevant in the context of globalization.55 For Garcia, globalization is ‘the sum 
total of political, social, economic, legal and symbolic processes rendering the division of the 
globe into national boundaries increasingly less important for the purpose of individual 
meaning and social decision.’56 Ultimately, globalization is an economic, political, social, and 
legal phenomenon where the relevance of national borders and sovereignty to individual and 
societal decision-making processes is challenged.  
 
MNEs have gained in power and influence during the contemporary phase of economic 
globalization.57  If MNEs can bring positive changes worldwide, they may also pose a threat 
to the enjoyment of human rights and a clean environment. 58  MNEs may use their 
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‘transboundary subjectivity and structure’ to escape from liability when they cause harm to 
people or the environment in other countries.59  
 
The law has been slow to respond and inadequate in controlling MNEs’ behaviour. 60 If 
international law has allowed MNEs to increasingly gain rights in the fields of foreign 
investment and international trade, thus facilitating their global expansion, it has been unable 
to ensure that MNEs respect human rights or the environment, especially in States where 
regulation provides little protection to individuals or the environment. Moreover, 
international law is fragmented into a myriad of treaties and institutions with different 
objectives, sets of values, and decision-making processes. The excessive specialization in 
each field of international law, and the lack of coordination and dialogue amongst those 
various fields contribute to create conflicts, especially between international economic law 
and international human rights law. Garcia suggests that these conflicts raise a problem of 
justice, as ‘the inquiry into the effects of market globalization on human rights law becomes 
an inquiry into how the economic facts and regulatory infrastructure of globalization 
enhance, or interfere with, the contributions which international human rights law seeks to 
make towards the attainment of justice.’ 61  National law also appears ill-adapted, as its 
predominant focus on domestic issues and its devotion to the economic persona have 
impeded its effectiveness in regulating and controlling MNEs.62  
 
At the same time, globalization has given rise to new demands on corporations to exercise 
their power responsibly and to account for it. It can exert a transformative effect on corporate 
accountability, turning it from a choice into an imperative.63  
 
Several aspects of the interplay between globalization and transnational litigation against 
MNEs must be considered here. First, the processes of globalization are fundamentally 
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changing the significance of national and societal boundaries, generally making them less 
important. 64  In the same way, transnational claims against MNEs challenge territorial 
conceptions of State jurisdiction firmly embedded in international and domestic legal 
systems. In particular, they point out ‘the mismatch between the territorial scope of State 
regulatory jurisdiction and the globally integrated organization of the MNE.’ 65  Second, 
globalization has renewed the debate on legal personality.66 While businesses have insisted 
on keeping a traditional interpretation, advocates for greater corporate accountability have 
supported new definitions of legal personality under international law.67 Similarly, plaintiffs 
in transnational claims against MNEs have challenged the application of separate legal 
personality to entities of MNEs. Third, a variety of significant actors who are relevant to the 
analysis of patterns of legal and law-related relations in the modern world are emerging in 
the context of globalization. 68  While MNEs are increasing their economic and political 
importance on the world stage, transnational activist movements advocating for new forms of 
corporate accountability are becoming influential in shaping international and domestic 
policies and laws through various strategies, including legal mobilization. Ultimately, 
transnational claims against MNEs represent one aspect of the globalization of the 
international legal system.69 Paul holds that they ‘represent both a frustration with the limits 
of traditional international institutions and cooperative regimes and a positive step toward 
building a new international legal order.’70 
 
Another fundamental aspect of this type of litigation is its transnational legal nature. Jessup 
defines the term ‘transnational law’ to include ‘all law which regulates actions or events that 
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transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are 
other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.’71 Importantly, transnational 
law may not be formally enacted by States, as it may be concerned with legal activity 
involving various actors, including States but also individuals, corporations, CSOs, and other 
groups.72 Transnational litigation against MNEs reflects the interpenetration of both public 
and private international law, as these claims raise not only questions of private international 
law (eg the choice of jurisdiction or applicable law) but also issues of public international 
law (eg the application of international human rights and environmental law to non-State 
actors in cross-border situations). It also involves a variety of actors, such as lawyers and 
CSOs, who seek to influence regulatory behaviour by challenging the application of legal 
norms and practice beyond borders. 
 
Transnational claims against MNEs also provide an example of the concept of ‘interlegality’ 
described by De Sousa Santos as the phenomenological dimension of legal plurality in which 
‘everyday life crosses or is interpenetrated by different and contrasting legal orders and legal 
cultures.’73 Interlegality is: 
 
the conception of different legal spaces surimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in our 
minds, as much as in our actions, either on occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping 
crises in our life trajectories, or in the dull routine of eventless everyday life. We live 
in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, multiple networks of legal orders 
forcing us to constant transition and trespassing.74  
 
In Europe, transnational claims against MNEs reveal the interactions between various legal 
orders, namely EU/Member States, host/home countries, international/national. Furthermore, 
litigators have made use of creative legal strategies, mixing aspects of different legal orders, 
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to challenge the perceived increase in corporate power and to force a debate on corporate 
accountability for human rights and environmental abuse. 
 
3.2 Legal tradition, litigation culture and legal transplant  
Legal tradition and litigation culture have influenced the emergence of transnational 
litigation against MNEs and the way it has developed in different home countries. 
 
According to Rheinstein, domestic and local systems of laws ‘can be grouped in families 
whose members are more or less all linked to one single mother law, and which thus tend to 
resemble each other to a more or less considerable extent.’ 75  As pointed out earlier, 
transnational litigation against MNEs was, until recently, predominantly practised in 
common law countries. Therefore, it has often been said that the legal tradition of common 
law countries fosters the emergence of transnational claims against MNEs by providing 
better opportunities for victims to gain access to remedies in courts.76 However, due to the 
recent increase in claims against MNEs in European civil law countries, one may question 
the role played by legal tradition in the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs.77 
 
Similarly, litigation culture is a useful tool to understand the differences in the legal 
strategies employed by litigators and, ultimately, the shaping of transnational litigation 
against MNEs in home countries. Scholars have argued that the differences in litigation 
culture between common law and civil law countries explain the various levels of 
development of tort litigation against MNEs amongst home countries. 78  For instance, 
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American and English litigators are more inclined to bring tort claims. In the US, tort 
litigation is used as a way to promote social reform, influence future policies, redress past 
civil wrongs, and prevent future ones from occurring. 79  Furthermore, a framework of 
financial incentives and public interest lawyers has developed to sustain tort litigation.80 In 
comparison, the litigation culture in many European civil law countries does not foster the 
use of tort litigation against MNEs.81 Europeans underestimate the role tort liability can play 
in social reform. For instance, the European Commission (EC) decided that tort liability law 
in Europe should no longer be oriented toward influencing socially undesirable behaviour 
and should focus on compensation instead.82 Such a decision is consistent with the civil law 
tradition of continental European systems, which traditionally view the protection of the 
public interest as a task for criminal law, and perceive tort law as an unfit tool for prevention 
or punishment of offenses. 83  As a result, litigators in civil law countries may favour 
alternative types of proceedings, such as criminal or specialised civil proceedings, to tort 
claims for suing MNEs. 
 
Legal transplant is another useful concept to understand the various shapes that litigation has 
taken in civil law countries.84 Watson defines legal transplant as ‘the moving of a rule or a 
system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another.’85 According to 
Legrand, ‘the transfer is one that occurs across jurisdictions: there is something in a given 
jurisdiction that is not native to it and that has been brought there from another.’86 However, 
Legrand warns us against the idea of a ‘pure legal transfer’ of a rule from one jurisdiction to 
another, as ‘a rule is necessarily an incorporative cultural form’ and is ‘the unknowing 
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articulator of a cultural sensibility.’87 Therefore, a ‘pure’ legal transfer of a rule from one 
country to another seems impossible. The rule implanted in another country will intrinsically 
be different from the original rule. Consequently, the comparison should not focus 
exclusively on legal similarities and differences, but should also take into consideration 
similarities and differences in the social, historical, and cultural context of the native and new 
jurisdictions.  
 
The concept of legal transplant provides a new perspective on transnational litigation against 
MNEs. One major question is whether this type of litigation is native to common law 
countries and, if so, whether it has been transplanted to European civil law countries. In this 
context, the existence of transnational networks of activists and the various exchanges 
between these actors seem to have played a key role in the transplant, or import, of 
transnational litigation against MNEs into civil law countries. Importantly, litigators and 
CSOs in France and the Netherlands have chosen legal strategies adapted to the social, 
political, and legal context of the new jurisdictions. This is particularly visible in France, 
where litigators have favoured the use of criminal proceedings instead of tort proceedings to 
hold MNEs liable. 
 
3.3 Access to justice  
Access to justice is a crucial concept in the context of this thesis.88 According to Cappelletti 
and Garth, the expression ‘access to justice’ serves to focus on two basic purposes of the 
‘legal system.’ 89  First, access to justice means that the legal system must be equally 
accessible to all. Plaintiffs must be empowered to bring a claim before a court. Therefore, the 
procedural rules and practicalities shaping the legal system, such as standards on standing, 
litigation costs, availability of legal aid, or access to legal representation, may allow or 
restrict the ability of plaintiffs, especially the poor and disadvantaged ones, to bring a claim. 
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Access to justice cannot be achieved when plaintiffs face many obstacles that prevent them 
from filing a lawsuit. Second, access to justice means that the legal system must lead to 
results that are ‘individually and socially just.’90 In transnational litigation against MNEs, 
existing standards of corporate liability may produce unfair results and create major obstacles 
for victims of business-related abuse to hold the parent company liable for harm caused by its 
subsidiaries.91 
 
The concept of access to justice should also be understood in a wider sense. Ghai and Cottrell 
argue that there is a narrow and a broad meaning of the concept of access to justice.92 The 
narrow approach focuses on the courts and other institutions of administering justice, and 
with the process whereby a person presents a case for adjudication. The broader approach, 
however, addresses the process of law making, the contents of the law, the legitimacy of the 
courts, alternative modes of legal representation, and dispute settlement.93 Ghai and Cottrell 
suggest that access to justice means ‘the ability to approach and influence decisions of those 
organs which exercise the authority of the State to make laws and to adjudicate on rights and 
obligations.’ 94  Transnational litigation against MNEs raises issues linked to the broad 
meaning of access to justice. Plaintiffs and litigators, including lawyers and CSOs, have 
challenged not only business accountability towards human rights and the environment in the 
context of foreign investment, but also the processes of international, regional, and national 
law-making, the contents of corporate liability regimes, and the role of national and regional 
courts to protect the interests of the most vulnerable. Ultimately, transnational litigation 
against MNEs is a search of justice for both the direct victims of corporate abuse and society 
at large. It aims to restore the balance between corporate interests and those of society and its 
most exposed elements by influencing policy-makers and courts.  
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3.4 Social movements and cause lawyers  
Over the last decades, CSOs and lawyers have played an important role in ensuring that 
global companies are held accountable for human rights and environmental abuse. 95 
Therefore, the concepts of social movements and cause lawyering are useful to understand 
how the development of transnational litigation against MNEs is closely associated to the 
existence and the demands of the corporate accountability movement.96  
 
Scholars from various fields of social sciences have written extensively on the concept of 
‘social movements.’97 Therefore, there is no unique definition of what a social movement is. 
Diani provides a basic definition of social movements as ‘networks of informal interactions 
between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or 
cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities.’98 In general, social movements 
are different from interest groups, political parties, protest events, and coalitions.99 According 
to Della Porta, four elements are common in social science definitions of social movements: 
a network structure, the use of unconventional means, shared beliefs and solidarity, and the 
pursuit of some conflictual aims.100 Della Porta and Diani argue that the turn of the 21st 
century saw the emergence of a wave of mobilizations for a ‘globalization from below.’101 
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They also call this new wave the ‘global justice movement.’ Della Porta and Diani suggest 
that the initiatives of the global justice movement are very heterogeneous and not necessarily 
connected to each other. Actors address a range of issues, from child labour and corporate 
human rights abuses to deforestation. Their initiatives take a myriad of forms and different 
points of view.102  
 
Keck and Sikkink have also provided a landmark analysis of transnational advocacy 
networks.103 They argue that activist networks, both transnationally and nationally, share 
similar central values or principled ideas, make creative use of information, and employ 
sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns. 104  In particular, Keck and 
Sikkink suggest that: 
 
[They] mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and 
to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and 
governments. Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but 
also to transform the terms and nature of the debate. They are not always successful 
in their efforts, but they are increasingly relevant players in policy debates.105 
 
It was pointed out earlier that De Sousa Santos describes different globalizations.106 In this 
context, he distinguishes between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalizations. One 
mode of production of counter-hegemonic globalization is ‘insurgent cosmopolitanism.’107 
De Sousa Santos describes it as follows: 
 
It consists of the transnationally organized resistance … through local/global 
linkages between social organizations and movements representing those classes and 
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social groups victimized by hegemonic globalization and united in concrete struggles 
against exclusion, subordinate inclusion, destruction of livelihoods and ecological 
destruction, political oppression, or cultural suppression, etc. They take advantage of 
the possibilities of transnational interaction created by the world system in 
transition.108 
 
An important feature of insurgent cosmopolitanism, as defined by De Sousa Santos, is ‘the 
aspiration by oppressed groups to organize their resistance on the same scale and through the 
same type of coalitions used by the oppressors to victimize them, that is, the global scale and 
local/global conditions.’109  
 
Insurgent cosmopolitanism lies at the heart of the mobilization and the construction of the 
corporate accountability movement. At the turn of the 21st century, CSOs, lawyers, and 
victims have grouped together to challenge corporate impunity and to demand accountability 
for business-related human rights abuse and environmental damage resulting from the 
various processes of economic globalization. They have organized their resistance through 
transnational activist networks, thus operating on the same scale than MNEs.110 They have 
also mobilized financial and modern communication resources to build campaigns and other 
activities, such as transnational litigation against MNEs, which strategically help them 
achieve their aims. In particular, the corporate accountability movement focuses on the role 
of States and national courts to impose human rights and environmental obligations on 
companies. Ultimately, the corporate accountability movement is a major actor of counter-
hegemonic globalization. 
 
The interactions of the corporate accountability movement with cause lawyers have 
contributed to the development of transnational litigation against MNEs as a strategic form of 
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legal mobilization. 111  The concept of cause lawyering poses a number of definitional 
challenges, as a result of the range of possible settings and styles of cause lawyering. 112 
Generally, cause lawyers are activist lawyers who seek to use the courts as a vehicle to 
achieve social change or social justice beyond the individual claim at stake. 113  Menkel-
Meadow defines cause lawyering as ‘any activity that seeks to use law-related means or to 
change laws or regulations to achieve great social justice – both for particular individuals 
(drawing on individualistic “helping” orientations) and for disadvantaged groups.’114  
 
Cause lawyering contrasts with conventional lawyering in the sense that cause lawyers 
participate in parallel advocacy and legal reform activities for the benefit of the cause they 
fight for. Furthermore, scholars suggest that cause lawyers have the propensity to transgress 
conventional or generally accepted professional ethical standards of legal practice, such as 
neutrality, client selection, or partisanship.115 Another important aspect of cause lawyering is 
that it is often said to be characteristic of common law countries, especially the US, where 
strategic litigation and public interest litigation are widely accepted.116  
 
In the context of this study, various types of cause lawyers have been involved in 
transnational claims against MNEs. While plaintiffs have been represented by lawyers 
practicing in activist law firms in England, the Netherlands, and Belgium, claims against 
MNEs have been led by NGOs created by lawyers in France and Germany. One 
commonality between these lawyers is that they are specialized in human rights, 
environmental, and, in particular, corporate accountability litigation. These cause lawyers 
demonstrate a particular legal entrepreneurship, as they make ‘creative use of existing laws 
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and procedures’ to seek redress and challenge corporate impunity in the home country of 
MNEs.117 Furthermore, they have been involved in advocacy and legal reform activities in 
parallel to litigation.  
 
4 Methodology 
Two main methods of research and analysis were used in this thesis. They formed a 
‘comparative socio-legal method,’ which aimed at ‘placing doctrinal materials in their social 
context’ to reach the underlying socio-legal reality of transnational litigation against MNEs 
in European countries.118 
 
First, a legal comparative method was used to identify similarities and differences in the 
characteristics of transnational claims against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. For this 
purpose, various types of data were collected, including complaints and judgements, national 
statutes and other forms of national and European regulation, legislative bills and reports, and 
academic articles. Second, a socio-legal method based on data mining and qualitative 
research was used to understand the role of various actors in the European corporate 
accountability movement in the emergence of transnational claims against MNEs and how 
their strategies have shaped this litigation in European countries. The main data were 
collected through interviews with relevant lawyers and NGO campaigners, and through 
analysis of CSOs reports and media articles. Overall, the fieldwork took place in London, 
Brussels, Amsterdam, and Paris. Due to potential sensitivity of existing cases, names of 
individuals, organizations, and places have been voluntarily omitted in this thesis to preserve 
anonymity. As a result, information collected during the interviews is presented in a generic 
way.119 
 
It should also be noted that a review of the academic literature and reports of international 
organizations, as well as an analysis of relevant international, regional, and national 
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legislation and case-law, were conducted to assess the response of public international law 
and host countries to issues of corporate accountability and access to justice.  
 
5 Obstacles  
While conducting this research, the author had to deal with several obstacles in relation to 
language, access to data, and position of the researcher. 
 
Numerous scholars have underlined the different issues linked to linguistics in comparative 
law methodology, including inadequate translation and misunderstanding of concepts.120 This 
study focuses on transnational claims against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. The 
author speaks both French and English. There were no particular difficulties in understanding 
documents regarding France. However, documents on the Netherlands were mainly in Dutch. 
At times, this situation complicated access to, and analysis of, some documents. Nonetheless, 
a great deal of legislation, case-law, and articles about the Netherlands was available in 
English. Another issue appeared regarding the different meanings that legal concepts could 
have in various countries. The author is a French lawyer mainly trained in French law. Some 
concepts found in other legal systems do not exist under French law. Furthermore, similar 
words had, at times, different meanings (eg the French word ‘responsabilité’ can be 
translated in ‘liability,’ ‘accountability,’ and ‘responsibility.’ However, these three words do 
not bear the same meaning). The author had to be extremely careful about such mistakes. 
 
Access to data, especially case-law, also proved to be challenging at times. For example, 
some judgements were not available on the Internet or any data-bases. When a case is 
pending, or when a judgement’s outcomes are negative for the plaintiffs, litigators tend to be 
reticent to publicize rulings. Furthermore, confidentiality may also prevent judgements from 
being shared. Out-of-court settlements are problematic in this regard, as companies always 
impose confidentiality requirements on plaintiffs to keep them from communicating the 
terms of the settlement. It was also difficult to interview relevant individuals from law firms 
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and CSOs who could provide the necessary information to understand the role of social 
movements and legal entrepreneurship in the development of transnational litigation against 
MNEs. Ultimately, the author was progressively able to access judgements or individuals 
through connections she made with CSOs and lawyers involved in transnational claims 
against MNEs. 
 
Finally, the position of the author was, at times, problematic. During her thesis, the author 
worked either on a voluntary basis or as an employee for CSOs involved either in 
transnational claims against MNEs or in the European corporate accountability movement. 
The author was aware of potential conflicts with objectivity requirements for this thesis.121 
 
6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1, which is the present chapter, introduces 
the background to the thesis; the aims, scope, and research questions; the theoretical 
framework; and the methodology. Chapter 2 presents the interplay between public 
international law and transnational litigation against MNEs. In particular, it explores how 
public international law has responded to three main issues raised in transnational litigation 
against MNEs, namely: home State obligations to protect human rights and the environment 
and to provide access to judicial remedies to victims of business-related abuse; MNE 
obligations under international human rights and environmental law; and existing 
international standards to guarantee access to justice. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the 
main opportunities and challenges faced by victims of corporate abuse when seeking to gain 
access to justice in host countries while questioning the desirability of litigation in home 
States. Chapter 4 explains the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs in England 
and presents the French and Dutch case studies of this research. Chapter 5 describes the 
influence of the EU regime of private international law and the rules governing criminal 
jurisdiction on transnational litigation against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. Chapter 
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6 is concerned with the study of civil and criminal regimes of corporate liability in France 
and the Netherlands. Chapter 7 presents an analysis of procedural opportunities and obstacles 
to gain effective access to remedies in France and the Netherlands. Chapter 8 examines the 
links between social movements, cause lawyering, and transnational litigation against MNEs. 
It identifies the European corporate accountability movement and cause lawyers, and 
assesses how various civil society actors have used legal mobilization as a strategy to achieve 
conflicting aims. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions of this research and the 
current international, European, and national initiatives to regulate MNEs and improve 









By nature, MNEs operate across borders of sovereign States. Therefore, an internationally 
coordinated approach appears to be an appropriate way to provide an effective normative 
framework to regulate MNE activity and offer redress in situations of corporate human 
rights abuse and environmental damage.1 Such regulation has been much debated in various 
international forums over the last decades. To date, voluntary and soft-law instruments, such 
as the UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines, have been the favoured form of 
international regulation.2 At the same time, there have been several ambitious initiatives to 
impose some sort of legally binding obligations on MNEs, such as the UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard 
to Human Rights (UN Norms).3 However, in 2005, the international community rejected the 
UN Norms, partly as a result of the absence of international consensus on the question of 
binding regulation of corporate accountability.4  
 
In 2005, John Ruggie was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
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(SRSG).5 Ruggie’s mission was to move beyond the impasse created by the rejection of the 
UN Norms and to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of States and businesses 
under public international law. Following Ruggie’s work, the UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) adopted the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights’ (UN Framework) in 2008,6 and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011.7  
 
The UN Framework is a ‘principles-based conceptual and policy framework’ which aims at 
‘adapting the human rights regime to provide more effective protection to individuals and 
communities against corporate-related human rights harm.’ 8  It comprises three 
complementary and interdependent principles, also called pillars:  
 
 the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business;  
 the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and  
 the need for more effective access to remedies.  
 
The UNGPs completed the UN Framework by providing recommendations for the 
implementation of the three pillars. They aim at enhancing standards and practices with 
regard to business and human rights and contributing to a socially sustainable globalization.9 
Nonetheless, neither the UN Framework nor the UNGPs create new international legal 
obligations upon States or businesses, and they are not legally binding.10 Furthermore, they 
do not address environmental issues in the context of business activities.11 
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Chapter 2 aims to describe how public international law, including European instruments, as 
well as the UN Framework and the UNGPs, has responded to three main issues raised in 
transnational litigation against MNEs. It assesses: 
 
 whether the home State has extraterritorial obligations to protect human rights and 
prevent environmental damage from MNEs under its jurisdiction or control in host 
countries; 
 whether MNEs have international obligations towards human rights and the 
environment; and 
 whether victims of business-related abuse enjoy a number of international rights and 
guarantees to gain access to judicial remedies against MNEs.  
 
The main goal of Chapter 2 is to identify the opportunities and the weaknesses of the 
international legal system to respond to challenges posed by MNE activities and demands 
for justice in cases of corporate abuse. 
 
2 Home State extraterritorial obligations towards human rights and the 
environment  
The transnational impacts of MNE activities challenge the scope and implementation of 
home State extraterritorial obligations under public international law. Scholars and lawyers 
have debated whether the home State obligation to protect the enjoyment of human rights 
from private actors interference applies in the context of its MNEs’ activities in host 
countries.12 Similarly, the question has arisen under international environmental law whether 
a home State has an obligation to prevent its MNEs from polluting in third countries. The 
debate over home State extraterritorial obligations under public international law is reflected 
at the domestic level in transnational claims against MNEs. This type of litigation raises 
similar questions, as plaintiffs challenge the home State duty to regulate, punish, and 
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provide remedies against a parent company for its involvement, either directly or through its 
subsidiaries, in human rights abuse and environmental damage occurring in host countries.  
 
This section explores how public international law has responded to the challenges 
regarding State extraterritorial obligations raised by transnational litigation against MNEs. It 
discusses the extraterritorial dimension of home State obligations under international human 
rights and environmental law. This section also covers the treatment of the State duty to 
protect under the UNGPs.  
 
Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify the concept of extraterritoriality, in 
particular the notion of State extraterritorial jurisdiction.13 Under public international law, 
each State has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the activities of natural and legal persons, 
including companies, within the limits of its territory.14 As a consequence, the territoriality 
principle serves as the basic principle of jurisdiction. However, national laws may be given 
extraterritorial application on an exceptional basis, provided that that they are justified by 
one of the recognized principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction under public international 
law, including the active personality, the passive personality, or the universality principles.15 
 
Zerk defines ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ as ‘the ability of a State, via various legal, 
regulatory and judicial institutions, to exercise its authority over actors and activities outside 
its own territory.’16 Extraterritorial jurisdiction may refer to three types of jurisdiction: 
 
 Prescriptive jurisdiction: States have the ability to prescribe their laws, or make their 
laws applicable, to persons, activities, or conducts abroad.  
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 Enforcement jurisdiction: States have the ability to ensure that their laws are 
complied with abroad by enforcing or compelling compliance or punishing 
noncompliance with their laws.  
 Adjudicative jurisdiction: States have the ability to subject persons to their domestic 
courts to resolve private disputes with a foreign element.17 
 
Transnational litigation against MNEs results from the interplay between prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdictions.18  
 
Finally, the UNGPs recognize that States may choose to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
through either domestic measures with extraterritorial implication or direct extraterritorial 
legislation and enforcement over private actors and activities abroad.19  
 
2.1 The extraterritorial jurisdiction of States under international environmental law 
International environmental law generally imposes a prohibition on States to cause 
transboundary pollution.20 States have a duty to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
and control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.21 This prohibition has been recognized as a rule of customary 
international law binding on all States.22 Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether home 
States should prevent their MNEs from causing environmental damage overseas on the basis 
of such prohibition. 
 
                                                 
 
17
 Zerk (n 16) 13; Ryngaert (n 13) 9. 
18
 Ryngaert (n 13) 10.  
19
 UNGPs (n 7) Principle 2, Commentary.  
20
 Trail Smelter Arbitration (US v Canada) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
21
 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (adopted on 16 June 1972) UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Principle 21; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (adopted on 13 June 
1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I), Principle 2; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Advisory Opinion) 1996 ICJ Rep 226, 29; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 
(Judgement) 1997 ICJ Rep 7, 53. 
22
 Jesse and Koppe (n 11) 178. 
50 
 
In general, the question of whether a home State should play a role in preventing and 
remedying environmental harm caused by MNEs abroad is controversial.23 Some authors 
have argued for the direct regulation of MNEs through the application of home State 
domestic environmental laws to their foreign operations to ensure that they respect stringent 
environmental standards wherever they operate. 24  However, in practice, States do not 
typically attempt to extend their domestic environmental laws to other States.25 At the same 
time, States may adopt domestic measures with extraterritorial implication to reduce 
transboundary environmental risks, to control the export of environmental hazards to other 
States, or to discourage poor environmental practices beyond their own jurisdiction. Such 
measures may have a direct effect on business actors operating both within their territory 
and in other States. 26  Generally, States prefer to address environmental issues through 
international treaty regimes. 27  Some treaties may allow or require the use of domestic 
measures with extraterritorial implication.28 However, international environmental law does 
not offer a general approach to States’ direct assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
2.2 The extraterritorial dimension of the State duty to protect under international 
human rights law 
Under international human rights law, it is generally accepted that States have three types of 
human rights obligations: to respect, to protect, and to fulfil.29 This section focuses on the 
State obligation to protect, which requires that States protect right holders against 
interference by private actors.30 The main UN human rights treaties generally acknowledge 
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that States have various obligations to protect, such as preventing the abuse of human rights 
by third parties and, when such an abuse takes place, punishing the perpetrators. Failure to 
abide by these obligations may amount to a violation of the State’s treaty obligations.31 
Direct references to situations of human rights abuse by business actors in the main UN 
human rights treaties are not widespread. Nonetheless, UN treaty bodies, which are 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the core international human rights 
treaties, have occasionally required States to effectively regulate and adjudicate corporate 
activities with regard to human rights.32 For instance, the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESRC) has held that, as part of their obligations to protect 
people’s resource base for food, States Parties should take appropriate steps to ensure that 
activities of the private business sector are in conformity with the right to food.33 A number 
of scholars argue that international human rights law is progressively accepting that States 
must protect the enjoyment of human rights from interference by businesses.34 Such a duty 
applies to both host and home States in the context of MNE activities. 
 
If States have a duty to protect human rights against interference by business actors, one can 
question whether such a duty extends outside their territory. In particular, do home States 
have an obligation to prevent their MNEs from committing human rights abuse in host 
countries? Furthermore, when such abuse takes place, do home States have an obligation to 
adjudicate and punish their MNEs? The main UN human rights treaties have adopted 
different approaches to the extraterritorial dimension of States’ obligations. However, in 
most cases, they provide unclear responses to questions raised in the context of MNE 
transnational activities. For instance, according to Article 2(1) International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), each State Party ‘undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized’ in the 
ICCPR.35 Nevertheless, the ambiguous formulation of ‘within its territory and subject to its 
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jurisdiction’ has cast doubt on whether contracting States have extraterritorial obligations 
under the ICCPR.36 Moreover, the UN Human Rights Committee (UNCCPR)37 has held that 
Article 2(1) means that a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
ICCPR to anyone within its power or effective control, even if not situated within the 
territory of the State Party.38 However, the UNCCPR has remained silent on whether a State 
Party must protect ICCPR rights against interference from private persons within its power 
or effective control, such as MNEs. 
 
Another example is Article 2(1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), which provides that each State Party ‘undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the ICESCR by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’39 As a result of the absence of a 
territorial/extraterritorial distinction regarding States’ obligations under the ICESCR in the 
wording of Article 2(1), various scholars have concluded that the drafters intended a certain 
extraterritorial scope as part of the treaty.40 In the context of the abuse of rights under the 
ICESCR by MNEs in host countries, Coomans argues that home States are under an 
obligation to regulate, investigate, and bring before their courts MNEs under their 
jurisdiction ‘where a threshold of gravity of human rights violations is at stake.’41 Coomans 
also advances that home States may be held responsible for violations of ICESCR rights that 
result from their failure to exercise due diligence in controlling the behaviour of their 
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MNEs.42 Furthermore, the Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles)43 provide that a 
State must adopt and enforce measures to protect ICESCR rights extraterritorially through 
legal and other means in specific circumstances, including where the harm or threat of harm 
originates or occurs on that State’s territory,44 or where the corporation, or its parent or 
controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has its main 
place of business or substantial business activities, in the State concerned.45 
 
Nevertheless, in the last years, some UN treaty bodies have increasingly encouraged home 
States to take regulatory action to prevent abuse by their companies overseas.46 In 2007, the 
UN Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination encouraged a State Party to 
take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to prevent adverse impacts on the 
rights of indigenous peoples in other countries from the activities of corporations registered 
in the State Party.47 Furthermore, in 2012, the UNCCPR encouraged Germany ‘to set out 
clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in its territory and/or its 
jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the Covenant throughout 
their operations’ and ‘to take appropriate measures to strengthen the remedies provided to 
protect people who have been victims of activities of such business enterprises operating 
abroad.’48 
 
In Europe, the ECtHR has progressively recognized that contracting States have positive 
obligations under the ECHR. Therefore, they must take measures to enable the full 
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enjoyment of the ECHR rights in private relations.49 In certain circumstances, a State may 
be responsible for failing to protect a right, or tolerating the violation of that right, by a 
private person. The ECtHR has already found that States had failed to protect ECHR rights 
against businesses.50 In Lόpez Ostra v Spain,51 the ECtHR found that the nuisance and health 
problems caused by a private waste-treatment plant had disproportionately interfered with 
the applicant’s right to privacy and family life. If the Spanish authorities were not directly 
responsible for the pollution in question, they allowed the plant to be built on public land 
and subsidised the plant’s construction. The ECtHR found that Spain ‘did not succeed in 
striking a fair balance between the interest of the town’s economic well-being – that of 
having a waste-treatment plant – and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to 
respect for her home and her private and family life.’52  
 
Another question relates to the extraterritorial dimension of the contracting States’ positive 
obligations under the ECHR. Article 1 ECHR provides that the contracting States ‘shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ of the convention. 
However, the ECHR remains silent about the situation where the perpetrator of the abuse is 
a private person under the contracting State’s jurisdiction. The ECtHR has identified various 
situations where a State may be held responsible for failing to protect ECHR rights in an 
extraterritorial context. In most cases, State responsibility was found for extraterritorial 
violations involving acts or omissions by State organs, not acts by private persons.53 Thus, it 
remains unclear whether a State could be held responsible for failing to prevent or tolerating 
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the extraterritorial violation of an ECHR right abroad by a company which is under its 
jurisdiction.54 
 
2.3 The State duty to protect under the UNGPs 
The UNGPs provide that ‘States must protect against human rights abuse within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires 
taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through 
effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.’55 Moreover, ‘States should set 
out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.’56 Specifically, the UNGPs 
provide that States are not generally required under international human rights law to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction.57 At the same time, they are not prohibited from doing so where a recognized 
basis for jurisdiction exists. 58  However, there is ‘increasing encouragement at the 
international level, including from the treaty bodies, for home States to take regulatory 
action to prevent abuse by their companies overseas.’59  
 
Scholars have underlined that the SRSG ‘settled for a middle-of-the-road position’ 
regarding the extraterritorial nature of State obligations under international human rights 
law. 60  Such a position has been criticized by various CSOs which viewed it as too 
conservative. In particular, they have argued that Principle 2 does not reflect the recognition 
by various international bodies of the legal obligation for States to take action to prevent 
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abuses by their companies overseas.61 The SRSG missed the opportunity to recognize an 
extraterritorial State obligation to protect, which would have bridged the protection gap 
which currently exists in some host countries and would have prevented ‘relocations of 
convenience,’ meaning the situation where companies decide to register in countries which 
do not subject them to regulations that protect human rights.62 Another weakness of the 
UNGPs is that they provide little indication of the nature and scope of potential 
extraterritorial measures (eg domestic measures with extraterritorial implications or direct 
extraterritorial legislation and enforcement). Ultimately, the UNGPs provide an insufficient 
response to the interplay between home State obligations under international human rights 
law and extraterritoriality. 
 
3 The responsibility of MNEs under international law 
The responsibility of MNEs under public international law has been the subject of an 
intense debate for the last decades. In particular, scholars and lawyers have argued about 
whether MNEs have rights and obligations under international law.63 The traditional view 
that only States may have international rights and obligations limits the effectiveness of 
public international law to protect human rights and the environment against interference 
from businesses in their transnational commercial activities. 64  At domestic level, 
transnational litigation against MNEs echoes the international debate on the responsibility 
of MNEs to respect human rights and the environment. In particular, it raises questions 
around the liability of parent companies for their direct or indirect involvement in human 
rights abuse and environmental damage resulting from corporate group’s activities abroad. 
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This section discusses the responsibility of MNEs under public international law. It first 
provides an overview of the international legal personality of non-State actors. It then 
explores whether MNEs have obligations under international human rights and 
environmental law. Finally, it covers the treatment of the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights under the UNGPs. 
 
3.1 The international legal personality of non-State actors 
According to Jägers, under international law, ‘entities only owe responsibilities to the 
international community when they are considered to be subjects of law, in other words, the 
bearers of international legal personality.’65 As such, the question of whether individual 
persons equate to ‘subjects of international law’ is an important one.  
 
According to a basic definition, a subject of international law is an entity capable of 
possessing international rights and duties.66 A more elaborate definition would describe a 
subject of international law as ‘an entity possessing international rights and obligations and 
having the capacity (a) to maintain its rights by bringing international claims; and (b) to be 
responsible for its breaches of obligation by being subjected to such claims.’ 67  One 
peculiarity of international legal personality is that ‘[it] not only denotes the quality of 
having rights and duties as well as certain capacities under the law, but […] it also includes 
the competence to create the law.’68 However, the existing literature disagrees on the various 
aspects of international legal personality, such as the modalities to acquire it or the precise 
consequences attached to it.69  
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Traditionally, States are considered to be the main subjects of international law.70 However, 
international courts have progressively accepted that other actors could be subjects of 
international law and, therefore, have international rights and obligations. In 1949, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted that the UN had the capacity to bring an 
international claim, thus recognizing that actors other than States could possess international 
legal personality.71 Nonetheless, the ICJ was cautious to specify that ‘the subjects of law in 
any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, 
and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.’72 Following World War II, the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal also accepted that ‘international law imposes 
duties and liabilities upon individuals as upon States.’73 The subsequent development of 
international criminal law and international human rights law has led to the acceptance that 
‘the individual today has acquired a legally relevant position in international law. It has 
internationally been granted rights and is made subject to obligations.’ 74  Furthermore, 
international humanitarian law places duties on rebel groups to respect certain human rights 
of persons under their control.75 
 
Since the period after 1945, scholars and lawyers have debated the question whether MNEs 
may be subjects of international law. 76  Under the State-centric paradigm of public 
international law, MNEs are not considered to be subjects of international law. As such, 
they have no rights or obligations, or some limited ones. It is admitted that each member of 
an MNE has legal personality only under the jurisdiction of the country in which it has its 
                                                 
 
70
 Walter (n 66) para 2. 
71
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 1949 ICJ Rep 
174 [184]-[185]. 
72
 ibid [178]. 
73
 Judgement of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 220. 
74
 Walter (n 66) para 18. 
75
 Ratner (n 64) 466. 
76
 Walter (n 66) para 19. On the subject, see Arghyrios Fatouros, ‘Problèmes et Méthodes d’une 
Règlementation des Entreprises Multinationales’ (1974) 101 Journal du Droit International 495; Theo 
Vogelaar, ‘Asser Institute Lectures on International Law: Multinational Corporations and International Law’ 
(1980) 27 Netherlands International Law Review 69; Dimitra Kokkini-Iatridou and Paul JIM de Waart, 
‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Legal Personality of Multinationals in International Law’ 
(1983) 14 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 87. 
59 
 
statutory seat. 77  However, the intensification of MNE activities, as a result of the 
liberalization of international trade and the multiplication of foreign direct investments, has 
shaped new legal interactions at the international level. For example, under foreign 
investment law, MNEs have been granted significant rights in international investment 
agreements in order to protect foreign investments against interference by the host State.78 
Furthermore, international arbitration tribunals and scholars have occasionally accepted that 
MNEs could be subjects of international law when they entered into investment agreements 
with States.79 This is the case when such agreements contain specific arbitration clauses to 
avoid litigation before the domestic courts of the contracting State in order to create a 
situation of equality between the contracting parties.80 Such a view may lead to a ‘partial’ or 
‘qualified’ international legal personality of MNEs. 81  At the same time, scholars have 
argued that such contractual clauses do not change the nature of the contractual relationship 
or the legal capacity of the contracting parties.82  
 
Ultimately, the intensification of MNE activities and the transnational nature of such 
business activities challenge the idea that MNEs cannot have rights and obligations under 
public international law. Furthermore, the State-centric paradigm of public international law 
appears inadequate, or limited, to regulate MNEs’ activities or deal with the intricate 
interactions between MNEs, States, and human rights and the environment.83  
 
Scholars, lawyers, and CSOs have criticized the classical approach of public international 
law regarding MNEs. They have suggested that MNEs benefit from their international non-
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status which ‘immunizes them from direct accountability to international legal norms and 
permits them to use sympathetic national governments to parry outside efforts to mould 
their behaviour.’84 They have also formulated new theories on the rights and obligations of 
MNEs under international human rights and environmental law. 85  Such theories aim to 
provide solutions to hold corporate groups accountable for their negative impacts on human 
rights and the environment.  
 
3.2 International environmental law 
While MNEs contribute considerably to worldwide stress on the environment, their 
transnational nature poses a considerable challenge to global environmental governance.86 
International environmental law is said to focus on the ‘transboundary effects on health and 
the environment, and transboundary fluxes of harmful substances.’87 However, it appears 
unable to apprehend and govern harm arising from MNE transnational activities. 88 
Furthermore, it fails to acknowledge MNEs’ abuse of their ‘transboundary subjectivity and 
structure’ to escape environmental liability.89 As a result, international environmental law 
offers little assistance to solve environmental challenges created by MNEs’ activities. 
 
Generally, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) lack a comprehensive approach 
to the regulation of corporate actors.90 They mainly create State obligations and, as a result, 
do not directly bind companies. Provisions imposing obligations on corporate actors are 
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usually indirect, as their implementation rests primarily on States and national courts at the 
domestic level. 91  Furthermore, other constraints, such as the restricted territorial or 
substantive scope of MEAs, the lack of ratification by some States, or the failure of many 
MEAs to enter into force, limit the ability of these agreements to impose obligations on 
corporate actors.92  
 
Nevertheless, MEAs have the potential to influence corporate environmental behaviour on 
various grounds. 93 First, a number of MEAs create a regime of civil liability in which 
corporate actors, where they qualify as operators in the context of specified activities, may 
be held liable for environmental pollution. 94  This is the case for a number of harmful 
activities, such as dumping of waste at sea, transboundary shipment in hazardous wastes, oil 
pollution at sea, hunting and trading in endangered species, and use of various hazardous 
and ozone-depleting substances.95 Second, some MEAs require the adoption of criminal 
penalties to regulate certain business conduct,96 such as the Convention on the Protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law of the CoE.97 Other MEAs explicitly create other 
types of State obligations regarding corporate actors. For example, Article 10(e) Convention 
on Biological Diversity 98  requires each State to ‘encourage cooperation between its 
governmental authorities and its private sector in developing methods for sustainable use of 
biological resources.’ Third, some MEAs contain provisions that may directly and indirectly 
affect free trade rules, or conflict with the measures contained in the agreements concluded 
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under the World Trade Organization.99 Fourth, international environmental law has seen the 
development of general concepts and principles (eg the precautionary and the polluter pays 
principles, environmental impact assessment, transparency, etc.), and policies, which are 
directly relevant to the regulation of corporate actors.100 Ultimately, however, MEAs offer 
only a fragmented and indirect response to the regulation of corporations and their impact 
on the environment.  
 
In parallel, self-regulation of corporate actors through soft-law instruments has gained in 
importance in international environmental law over the last decades. Some scholars argue 
that such regulatory approach has contributed to the emergence of a number of standards on 
corporate conduct which are now rooted in international environmental law. The soft-law 
nature of these instruments and the participation of companies in these processes have 
generally facilitated the development of such standards.101 Although these standards are non 
binding, they constitute criteria against which business activities may be measured with 
respect to environmental protection.102 In addition, the participation of corporate actors in 
international environmental standard-setting processes may increase the chances that 
companies will follow environmentally sound behaviour.103 Some authors argue that these 
environmental standards are now converging to a considerable extent and may be directly 
applicable to MNEs. 104  Furthermore, when developed in the context of international 
initiatives, the respect of these standards by corporate actors may be monitored by 
international mechanisms, which ‘contribute to the establishment of a coherent corporate 
responsibility framework.’105 For some authors, international environmental law has found 
innovative and pragmatic normative ways to address the challenges arising from corporate 
actors environmental behaviour. 106  At the same time, some scholars and CSOs have 
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challenged the idea that self-regulation through soft-law instruments is an effective way to 
prevent the occurrence of environmental damage by companies.107 
 
3.3 International human rights law 
There is no international regime of binding norms governing the interactions between 
MNEs and human rights. 108  Some authors have talked of the ‘invisibility’ of MNEs’ 
accountability under international human rights law.109 This situation may be explained by 
the influence of the abovementioned State-centric paradigm of public international law on 
the development of international human rights law. Since MNEs are not usually recognized 
as traditional subjects of international law, they cannot be direct bearers of legal obligations 
under international human rights law.110 Furthermore, human rights were originally devised 
to protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of power by the authorities of the 
territorial State.111  
 
Scholars, lawyers, and CSOs have progressively challenged this status quo and have 
developed various theories on the obligations of MNEs under international human rights 
law. These theories share the idea that MNEs have acquired an ‘enormous power’ which 
interferes with the enjoyment of human rights. 112 However, States have been unable or 
unwilling to regulate such power while MNEs have used the ‘innocent bystander rhetoric’ 
to avoid accountability with regard to human rights abuse.113 Therefore, to avoid a situation 
of impunity, MNEs increase in power should be accompanied by an increase in 
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accountability under international human rights law.114 Scholars have suggested that it is not 
necessary for MNEs to possess full international legal personality, such as the one possessed 
by States, to be imposed human rights obligations.115 The reason is that transplanting notions 
of State responsibility to businesses would prove too difficult.116 Instead, they propose that 
MNEs have ‘limited rights and responsibilities, such as the right to sue and be sued, the 
ability to assert a right, and the acceptance of legal responsibility in judicial forums, but not 
have the status as a party to intergovernmental forums or international instruments.’117 This 
solution, they say, would constitute ‘a sound base upon which to build a regime of direct 
human rights responsibilities at international law, but it would also preserve the primacy of 
States on the international plane.’118 
 
Even where there is agreement that MNEs can have duties under international human rights 
law, opinions diverge on the scope of obligations MNEs should possess. In particular, 
authors have various views on the normative nature (ie binding/non-binding), the type (ie 
respect, protect, fulfil), and the range (ie all human rights or a limited number) of human 
rights obligations of MNEs. 
 
First, there is a disagreement on the normative nature of MNEs’ human rights obligations. 
While some authors plead for the adoption of human rights norms legally binding on MNEs, 
others argue that voluntary norms are more politically and technically feasible.119 To date, 
most international human rights norms directly applicable to MNEs have been formulated in 
soft-law instruments. As a result, soft-law instruments have a normative impact on MNEs 
by calling them to respect certain conduct vis-à-vis human rights.120 However, because these 
norms are generally unenforceable, they are, in practice, effectively limited.121 At the same 
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time, some authors postulate that the international legal framework on human rights already 
provides the basis for ‘drawing out strong legally binding obligations for corporations.’122 
For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)123 has often been quoted 
as ‘a potential legal source of corporate human rights responsibilities.’124 
 
Second, the debate focuses on the extent of MNEs’ responsibility under international human 
rights law, as well as the type of human rights obligations that MNEs should bear (ie 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil). This question demonstrates at least the perception 
of competition between imposing obligations on either State or non-State actors under 
international human rights law. In general, experts agree that MNE responsibility should not 
exclude State responsibility. Furthermore, it is frequently held that MNEs should not simply 
have the same human rights obligations as States because such an approach would amount 
‘to ignore the differences between the nature and functions of States and corporations.’125 
Corporate obligations under international human rights law should therefore be modelled in 
the light of the characteristics of corporate activity.126 However, there is a disagreement as to 
the types of human rights obligation that MNEs should bear. While some authors argue that 
MNEs should only have an obligation to respect human rights, 127  others suggest that 
corporate groups should have, in certain circumstances, an obligation to protect, even to 
fulfil, human rights.128 For example, a company should ensure that its business partners do 
not abuse human rights in their own activities. Previous normative efforts to impose human 
rights obligations upon MNEs considered the possibility that MNEs may bear other types of 
obligations. For instance, the UN Norms provided that, within their respective spheres of 
activity and influence, MNEs had the obligation ‘to promote, secure the fulfilment of, 
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respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as 
national law.’129 However, the SRSG rejected this view, partly because of the difficulties 
associated with the concepts of spheres of activity and influence.130 
 
Third, there are various views on the question whether the entire body of human rights law 
should apply directly to MNEs, and corporations more generally. One approach accepts that 
MNEs should have specific international obligations only with regard to gross human rights 
abuses, such as the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity.131 In theory, international 
criminal law seems to admit that MNEs must refrain from participating in the commission 
of genocide. 132  Other authors differentiate between human rights that corporations can 
directly infringe upon, and human rights that only States can directly violate. Ratner argues 
that the duties of the corporation with regard to the latter can only be complicity-based, and 
that links between the corporation and the State are a necessary factor for the derivation of 
corporate duties.133  
 
UN treaty bodies have expressed various views regarding the question whether private 
actors have obligations under international human rights law. The UNCCPR clearly stated 
that, under Article 2(1) ICCPR, obligations are binding only on States Parties and do not 
have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law. 134  Therefore, the ICCPR 
produces no direct effect for private third parties, and private actors, such as MNEs, do not 
have obligations under the ICCPR. 135  Furthermore, the question of MNEs’ obligations 
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regarding ICESCR rights has not been addressed systematically.136 On several occasions, the 
UNCESCR has formulated the role of business actors in the realization of some ICESCR 
rights. For example, in its General Comment 12 on the right to adequate food, the 
UNCESCR stated that violations of the right to food could occur through the direct action of 
States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States.137 In particular, while only States 
are parties to the ICESCR and are thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all 
members of society, including the private business sector, have responsibilities in the 
realization of the right to adequate food.138 In particular, the private business sector, either 
national or transnational, ‘should pursue its activities within the framework of a code of 
conduct conducive to respect of the right to adequate food, agreed upon jointly with the 
Government and civil society.’ 139  Therefore, the UNCESCR formulated a non-binding 
responsibility of MNEs to respect the right to food.  
 
In Europe,140 the existing case-law of the ECtHR in relation to private companies is limited 
to cases where such actors invoke their own rights under the ECHR. An individual alleging 
a violation of his rights by a private company cannot raise his claim before the ECtHR, 
based on various reasons.141 First, applications may only be brought against contracting 
States.142 As a result, any application brought against a company is inadmissible, as being 
incompatible ratione personae with the ECHR’s provisions.143 Second, the ECHR rights do 
not have any horizontal effect, since this instrument does not recognise the principle of 
direct third party effect. 144  Third, the ECtHR may consider applications only after all 
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domestic remedies have been exhausted. Consequently, the applications brought to the 
ECtHR are against judgements of domestic courts, not corporations.145 Fourth, it appears 
that judges of the ECtHR lack the awareness to creatively hold companies accountable for 
human rights abuse under the ECHR.146 Consequently, private companies cannot be held 
responsible for human rights violations under the ECHR.  
 
3.4 The corporate responsibility to respect under the UNGPs 
The SRSG rejected the view that companies, where they have influence, should have the 
same range of responsibilities as States.147 Companies are economic actors and, as such, 
their responsibilities ‘cannot and should not simply mirror the duties of States.’ 148 
Furthermore, the SRSG rejected that companies should have responsibilities for a limited 
list of human rights. Since businesses can have an impact on the entire spectrum of 
internationally recognized rights,149 limiting the rights for which they may be responsible 
would have negative consequences in particular instances.150 Businesses should, at least, 
respect internationally recognized human rights.151 As a result, the UN Framework and the 
UNGPs rest on ‘differentiated but complementary responsibilities’ in relation to all human 
rights.152  
 
Both instruments recognize the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
independently of States’ duties.153 Business enterprises should avoid infringing the human 
rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
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involved.154 The term ‘responsibility’ was preferred to ‘duty’ to indicate that respecting 
human rights is not currently an obligation that international human rights law generally 
imposes directly on companies. Instead, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
is ‘a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate,’ 
and ‘exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights.’ 155  Companies should respect human rights ‘because it is the basic expectation 
society has of business.’156 Ultimately, the UN Framework and the UNGPs define corporate 
responsibility on the basis of social expectations (the social licence of companies to operate) 
and not legal standards.157  
 
Importantly, in order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business 
enterprises should have in place a process called ‘human rights due diligence’ to identify, 
prevent, mitigate, and account for how they address their impacts on human rights. 158 
Human rights due diligence ‘should include assessing actual and potential human rights 
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating 
how impacts are addressed.’159 Therefore, human rights due diligence refers to the steps a 
company must take to become aware of, prevent, and address adverse human rights 
impacts. 160  The SRSG noted that, to discharge its responsibility to respect, a company 
should carry out due diligence. 161  However, the nature of human rights due diligence, 
whether it is a principle or a process, is unclear.162  
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If the UN Framework and the UNGPs have been acknowledged as representing an 
important step, they have not closed the long-running debate about corporations and the 
demands for international legal obligations and corporate accountability. 163 In particular, 
scholars and CSOs have criticized the voluntary nature of the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights.164 Both instruments excessively emphasize the role of the State as the 
sole duty-bearer of human rights obligations while avoiding to establish clear international 
standards and/or obligations applicable to companies. As a result, the ‘rather minimalist 
take’ on corporate responsibility leads to missed opportunities and weaknesses, especially 
since companies have already been legally obliged not to perpetrate, aid, or abet 
international crimes.165 Scholars have also pointed out that ‘it is difficult to see how, without 
the complement of international legal obligations, this privatised voluntary process will be 
significantly more effective than other voluntary self-regulation regimes in regulating and 
enforcing the compliance of corporations with human rights norms.’166 Furthermore, they 
have criticized the scope of the corporate responsibility to respect, arguing that ‘corporate 
obligations should not only involve “negative” obligations to avoid harm but also include a 
“duty to fulfil”: obligations to contribute actively to the realisation of fundamental rights.’167 
Scholars have also pointed out that the SRSG failed to acknowledge that corporations may 
have an obligation to realize human rights based on their social function.168 At the same 
time, the SRSG’s views of the ambit of the corporate responsibility to respect, especially the 
human rights due diligence process, is sometimes ambiguous. At times, the SRSG seems to 
imply that corporations may have a positive duty to protect human rights against abuse by 
third parties, which is similar to the State obligation to protect under international human 
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rights law.169 Commentators have also criticized the practical approach to corporate human 
rights due diligence. 170 For instance, the absence of any template or indicative methodology 
for the production of accurate human rights due diligence makes it difficult for outsiders to 
evaluate a company’s respect of human rights, or for companies to learn and share best 
practice with each other.171 
 
At the same time, other authors have argued that the corporate responsibility to respect is an 
important improvement in comparison with what previously existed. Despite its soft-law 
nature, it may nonetheless produce ‘real legal consequences.’ 172  To date, the corporate 
responsibility to respect has been welcomed by various actors with competing interests and, 
on the long term, it may be universally accepted as an international standard.173 Moreover, 
human rights due diligence may create a direct duty of care upon businesses either where 
they have voluntary accepted to carry it out, 174  or where States have enacted statutes 
governing the human rights due diligence of companies. Furthermore, when properly 
conducted, human rights due diligence can help companies demonstrate that they took every 
reasonable step to avoid involvement in a human rights violation and provide protection 
against mismanagement claims by shareholders.175 The implementation of human rights due 
diligence also encourages companies to depart from an exclusive shareholder-based 
corporate governance model towards a more stakeholder-based model, which takes into 
account the interests of victims of business-related human rights abuse in the decision-
making processes of companies.176 
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4 Effective access to justice under international law 
Effective access to justice is an essential component of the system of protection and 
enforcement of various international regimes. For instance, when a human right is violated, 
access to justice is of fundamental importance for the injured individual. In particular, the 
respect and the protection of human rights can be guaranteed only by the availability of 
effective judicial remedies under both international and national law.177 Similarly, in order 
for international and national regimes of environmental law to be effectively protective, 
victims of environmental damage and NGOs must be able to bring a claim before a court 
and have access to various remedies, such as damages and restoration.  
 
This section explores the treatment of access to justice under international law. In particular, 
it focuses on how international law guarantees the effective implementation of specific 
aspects of access to justice relevant to transnational litigation against MNEs, such as access 
to courts, availability of remedies, and protection of victims’ procedural rights. This section 
places emphasis on the international and European frameworks governing human rights and 
the environment. It ends with an overview of the third pillar of the UNGPs on effective 
access to remedy. 
 
4.1 Access to justice under international human rights law 
International and regional treaties do not protect a general right to access to justice per se. 
Nonetheless, they may protect certain guarantees and rights related to access to justice, such 
as access to courts, availability of remedies, and various procedural guarantees during the 
legal proceedings. 178  In general, international and regional human rights instruments 
recognize the right to a fair trial in proceedings relating to criminal charges and to civil 
rights and obligations.179 For instance, Article 14 ICCPR enumerates a number of guarantees 
to ensure the fairness of criminal trials and the effective protection of persons charged with 
a criminal offence, such as the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
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to law. Article 7 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter)180 goes 
further by rendering the right to a fair trial applicable to all proceedings.181  
 
If the number of protected guarantees and rights and their treatment may vary from one 
instrument to another, some guarantees and rights may be commonly found amongst 
international instruments. For example, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary is 
an absolute guarantee and a crucial component of the right to a fair trial.182 The right to 
equality before courts and tribunals is also a key element of human rights protection and 
serves as a procedural means to safeguard the rule of law.183 It usually imposes a positive 
obligation on States to provide equal access to courts and procedural rights in their legal 
systems.184 An important feature of the right to equality before courts and tribunals, which is 
relevant in the context of transnational litigation against MNEs, is the principle of equality 
of arms. This principle means that the same procedural rights are to be provided to all the 
parties, unless distinctions are based on law and can be justified on objective and reasonable 
grounds.185 A number of international and regional human rights instruments also protect the 
right to an effective remedy by a competent national court or authority for acts violating the 
human rights they enshrine. 186  They usually impose on States a positive obligation to 
provide access to courts, and foresee the availability of remedies. Ultimately, States have 
the main responsibility to ensure the respect, protection, and fulfilment of rights related to 
access to justice. 
 
4.2 Access to justice in Europe 
In Europe, various regional bodies have adopted legal standards and case-law to ensure 
effective access to justice in situations of human rights abuse and environmental pollution. 
The EU, the CoE, and the UNECE are the most relevant organizations in this regard. 
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4.2.1 European Union 
Despite the lack of clarity of the access to justice concept in EU law,187 some observers have 
pointed out the European ‘constitutionalisation’188 of access to justice over the past years. In 
particular, recent changes in EU primary law have strengthened the role and the powers of 
the EU institutions to legislate in civil and criminal justice.189 Article 61(4) Treaty of Lisbon 
imposes a general requirement on the EU to facilitate access to justice.190 In particular, the 
EU must adopt measures to ensure effective access to civil justice191 and it may establish 
minimum rules to guarantee the rights of victims of crime.192 The EU has already used its 
new powers to improve specific rights related to access to justice. For instance, it recently 
enacted Directive 2012/29/EU (Directive on the rights of victims of crimes), 193  which 
establishes minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime. 
This instrument aims ‘to ensure that victims of crime receive appropriate information, 
support and protection and are able to participate in criminal proceedings.’194 As will be 
demonstrated later in this thesis, the Directive on the rights of victims of crimes is directly 
relevant to transnational criminal litigation against MNEs.  
 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon gave the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EU 
Charter)195 the same legal binding force as EU treaties.196 Therefore, the EU Charter ‘is not a 
text setting out abstract values, it is an instrument to enable people to enjoy the rights 
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enshrined within it when they are in a situation governed by Union law.’197 However, much 
uncertainty remains regarding the direct horizontal effect of the EU Charter or its exact 
scope of applicability in EU Member States.198 Article 47 EU Charter provides for the right 
to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, echoing Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.199 Article 47 
foresees that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. In addition, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law. Article 47 also provides for the right to legal advice and 
representation, and for legal aid when it is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.  
 
Given the new status of the EU Charter, the rights protected under Article 47 have become 
primary law that the EU and the Member States must respect when implementing EU law. 
Therefore, Article 47 could play a decisive role in improving the effectiveness of rights 
granted under European private law.200 In this regard, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
may play an increasing role in protecting the rights and guarantees enshrined in Article 47 
and, therefore, in promoting effective access to justice in the EU.201 The CJEU has already 
guaranteed effective judicial protection and access to legal aid on the grounds of Article 
47.202 However, restricted access to the CJEU by victims of rights abuse limits its role in 
protecting effective access to justice in the EU. 
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4.2.2 Council of Europe 
Article 6 ECHR protects the right to a fair trial in civil and criminal proceedings. Everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Article 6 also provides for a number of guarantees in 
the context of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, Article 13 ECHR protects the right to an 
effective remedy. Everyone whose rights guaranteed in the ECHR are violated must have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. In general, States Parties have a 
positive obligation to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction both rights.203 
 
The ECtHR has developed a progressive case-law in relation to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, 
which has had a positive impact on access to justice in contracting States.204 However, to 
date, the ECtHR has been of little help to plaintiffs in the context of transnational litigation 
against MNEs. In several cases, after exhaustion of domestic remedies, plaintiffs brought an 
application to the ECtHR on the grounds that States had violated their right to a fair trial 
under Article 6. However, the ECtHR rejected all applications without providing any 
justification.205 This lack of transparency contradicts the objectives and the nature of the 
ECHR. Furthermore, litigators have suggested that the ECtHR is missing the chance to 
clarify how Article 6 can play a role in securing access to justice in Europe to foreign 
victims of corporate abuse.206 
 
4.2.3 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe  
Access to justice has gained momentum in the field of international environmental law. The 
most obvious example is the Aarhus Convention,207 which is a ‘reflection of the procedural 
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dimension to the intersection between environmental and human rights.’208 Article 9 Aarhus 
Convention contains various provisions governing access to justice in environmental 
matters.209 In particular, Article 9(3) explicitly recognizes access to justice in horizontal 
relationships by providing that each State Party ‘shall ensure that, where they meet the 
criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members of the public have access to 
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and 
public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the 
environment.’ Such procedures must provide adequate and effective remedies, including 
injunctive relief, and must be fair, equitable, timely, and not prohibitively expensive.210 
Furthermore, States must ensure that information is provided to the public on access to 
administrative and judicial review procedures and they must consider the establishment of 
appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to 
access to justice.211  
 
The Aarhus Convention is widely ratified in Europe (including by France and the 
Netherlands) and has helped shape national environmental law and practice in European 
countries. 212  However, litigators have not used it in the context of transnational 
environmental litigation against MNEs. It remains to be seen how the Aarhus Convention 
can be a helpful instrument to improve access to justice in European countries by victims of 
corporate abuse in the future. 
 
4.3 Effective access to judicial remedy under the UNGPs 
The UN Framework acknowledges that victims of corporate abuse have sought remedy 
outside the State where the harm occurred, particularly through home State courts, but have 
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faced extensive obstacles (eg prohibitive costs, absence of legal aid, lack of legal standing 
for non-citizens, etc.). Matters are further complicated when they seek redress from a parent 
corporation for actions by a foreign subsidiary. As a result, these obstacles may deter claims 
and prevent victims from gaining access to remedy. 213  Therefore, the UN Framework 
formulates the need for effective access to remedies, through judicial and non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms.214 Importantly, effective grievance mechanisms play an important 
role in the State duty to protect, as ‘State regulation proscribing certain corporate conduct 
will have little impact without accompanying mechanisms to investigate, punish, and 
redress abuses.’215  
 
The UNGPs also provide that, ‘as part of their duty to protect against business-related 
human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, 
administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within 
their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.’ 216 
Furthermore, ‘States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic 
judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including 
considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a 
denial of access to remedy.’217 
 
Scholars and CSOs have been critical of the access to remedy pillar, holding that it is the 
weakest of the three pillars and that the SRSG has particularly neglected the formulation of 
access to judicial remedies.218 The UN Framework and the UNGPs do not provide clear 
solutions to address obstacles to gain access to remedy.219 Furthermore, they do not offer 
guidance to victims on the ways in which to gain access to courts in home States in the 
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context of transnational litigation against MNEs.220 As a way to respond to the various 
criticisms regarding the content of the third pillar, the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) received a mandate from the UNHRC to launch an initiative 
aiming to deliver guidance to States on the implementation of the UNGPs in the area of 
access to remedy.221 
 
5 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 assessed how public international law has responded to three main issues arising 
in the context of transnational litigation against MNEs, namely the home State obligations 
to regulate the extraterritorial impacts of its MNEs and to provide foreign victims with 
access to judicial remedies; MNE international obligations towards human rights and the 
environment; and the international rights and procedural guarantees that victims of 
business-related abuse should enjoy when seeking to gain access to judicial remedies.  
 
First, home States have the general obligation to protect the enjoyment of human rights 
against interference from MNEs. However, it remains unclear whether such an obligation 
extends extraterritorially, meaning whether home States have an obligation to protect 
against human rights violations by their MNEs in host countries. Furthermore, while it is 
accepted that States should not cause environmental damage on the territory of other States, 
it is unclear whether such an obligation applies extraterritorially to MNEs under their 
jurisdiction or control. Second, under the traditional State-centric approach to international 
law, non-State actors, such as MNEs, do not have international legal personality. Therefore, 
they have neither rights nor obligations, and they cannot be held liable for breach of 
international law standards, such as human rights or environmental standards. However, this 
view has been progressively challenged. For instance, international investment law 
recognizes that MNEs, as foreign investors, enjoy a number of rights. Moreover, human 
rights treaty bodies have occasionally accepted that specific non-State actors may have 
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international obligations in specific circumstances. Third, public international law 
recognizes a number of rights and procedural guarantees related to access to justice, which 
may prove useful to victims of corporate human rights abuse and environmental damage 
seeking to obtain remedies. However, in Europe, it remains unclear how various regional 
human rights and environmental instruments may provide opportunities for foreign victims 
to gain access to remedies at the domestic level. 
 
Finally, while the UN Framework and the UNGPs have clarified various issues at stake in 
the debate on business and human rights, scholars and CSOs have criticized the SRSG for 
‘sacrificing principle for the purposes of achieving agreements.’222 They have disagreed with 
the SRSG position on the respective human rights obligations of States and MNEs and 
criticized the weaknesses of the third pillar on access to remedies. Ultimately, the absence 
of adequate solutions provided by public international law to MNE human rights abuse and 
environmental damage in their transnational activities has strengthened demands for 
corporate accountability and access to justice at the domestic level. 
 
The next chapter of this thesis focuses on such demands in host States and assesses the main 
legal, procedural, and institutional opportunities and obstacles for victims of business-
related abuse to gain access to judicial remedies. 
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The origins of transnational litigation against multinational enterprises: access to 
justice and corporate accountability in host countries 
 
1 Introduction 
Transnational litigation against MNEs partly has its origins in governance and justiciability 
issues in host developing countries (host countries).1 Lawyers, CSOs, and scholars frequently 
argue that host countries cannot effectively control and regulate foreign MNEs. 2 
Furthermore, they hold that various legal, procedural, and institutional obstacles often restrict 
the ability of victims of business-related abuse to gain access to justice in host countries. 
Amongst the several hurdles regularly cited, one can find pervasive State corruption, 
inadequate liability regimes to deal with complex corporate structures, lack of judicial 
impartiality, or persecution of victims or witnesses.3 As a result, victims of MNEs would 
rarely be successful in lawsuits against companies in host States. 4  By contrast, home 
developed States (home States) would be more likely to have a legal and judicial system able 
to cope with complex liability claims involving MNEs or to offer large amounts of damages.5  
 
At the same time, some experts argue that recent litigation in some host countries 
demonstrates that foreign companies may be successfully sued for social and environmental 
damage.6 They suggest that human rights and environmental litigation against MNEs is not 
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solely a Western phenomenon and is also emerging in developing countries.7 For instance, 
since the 1990s, litigation against oil companies in Nigeria has quickly grown as a result of 
changes in tort law, including relaxed rules of evidence and higher financial compensation.8 
These changes have made it easier to effectively sue oil companies.9 Furthermore, South 
Africa has also seen the emergence of human rights and environmental litigation against 
MNEs.10 Over the last two decades, a number of class action lawsuits have been brought 
before the South African courts against mining companies for alleged health and security 
negligence. 11  Recently, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC), the 
leading information platform on business and human rights, suggested that litigation related 
to corporate human rights and environmental abuse is increasing in developing countries. A 
growing number of cases have been filed in various host countries, including Kenya, 
Myanmar, Peru, and Thailand, often in relation to land grabbing conflicts.12  
 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to assess the specific challenges that the legal, procedural, and 
institutional frameworks of host States have posed, or may pose, to victims of business-
related abuse trying to gain access to justice. It also considers the link between the existence 
of these challenges and the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs in home 
States. Chapter 3 starts with an examination of legal and procedural frameworks in host 
countries, focusing on liability regimes, procedural rules, and remedies. It then provides a 
description of the institutional framework in host countries, including the role of the State, 
                                                 
 
7
 See Jedrzej Frynas, ‘Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related Litigation in Nigeria’ (1999) 43 
Journal of African Law 121; Iman Prihandono, ‘Litigating Human Rights-Related Cases against TNCs in 
Indonesia’ (2012) 133 LAWASIA 113; Peter Muchlinski and Virginie Rouas, ‘Foreign Direct-Liability 
Litigation: Toward the Transnationalization of Corporate Legal Responsibility’ in Lara Blecher, Nancy Kaymar 
Stafford and Gretchen Bellamy (eds), Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts: New Expectations 
and Paradigms (American Bar Association 2014).  
8
 Frynas, ‘Social and Environmental Litigation’ (n 6) 371-372. In 1994, in the Shell v Farah case, claimants 






 In 2012, a South African law firm applied for a class action order on behalf of 15,000 former gold miners 
who had contracted silicosis. The litigation names 29 respondent gold mining companies. ‘About the Silicosis 
Litigation’ (Richard Spoor Inc Attorneys) <http://goldminersilicosis.co.za/about-the-silicosis-litigation/> 
accessed 30 November 2015. 
12
 ‘Annual Briefing: Corporate Legal Accountability’(Business and Human Rights Resource Center, January 
2015) 7-8 <http://business-humanrights.org/en/corporate-legal-accountability/publications/corporate-legal-
accountability-annual-briefings> accessed 30 November 2015. 
83 
 
the judiciary, and civil society. It finally weights the arguments for and against transnational 
litigation against MNEs in home States. 
 
The author was confronted with a number of methodological issues for this chapter. First, it 
should be noted that it is beyond the purpose of this chapter to conduct a detailed study of 
access to justice in host countries. Instead, it provides an overview of the main challenges 
that victims of corporate abuse have faced, or may face, when seeking to gain access to 
justice in host countries based on a review of the existing literature on the subject. In 
particular, the series of reports recently published by the International Commission of Jurists 
on access to justice for victims of corporate human rights abuse in various countries provided 
the main source of information.13 Second, the concept of ‘host countries’ is problematic from 
a comparative law perspective. The business-related abuses raised in past transnational 
claims against MNEs took place in host countries at different stages of economic (eg 
emerging/least developed economies), political (eg democratic/dictatorial; conflict-
affected/post-conflict societies), or social development. In addition, host countries belong to 
various groups of legal traditions (eg common law/civil law/mixed, etc.). Therefore, it seems 
inaccurate to assume that host States form a homogenous category and that a comparison of 
their legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks will extract a general truth about access 
to justice for corporate abuse in host countries. As a result, this chapter only aims to provide 
a basis for future in-depth research on the subject.  
 
2 Legal and procedural frameworks 
Scholars, litigators, and CSOs often point out the weaknesses of host countries’ legal and 
procedural frameworks in comparison with those of home countries. This section explores 
the main challenges relating to rules on liability, procedure, and available remedies existing 
in host States. 
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2.1 Liability  
Commentators often argue that host States have weak environmental and social regulation in 
place in order to attract foreign investment. Furthermore, they hold that host countries 
frequently lack an efficient legal system capable to deal with complex liability claims 
involving corporate groups or large groups of individuals.14  
 
The reports of the International Commission of Jurists demonstrate that host countries have 
progressively shaped a legal framework to protect human rights and the environment.15 This 
conclusion seems to apply not only to politically stable countries but also to fragile and 
conflict-affected States, such as the DRC. Many host countries are States parties to the main 
UN human rights treaties, including the ICCPR,16 and other regional treaties, such as the 
Banjul Charter. Some of the rights contained in these treaties have received legal protection 
under the constitution of some host States, such as Nigeria. In addition, some national 
constitutions contain innovative provisions, which may be useful in the context of litigation 
against companies. For example, the Indian Constitution contains some Fundamental Rights 
which are expressly guaranteed against non-State actors and are, therefore, directly and 
horizontally applicable against companies. 17  Furthermore, some host States have enacted 
legislation which may protect specific interests, such as the environment, or provide victims 
of business-related abuse access to remedies. For instance, following the Bhopal gas leak in 
1984,18 India enacted the Environment (Protection) Act in 1986 and the Public Liability 
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Insurance Act in 1991. 19  The latter provides immediate relief to victims of accidents 
involving hazardous substance.20  
 
However, the laws of some host countries may be framed to discourage litigation, making it 
particularly difficult for poor or vulnerable communities to use the legal system to protect 
their rights.21 Furthermore, the enforcement of legislation, which is crucial to ensure the 
protection of human rights and the environment, remains a major challenge in many host 
countries. 22  For instance, India has a rich corpus of environmental laws, but limited 
implementation of these laws restricts their efficacy.23 There are a number of reasons for such 
a situation: the absence of governmental willingness; the lack of resources; corruption and 
cultural indifference to the rule of law.24 Enforcement problems may be particularly acute in 
authoritarian regimes or poor countries. 25  When business-related abuse takes place in 
dictatorial regimes where the State itself also commits human rights violations, the 
application of legal standards to protect people and the environment against corporate abuse 
may be particularly limited. In Nigeria, successive military regimes prevented the protection 
of human rights despite the existence of constitutional guarantees since the independence of 
the country.26 
 
It has also been argued that host States may provide inadequate liability regimes to treat 
complex claims related to corporate human rights abuse and environmental damage. For 
instance, traditional Indian tort law and class action suits appear to be insufficiently 
developed to deal with mass torts.27 Other host States may not recognize the criminal liability 
of companies, such as the DRC, or may recognize criminal liability of companies for a 
                                                 
 
19
 ‘India’ (n 17) 19. 
20
 ibid 21. 
21
 Michael Anderson, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor 
People in LDCs’ (2003) IDS Working Paper 178, 16; ibid 58. 
22
 For example, in Indonesia, despite the existence of laws protecting human rights and the environment, their 
functioning and enforcement remain problematic. See Prihandono (n 15).   
23
 ‘India’ (n 17) 19. 
24
 ibid 48. 
25
 ‘Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations – The Democratic Republic of the Congo’ 
(International Commission of Jurists 2012) 26.  
26
 Amao (n 2) 113. 
27
 ‘India’ (n 17) 58. 
86 
 
limited number of crimes, such as Nigeria or India.28 Courts may also be reluctant to pierce 
the corporate veil or they may rigidly apply legislation or case-law related to corporate 
separate legal personality and limited liability, such as in Nigeria or India.29  
 
However, as this thesis demonstrates later, such criticisms should not be confined towards 
host States alone. Indeed, courts in home countries also struggle with the attribution of 
liability when faced with claims related to complex corporate groups and are often reluctant 
to pierce the corporate veil. Furthermore, many host countries are former colonies which 
continue to rely upon the legal architecture of some European home States built to support 
colonial rules.30 Many host countries have inherited specific legal principles or procedural 
rules from European countries (eg the DRC applies specific concepts of company law dating 
from Belgian colonisation)31 or share similar liability rules with them (eg India32 and Nigeria33 
share tort law based in common law with England). At times, the continued survival of 
colonial legislation is inconsistent with basic human rights.34 However, in some instances, 
courts in host States have actually departed from these legal rules to adopt a progressive 
approach, which meets contemporary liability needs.35 Finally, the existence of successful 
claims in which courts in host States have established corporate liability should not be 
ignored. For instance, in what appears to be a landmark case, the director of a mining 
company was recently found criminally liable for environmental pollution in South Africa.36 
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Over the last decade, an increasing number of host countries have enacted innovative 
legislation to impose mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) on corporations, 
including Indonesia, Mauritius, and India.37 In 2007, Indonesia enacted the Limited Company 
Liability Act No 40/2007, which created mandatory CSR for natural resources companies. 
Similarly, in 2009, Mauritius amended its legislation on income tax to introduce a binding 
requirement on CSR. Since 2012, registered companies must pay 2% of their profits towards 
programmes promoting the social and environmental development of Mauritius. 38  The 
introduction of such legislation is particularly innovative, as it allows the redistribution of 
corporate profits to programmes which benefit local communities and protect the 
environment. This is particularly welcome in host countries where poverty and the lack of 
infrastructure or basic services are recurrent issues.  
 
However, these provisions do little to hold companies which are involved in human rights 
abuse or polluting activities accountable. Furthermore, scholars have pointed out a number of 
challenges which threaten the effective enforcement of these laws and, ultimately, their 
potential benefits. For instance, in Indonesia, the lack of legislative or governmental 
guidance as to the meaning of mandatory CSR has created legal uncertainties regarding what 
is expected from companies.39  
 
2.2 Procedure 
The existence of protective legislation is of no use ‘unless it is harnessed to an effective 
procedural remedy which allows the litigant to actually bring the case before the court in 
good time and without excessive cost.’40 The socio-economic reality of many host countries, 
such as poverty or the lack of legal awareness,41 coupled with ill-adapted procedural rules or 
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excessive formalism in the application of procedural rules, often limits the opportunities for 
victims to gain access to justice in host countries. Furthermore, the lack of institutional skill 
and legal literacy (ie the ability to understand and use the legal system), reluctance to use the 
law, particularly among poor communities, difficulty in accessing legal information, and 
inadequate legal representation all contribute to access to justice issues in developing 
countries.42  
 
The rules governing legal standing in a number of host countries allow victims and, in some 
cases, their representatives and NGOs to bring claims against companies.43 In Indonesia, 
environmental NGOs have legal standing to bring civil claims to protect the environment. 
However, they can only request specific measures from the defendant, such as environmental 
rehabilitation, and cannot request compensation for potential damages.44 In the DRC, legally-
registered NGOs can potentially bring a civil claim for damages. Furthermore, victims may 
bring a civil claim as ‘partie civile’ in the context of criminal proceedings. However, the 
existence of collective redress mechanisms is still unclear.45 Some host countries, such as 
India and Nigeria, have embraced public interest litigation (PIL).46 This type of litigation 
liberalizes standing rules so that litigation can be brought on behalf of the poorest. 47 
Nevertheless, PIL focuses mainly on challenging governmental policies, thus providing 
limited remedy opportunities to victims.48 
 
High legal costs and limited, or non-existent, legal aid or pro bono services may prevent poor 
victims from gaining access to courts in host countries. 49  In India, the existence of ad 
valorem fees (fees in proportion to the value of the claim made) tend to prevent litigants from 
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bringing claims against companies in mass tort cases where court fees are very high.50 In the 
DRC, parties must pay court fees, including enforcement fees, which are often too high in 
proportion to their income. Moreover, the pro bono legal aid system in the DRC is often 
inoperative.51 In South Africa, as a priority, legal aid is allocated to criminal matters, meaning 
that victims of corporate abuse may not have access to legal aid.52 
 
Another challenge relates to rules governing evidence. In some countries, plaintiffs have no 
right to access evidence or information held by companies (eg Nigeria) while in others 
discovery or disclosure procedures provide limited opportunities to gain access to evidence, 
especially in comparison with the US or England (eg India).53 Finally, endemic delays in 
judicial process remain problematic in many host countries.54  
 
2.3 Remedies 
The extent of available remedies also influences the level of access to justice by victims of 
corporate abuse. It is crucial that they have access to various remedies, ranging from 
compensation to restitution or reparation, which are appropriately tailored to their needs. In 
some cases, the use of remedies other than damages, such as injunctions, may be necessary to 
prevent environmental pollution or the breach of individual rights.  
 
Recent examples have demonstrated that national courts in host countries are receptive to 
injunction requests.55 In India, courts have been willing to issue injunctions, including interim 
injunctions, against polluting companies to protect the environment. 56  At the same time, 
however, courts may favour the award of damages to victims or ignore requests for other 
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remedies to the detriment of other interests. For example, Nigerian courts have failed to order 
any injunctions to stop harmful gas flaring or to force MNEs to upgrade their facilities, 
despite the existence of legal provisions allowing them to do so. 57  They usually ignore 
remedies which can prevent environmental damage or restore damaged environment in the 
context of oil-related litigation.58 However, it should be pointed out that courts in some home 
countries also tend to favour the award of damages, even though other remedies may be 
available and more appropriate to the claim.  
 
In tort litigation, the award of damages may be lower in host countries in comparison with 
home countries (eg the US and England). Following the Bhopal gas leak, the Indian 
government chose to file a lawsuit against Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) in the US, and 
not in India, because damages awarded in tort actions in India were lower and not perceived 
to have much deterrent effect.59 Some scholars argue that the main motivation for claims 
against MNEs in the US and England is linked to plaintiff-friendly levels of damages. While 
Nigerian and South Africa cases have a prospect of obtaining millions of dollars in 
compensation, court cases in the US may potentially lead to compensation awards in the 
range of billions of dollars.60 Furthermore, the practice of imposing punitive damages is well 
developed in the US and is available in many common law countries.61 
 
The failure to enforce, or execute judgements, remains a major concern in many host 
countries.62 In Nigeria, a tort claim was brought against a number of oil companies in which 
plaintiffs alleged that the practice of gas flaring violated their constitutionally protected rights 
and environmental law. In 2005, the Federal High Court of Nigeria agreed with them and 
ordered that gas flaring stopped immediately. However, the oil companies failed to comply 
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with the ruling, which was never executed. Furthermore, the judge in this case was later 
transferred to a different court and the lead plaintiff in the action was detained. Such 
difficulties in enforcing judicial decisions make access to justice in Nigeria seems unlikely.63 
 
3 The institutional framework 
The institutional context is one of the major obstacles to access to justice for corporate abuse 
in host States. The relationship between host States and MNEs can be problematic, especially 
when authorities have little leeway or willingness to enact protective legislation or to 
promote corporate accountability. In addition, the lack of impartiality and independence of 
the judiciary in host States may prevent plaintiffs from being heard in a fair way. Finally, the 
presence of NGOs and lawyers concerned with human rights, environmental protection, and 
corporate accountability is crucial in helping victims bring claims against companies.  
 
3.1 The host State  
Scholars have pointed out that governments of developing countries are generally reluctant to 
sue MNEs on behalf of their citizens.64 As a result, injured citizens are usually left without a 
local remedy for the harm suffered.65 The relationship between MNEs and governments of 
host States may explain such situation. 
 
Attracting foreign investment is crucial for developing countries facing poverty and 
development issues. Scholars have explained that MNEs exploit regulatory differences 
between countries (‘regulatory arbitrage’), which results in an intense competition between 
States to attract foreign investment. 66  When host States enact laws to facilitate foreign 
investment, they may be reluctant to consider the impact of these laws on human rights and 
the environment and to impose regulation on MNEs. 67  Investment agreements between 
foreign investors and host States may contain stabilisation clauses, which address changes of 
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legislation in the host State throughout the period of investment.68 Stabilisation clauses may 
constrain the ability of host States to enact legislation to protect humans and the environment 
due to impacts on foreign investment. 69  Furthermore, under the current regime of 
international arbitration for foreign investment, rulings in host States upholding complaints 
brought by private parties may be attacked by the foreign investor before an arbitral tribunal 
on the grounds that they constitute wrongful interference with the investment.70 Ultimately, 
the obligations imposed by investment treaties on host States may, in practice, prevent them 
from fully complying with their international human rights obligations.71  
 
Host States may also have a substantial interest, or be actively involved, in the economic 
activity of the MNE. In some countries, the government may be excessively reliant on 
revenues from the extractive industry where the impact of MNE operations is the most 
obvious.72 For instance, Nigeria is one of the largest producers of crude petroleum in the 
world and its government relies excessively on oil revenue.73 Another example is the Chad-
Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project, a 1,070km underground pipeline designed to carry crude 
oil from Chad to Cameroon, which has raised a number of social and environmental 
concerns. It was executed through a joint venture involving the governments of Chad and 
Cameroon as well as foreign MNEs. The relationship between the host State and the 
company is, therefore, inextricable,74 as, for instance, involvement of host States in joint 
ventures can result in ‘a weak judiciary, which is dependent on the executive, even more 
biased in actions brought by ordinary citizens against the company.’75  
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Generally, corruption may limit access to justice in host countries.76 African CSOs identify 
corruption as ‘the primary challenge preventing improved access to justice and remedies.’77 
The illegal dumping of toxic waste in Ivory Coast in 2006 and the ensuing litigation in the 
Ivory Coast and in England against Trafigura, an MNE trading international commodities, 
illustrate this point.78 This case concerned the more general issue of transnational movements 
and the subsequent dumping of hazardous waste in developing countries. 79 In late 2005, 
Trafigura decided to buy a large amount of unrefined petroleum called coker naphtha as a 
cheap blendstock for fuels. Trafigura refined it through an industrial process called caustic 
washing carried on board of the Probo Koala ship, which sailed on charter for Trafigura. In 
June 2006, after several unsuccessful attempts to dispose of the waste produced during the 
caustic washing, Trafigura arranged to deliver the waste to the Amsterdam Port Services 
(APS) in the Netherlands. However, while unloading the waste, APS discovered that the 
waste was far more contaminated than it had thought and raised the price for treatment. 
Trafigura rejected the new quote and asked for the waste to be reloaded onto the Probo 
Koala. In August 2006, the Probo Koala illegally unloaded the shipment of toxic waste in 
the city of Abidjan. During the following days, more than 100,000 individuals experienced 
various physical symptoms, including headaches, skin irritations, breathing difficulties, and 
bleeding noses, and had to visit hospitals. The Ivorian authorities attributed at least 15 deaths 
to exposure to the waste.80 The Probo Koala incident resulted in one of the worst sanitary 
crises in the history of the Ivory Coast. In September 2006, two executives of Trafigura were 
charged with various criminal offences of Ivorian public health and environmental laws, as 
well as poisoning. A number of Ivorian port and customs officials were also charged with 
several offences. However, in February 2007, Trafigura and the government of Ivory Coast 
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reached a settlement, in which Trafigura agreed to pay the sum of CFA 95bn (approximately 
US $195m) and the government waived its right to prosecute against the company. Neither 
Trafigura nor its executives were brought to trial in Ivory Coast.81 
 
In November 2006, the British law firm Leigh Day filed a tort claim in the English High 
Court on behalf of 30,000 Ivoirians against Trafigura Ltd and Trafigura Beheer BV82 for 
damages relating to personal injury and economic loss caused by the dumping of toxic waste 
in Abidjan.83 In September 2009, the parties reached a confidential out-of-court settlement in 
which Trafigura agreed to pay approximately £30m to the claimants, which amounted to 
roughly £1,000 per claimant. 84  However, Trafigura did not admit liability for the harm 
alleged by the claimants. Following the settlement, Trafigura proceeded with the payment of 
financial compensation, but the claimants faced, and continue to face, major difficulties in 
receiving compensation. In November 2009, Leigh Day expressed its concern that the 
compensation paid by Trafigura to the Ivorian claimants had been misappropriated. 85  It 
appeared that the distribution process established by the claimants’ lawyers was derailed 
when a group of individuals, who falsely claimed to represent the claimants, secured control 
of the compensation fund through an Ivorian court order. 86  In 2012, an Ivorian police 
investigation concluded that £5m from the compensation fund had disappeared and 
recommended the opening of a case for fraud and misuse of funds.87 Various government 
officials were accused of embezzling funds intended for the victims, including the Minister 
Adama Bictogo who resigned over allegations that he had stolen £700,000 from the 
compensation fund.88 Some victims were still awaiting financial compensation in 2015.89 
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Host States may also be reluctant to launch criminal proceedings against MNEs or 
investigate business impacts on people and the environment when settlement agreements are 
concluded with MNEs. For instance, the government of Ivory Coast agreed that Trafigura 
would not be sued in Ivorian courts following the settlement agreement. However, Ivorian 
victims were never compensated for the harm they suffered. Similarly, after the Bhopal gas 
leak, UCC paid $470m to the government of India following an order of the Indian Supreme 
Court at the beginning of the 1990s. The Indian government had appointed itself the 
exclusive representative of the victims, which excluded individuals from bringing a claim 
against the MNE. Nonetheless, as of 1998, less than half of the sum had been paid to the 
victims. 
 
In some extreme cases, litigation in host countries has led to State violence against CSOs and 
victims.90 Some host States have even enacted legislation to criminalize any attempts by their 
own nationals to sue an MNE in the home State.91 This was the case in Papua New Guinea, 
which enacted the Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceedings) Act 1995. This 
law was designed to protect BHP Billiton, a mining MNE, from potential liability for 
environmental damage occurring in the Tedi River Basin. 92  In some cases, victims of 
corporate abuse have become the defendants, such as in Peru where protestors against a 
mining project were criminally prosecuted after being tortured and sexually abused on land 
where the concerned MNE was operating.93 
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3.2 The judiciary 
The lack of an independent and impartial judiciary is a major obstacle for victims of 
business-related abuse when seeking access to justice in host countries.94 This hurdle exists 
amongst host States, whether fragile, conflict-affected, or post-conflict, as well as countries 
with stable political regimes. 
 
The lack of independent and impartial judges is particularly problematic in fragile, conflict-
affected, and post-conflict States. In the DRC, the culture of corruption is present at all levels 
of the judiciary and has a serious impact on access to justice for Congolese citizens, 
especially for poor plaintiffs.95 The case against Anvil Mining, a Canadian mining MNE, in 
the DRC is an illustrative example.96 In October 2004, Congolese troops conducted violent 
reprisals for a minor uprising in Kilwa, a small town in the Katanga province. They engaged 
in summary executions, rape, torture, pillaging, and other human rights violations. It was 
alleged that Anvil Mining provided logistical assistance for the military actions.97 In July 
2005, the Congolese authorities launched a criminal investigation, following pressure from 
the UN Mission in the DRC, and Congolese and international CSOs. In December 2006, a 
criminal trial before the Military Court of Katanga started. Charges of war crimes and other 
violations of international humanitarian law were laid against a number of military personnel 
and employees of Anvil Mining. 
 
During the proceedings, international and national actors expressed concern about the 
impartiality of some of the judges and denounced pressure exerted on the public prosecutor.98 
Ultimately, the court acquitted all the defendants of all charges. It concluded that the deaths 
in Kilwa were caused by fighting between rebels and the military and did not amount to war 
crimes. The court further held that the employees of Anvil had been coerced and were not 
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liable for aiding and abetting the military.99 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
criticized the court’s verdict, as well as the military court’s jurisdiction over civilians in this 
case, adding that civilians should be tried before fair and independent civilian courts.100 As a 
result of the criminal proceedings in the DRC being unable to deliver justice, victims and 
their litigators subsequently launched proceedings in other forums, including Canada and 
Australia. Given the lack of judicial independence or impartiality in conflict-affected and 
post-conflict States, victims and other litigators may decide to launch proceedings directly in 
the home State of the MNE. The state of the Libyan judicial system after the Arab Spring of 
2011 partly motivated FIDH, a human rights NGO, to start legal proceedings against 
Amesys, a French IT company, directly in France.101 
 
Even in host countries that have a stable political regime, victims may still face courts which 
lack the independence and impartiality required by international law. Such was the case when 
Sherpa, a French NGO, insisted on bringing a case against Rougier, a French company, in 
France because endemic corruption prevented victims from gaining access to justice in 
Cameroon.102 The scarcity of resources allocated to the judiciary in some host countries also 
provides a fertile ground for corrupt practices.103 
 
However, the role of the judiciary in protecting human rights and the environment against 
corporate abuse in host countries should not be neglected. For instance, the Indian judiciary 
has played an active role in opening justice to poor and disadvantaged communities by 
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allowing the development of PIL.104 Furthermore, Indian courts have developed protective 
case-law on the grounds of the polluter pays and the precautionary principles. In Indonesia, 
the Constitutional Court has sought to influence the human rights conduct of MNEs. 105 
Likewise, the South African Constitutional Court has played a major role in the development 
of an innovative body of case-law to protect economic, social, and cultural rights. 106 
Litigation, supported by NGOs, has forced governments to implement their human rights 
treaty and constitutional obligations. In Nigeria, judges have progressively shown a greater 
flexibility in their interpretation of legal statutes and case-law which has, ultimately, 
benefitted victims in litigation against MNEs.107 For some authors, in the future, litigation 
against MNEs may actually rise in Africa due to the lack of governmental control over the 
judiciary.108 
 
Regional human rights courts may also play an important role in recognizing the negative 
impacts of corporate activities on human rights and the role of States in protecting human 
rights from interference by companies. The role of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) in the SERAC v Nigeria case 109  is an illustrative 
example. In 2001, the African Commission found that Nigeria had violated several rights 
contained in the Banjul Charter, including the right to a general satisfactory environment 
favourable to peoples’ development, the right to health, and the right to food, in the context 
of the activities of an oil consortium in the Ogoniland. Two human rights NGOs alleged that 
an oil consortium’s operations had caused the contamination of the environment where the 
Ogoni People lived, which resulted in environmental degradation, health problems, and 
human rights violations. The litigants raised the responsibility of Nigeria for providing legal 
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and military support to the oil consortium and for not monitoring the risks created by the oil 
activities. The African Commission found that, despite its obligation to protect persons 
against interference in the enjoyment of their rights, Nigeria facilitated the destruction of the 
Ogoniland by oil companies, which devastatingly affected the well-being of the Ogonis. It 
held that governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through appropriate 
legislation and effective enforcement, but also by protecting them from damaging acts that 
may be perpetrated by private parties. Amongst various measures, the African Commission 
called on Nigeria to prosecute officials and individuals involved in human rights violations; 
to ensure adequate compensation to victims, including relief and resettlement assistance to 
victims of government sponsored raids; to undertake a comprehensive clean-up of lands and 
rivers damaged by oil operations; and to provide communities likely to be affected by oil 
operations meaningful access to regulatory and decision-making bodies.110  
 
The SERAC ruling was a landmark in various respects. It represents the African 
Commission’s first articulation of the duties of African governments to monitor and control 
the activities of MNEs.111 In addition, this case shows the potential to bring a class action 
complaint before the African Commission and the added value of cooperation between 
national and foreign NGOs in formulating such a complaint.112 At the same time, the ruling’s 
value was limited in a few respects, including the inability to enforce the judgement, the 
African Commission’s restrictive interpretation of the requirement of exhaustion of local 
remedies, the length of the proceedings (five years), and the failure of the African 
Commission to give its views about the conduct of private companies. 
 
3.3 Civil society  
The existence of an active civil society, which includes NGOs and lawyers, is crucial in 
being able to bring claims against companies in host countries. For instance, Indian civil 
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society has been particularly active in challenging corporate activities in courts. 113 
Furthermore, litigation against oil companies in Nigeria has emerged partly as the result of 
campaigns by local pressure groups and the involvement of skilled lawyers.114  
 
However, the limited financial capacity and legal expertise of NGOs to support and 
participate in legal proceedings is also an obstacle to litigation against MNEs in host States. 
Often, local NGOs lack the capacity to collect evidence to document the impacts of particular 
business activities. They may also lack the adequate methodology and expertise to produce 
credible information which can be used as elements of proof before a court. 115 In some 
countries, NGOs are mainly located in urban areas, far from poor rural areas where corporate 
abuse occurs. The above may limit the value that NGO support can bring to victims seeking 
justice.116 Moreover, the scope of support that NGOs can provide to victims of corporate 
abuse is unevenly divided, often preventing access for those that need it most. Frynas 
describes how: 
 
[L]egal recourse is limited to groups from selected countries, those with NGO support 
and financial resources, and crucially depends on available legal remedies. Litigation 
in Africa has so far focused on a few countries – South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia – 
rather than the continent’s poorest States. […] In other words, litigation has a very 
uneven reach and does not always address some of the most serious corporate 
wrongdoings in society.117 
 
The existence of cause lawyers in the host country is also an important factor in the 
development of litigation against MNEs. For instance, the BHRRC recently built an 
international directory of lawyers working on cases of corporate human rights and 
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environmental abuse, which includes a growing number of lawyers from host countries.118 In 
South Africa, some of the cases against MNEs have been brought by a South African lawyer 
who had previously worked with Leigh Day, a London-based law firm which has challenged 
the use of English courts in the context transnational litigation against MNEs.119 Scholars 
have, however, questioned the motivations of some of the lawyers involved in litigation 
against MNEs.120 They argue that lawyers in Nigeria have been attracted by the ‘financial 
rewards of oil-related litigation.’ They ‘work for “free” for their client during the legal 
proceedings, but, in return, demand a high share of the compensation payment (which can be 
as much as half of it if the suit succeeds).’121 More generally, litigation patterns and the 
structure and costs of legal representation appear to exclude the poorest from courts.122 
 
4 Litigation in host States v home States 
The imperfect situation of access to justice in host States leads us to question whether it 
would be better to bring transnational litigation against MNEs in home countries. Such a 
question is regularly a subject of debate amongst scholars and CSOs.123 It is therefore crucial 
to assess the various arguments for and against litigation in home States versus host States. 
 
Transnational litigation against MNEs raises controversial questions about State sovereignty, 
economic and legal development in host States, and its efficiency in controlling corporate 
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behaviour and providing victims with access to remedy. Joseph argues that the extraterritorial 
application of home State regulations through litigation ‘arguably impinges on the 
sovereignty of the territorial State, and perhaps amounts to a form of “judicial imperialism” 
by developed countries over their former colonies.’124 Home States are, therefore, passing 
judgement over actions otherwise under the traditional jurisdiction of host States. 125 
Similarly, Baxi raises that governments and courts in host States may demonstrate defiant 
resistance to judgements in home States, as they perceive those judgements as a colonialist 
critique of legal and judicial systems in host States. Ultimately, Baxi calls for the 
‘decolonization of private international law.’ 126  Legal scholars have also argued that 
transnational litigation against MNEs stunts the development and capacity of host country 
legal systems to address rogue MNE activity.127 Newell suggests that, ‘as a development 
strategy, transnational litigation also does nothing to build up the capacity of legal systems in 
the South,’ even if cases brought in home State courts may establish important precedents for 
holding MNEs to account. 128  Furthermore, transnational litigation against MNEs may 
threaten foreign direct investment in host States and, therefore, impact detrimentally on 
economic growth and poverty alleviation in developing countries. 129  In addition, holding 
parent companies liable through litigation is not a necessary condition for the improvement 
of MNEs’ behaviour in the short run.130 Moreover, transnational litigation against MNEs in 
home countries may be disadvantageous on several grounds, including language, access to 
evidence, and participation of victims in the proceedings. As a result, plaintiffs may be better 
off suing in the host State,131 and various actors, such as businesses, international and host 
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State NGOs, and the EU, have argued that justice should be carried out in host countries 
instead of ‘remote justice.’132 
 
At the same time, transnational litigation against MNEs may be justifiable according to the 
interests of both home and host States, as well as from an ethical perspective. Muchlinski 
argues that the strict respect of the territorial principle of State jurisdiction, resulting from the 
exclusive sovereignty of each State over the territory it controls, may be restrictive of a 
State’s legitimate interest in the effective enforcement of its law against MNEs. 133  In 
particular, home States may have a legitimate interest to regulate parent companies which are 
directly involved in human rights or environmental abuse occurring in host countries. Joseph 
points out that it may sound unjust and immoral to permit corporations to escape liability for 
human rights abuses simply because the victim is from a developing country when an 
analogous victim in a developed country could expect redress.134 However, Seck argues that 
home State regulation would gain in legitimacy if its structure gave voice to subaltern local 
communities in host countries.135 Thus, ‘home State regulation, if structured in light of a 
principle of democratic inclusion, can be conceptualized as an example of transnational 
governance informed by the counter-hegemonic project of reading subaltern resistance into 
international law rather than as an illegitimate, if not imperialistic, exercise of unilateral 
jurisdiction.’136 Moreover, in some cases, host States have themselves been the proponents of 
transnational litigation against MNEs in home States. For instance, the Indian government 
supported the claims brought against UCC under the ATS in the US. 137  Transnational 
litigation against MNEs may become legitimate when host States victims cannot gain access 
to justice in their country at all. Similarly, a number of NGOs in Africa believe that litigation 
against the parent company in its home State is ‘the most effective tool to draw attention to 
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violations and guarantee compensation for victims.’138 Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 2, in 
an era of economic globalization, where MNEs have acquired a great deal of economic 
freedom and power through foreign direct investment, new demands on MNEs to exercise 
their power responsibly have emerged. Therefore, transnational litigation against MNEs 
appears necessary as the sharp end of corporate accountability.139 
 
5 Conclusions 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the picture of access to justice in the context of corporate abuse 
in host countries is more complex than what scholars and NGOs from home States have 
usually assumed. It should be noted that speaking generally of access to justice in host 
countries is problematic, since host States are socially, economically, and politically 
heterogeneous and their legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks vary considerably. 
 
Existing legal frameworks and judicial proceedings, especially in politically stable host 
States, provide some opportunities for justice that should not be underestimated. In various 
host States, existing laws and case-law offer potential avenues to hold corporate actors liable 
for human rights abuse and environmental damage, and to obtain remediation. Legal 
standards in host States may often be similar to those in home countries, especially when host 
States are former colonies of home States and were forced to adopt similar legal principles or 
substantive rules. Furthermore, following occurrences of corporate abuse and failed justice, 
some host States have started the necessary reforms to improve corporate accountability and 
access to justice. For instance, the 1984 Bhopal gas leak triggered legal reform in India, 
through the enactment of protective environmental and compensation legislation. In addition, 
a growing number of host States, such as Indonesia, Mauritius, and India, are adopting 
innovative laws to promote the role of companies in society. Host States may also have in 
place pioneering proceedings to raise environmental and human rights concerns, such as PIL 
in India, and courts may be sensitive to plaintiffs’ demands for justice.  
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However, victims face a number of obstacles to gain access to justice, which are mainly 
linked to poverty and corruption issues existing in host countries. Those hurdles are 
particularly exacerbated in fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict States. Obstacles 
include the unwillingness or incapacity of host State governments to regulate MNEs, the lack 
of legal enforcement, the absence of an independent and impartial judiciary, and limited 
execution of judgements. Furthermore, civil society actors may lack sufficient financial 
resources or legal expertise to support litigation against MNEs.  
 
Ultimately, further analysis, through empirical studies of access to justice in the context of 
corporate abuse in host States, is urgently needed to better understand the litigation 
opportunities offered by those countries, not only in the context of legal recourses available 
before State courts but also in the context of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
The next chapter gives an account of the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs 






The development of transnational litigation against multinational enterprises in Europe 
 
1 Introduction 
Transnational litigation against MNEs originally started in the US and England in the 1980s-
1990s. However, the nature of this litigation has been different in both countries. While 
victims of business-related human rights abuse and environmental damage brought general 
tort claims against parent companies of MNEs in England, in the US, they took advantage of 
the particularities of the ATS to challenge wrongful corporate conduct in foreign countries. 
In both countries, plaintiffs have nevertheless hoped to gain faster and easier access to 
financial compensation and to obtain the recognition of the harm suffered.  
 
By contrast, the practice of transnational litigation against MNEs in European civil law 
countries (eg France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland) appeared more 
recently.1 It has developed under various forms, including criminal, tort, and specialized civil 
law, as a result of litigators using various legal strategies. Nevertheless, in both common and 
civil law countries, the existence of a corporate accountability movement has been crucial to 
trigger the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs. In particular, cause lawyers 
and CSOs have supported these claims not only to help victims secure access to remedies but 
also to raise the visibility of MNE impunity towards human rights and the environment and 
to trigger legal and policy reform.  
 
Until recently, the US was considered to be the global leader in imposing corporate 
accountability for human rights abuses, as a result of the existence of the ATS and favourable 
litigation culture. However, the US courts started declining jurisdiction for extraterritorial 
corporate abuses and, in 2013, the US Supreme Court restricted the scope of the ATS by 
holding that the ‘presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and 
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nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.’2 As a result, experts suggest that Europe may 
become the preferred destination for transnational litigation against MNEs.3 
 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to provide an account of the development and the characteristics of 
transnational litigation against MNEs in Europe. Chapter 4 starts with a description of tort 
litigation against MNEs in England. It then describes transnational civil and criminal claims 
against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. These latter claims represent the main case 
studies of this thesis, and a more in-depth analysis of their legal and procedural aspects is 
provided in subsequent chapters. 
 
2 The emergence of tort litigation against MNEs in England 
In Europe, transnational litigation against MNEs started in England where the first tort claims 
were brought against parent companies of MNEs for harm occurring in the context of their 
subsidiaries’ activities in developing countries. These claims have alleged a variety of harms, 
such as asbestos-related occupational disease,4 oil spills and environmental pollution,5 toxic 
waste dumping,6 torture and ill treatment.7 According to Meeran, a British lawyer of Leigh 
Day, the London-based law firm that pioneered this type of litigation, the fundamental 
objectives of tort litigation against MNEs are twofold: to ‘provide a level of compensation to 
a victim which as much as possible reinstates the victim in the position that he or she would 
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have been in if the negligence had not occurred,’ and to ‘act as a deterrent against future 
wrongdoing by the perpetrator and others generally.’8  
 
This section provides an overview of the legal and procedural characteristics of transnational 
litigation against MNEs in England. 
 
2.1 Jurisdiction and the forum non conveniens doctrine 
Until 2005, plaintiffs wishing to bring tort litigation against MNEs for conduct committed 
abroad in the English courts had to deal with the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This 
doctrine ‘deals with the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed 
jurisdiction whenever it appears that the case before it may be more appropriately tried 
elsewhere.’9 The doctrine of forum non conveniens was originally invoked to protect the 
defendant from being harassed by a plaintiff choosing a genuinely inconvenient or 
inappropriate forum. However, ‘it has become in many instances a device for parent 
companies to escape liability for tortious acts committed abroad.’10 Critics of forum non 
conveniens point out that this doctrine is simply not adequate to treat claims that arise in 
modern transnational business patterns and that it limits accessibility of justice by victims.11 
The application of this doctrine in England proved problematic in the context of past claims 
against MNEs.12 
 
The significance of this obstacle was particularly visible in two cases raising personal 
injuries or death caused by exposure to uranium and asbestos: Connelly v RTZ Corporation 
Plc 13  and Lubbe v Cape Plc. 14  In both cases, the parent company applied for a stay of 
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proceedings on the grounds that the host State (Namibia and South Africa respectively) was 
the more appropriate forum to hear the claim. In Connelly, the English High Court granted a 
stay of proceedings on the grounds that Namibia was the appropriate forum for the trial of the 
action. However, the Court of Appeal later removed the stay15 and the House of Lords upheld 
the decision in 1997.16 As a result, the case remained under English jurisdiction. Similarly, in 
Lubbe, the proceedings were stayed on the grounds that South Africa was the more 
appropriate forum for the trial of the group action. Ultimately, the House of Lords removed 
the stay, refusing to decline jurisdiction in favour of South Africa.17 In both cases, the House 
of Lords found that a stay would lead to a denial of justice where the plaintiffs could 
demonstrate, through evidence, such as the absence of adequate funding or legal 
representation in the host State, that they would be unable obtain justice in the foreign forum. 
  
In the 2005 Owusu v Jackson case, 18  the CJEU foreclosed the use of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine in the English courts.19 The CJEU reasserted that Article 2(1) Regulation 
(EC) No 44/200120 was directly applicable to all EU Member States and that this rule could 
not be derogated from. In particular, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was deemed 
incompatible with the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters,21 as it would undermine the principle of legal 
certainty and the uniform application of European rules of jurisdiction. Consequently, since 
Owusu, forum non conveniens is no longer an issue in transnational cases against MNEs in 
England, thus leaving the way open for subsequent litigation.22 
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2.2 Corporate liability 
In the majority of claims against MNEs, plaintiffs have raised the tort liability of the parent 
company for its negligence arising from a breach of a duty of care.23 In England, judges have 
progressively accepted ‘to be more creative and influential in solving the legal problems 
before them, which enhances the chances of success for plaintiffs who are bringing novel 
legal arguments.’24 This was particularly visible in Guerrero25 and Chandler v Cape Plc.26 
 
In Guerrero, most of the plaintiffs were Peruvian farmers who had participated in a protest 
against the proposed development of a mine at Rio Blanco by Monterrico Metals Plc 
(Monterrico), a UK-based company, in the summer of 2005. During the protest, the plaintiffs 
were handcuffed and taken blindfold into the mining site where they were arbitrarily detained 
and tortured for three days by a task force of security guards and police forces.27 In 2009, the 
plaintiffs brought a tort claim before the English High Court against Monterrico and Rio 
Blanco Copper SA (Rio Blanco), its indirect Peruvian subsidiary. 28 They argued that the 
companies’ officers should have intervened to prevent the human rights abuse they suffered 
and were otherwise responsible for their injuries.29 With regard to the parent company, the 
plaintiffs pleaded that Monterrico instigated, aided, counselled the trespass to their persons, 
conspired to cause them injury, and conspired to use unlawful means. They also held that 
Monterrico owed them ‘a duty of care to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to 
them and [was] liable in negligence in respect of its own failures to ensure adequate risk 
management of the mines operation.’30 
 
In May 2009, Monterrico announced its intention to de-list from the Alternative Investment 
Market, a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange. This announcement raised concerns 
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that Monterrico might transfer assets out of England, which would have prevented the 
plaintiffs from collecting damages had their action been successful. The claimants applied for 
a freezing injunction, which was granted by the English High Court in June 2009. Monterrico 
was restrained from disposing of assets to an extent that would leave it with less than £7.2m 
in England. This freezing injunction was made permanent for £5m in October 2009. 31 
Although the injunction did not deal directly with corporate liability, the English High Court 
showed inclination to consider liability claims against the companies, in particular 
Monterrico, for the abuse suffered by the plaintiffs. In particular, Mrs Justice Gloster found 
that the claimants had a ‘good arguable case’: 
 
The alleged facts as to Monterrico’s responsibility and participation in the alleged 
brutality against the protesters would appear to be sufficient to found a cause of 
action. On any basis the facts are keenly disputed to such an extent that it is 
impossible for me to resolve them in any meaningful way on an interim application. 
[…] the evidence in relation to the participation, or part played, by Monterrico’s 
employees or officers, whether actually at the mining site or behind the scenes, is not 
so clear cut in my judgment as to exonerate the company conclusively from any legal 
responsibility for the brutality which it appears occurred as a result of the conduct of 
the police.32 
 
In July 2011, a few months before the start of the trial, Monterrico offered to compensate the 
claimants and to cover their legal costs in return for the withdrawal of their claims. However, 
Monterrico did not admit liability for the harm suffered by the claimants. Ultimately, there 
was no judgement to establish the liability of Monterrico or Rio Blanco. Nonetheless, this 
case is significant for demonstrating that transnational claims against MNEs have 
progressively gained credibility in England. In particular, the English courts appear to be 
open to hold parent companies liable for harm arising out of their subsidiary’s activities in 
host countries. 
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Chandler opened the door to liability of parent companies when they breach their duty of 
care towards their subsidiaries’ employees. Chandler was employed by Cape Building 
Products Ltd (Cape Products) in England between 1959 and 1962. Cape Products was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Cape Plc that manufactured asbestos products. In 2007, 
Chandler discovered that he had contracted asbestosis, as a result of exposure to asbestos 
during his employment with Cape Products. However, by that time, Cape Products no longer 
existed and its remaining insurance policies excluded asbestosis. Therefore, Chandler 
brought a claim for damages against the parent company Cape Plc for breach of its duty of 
care towards Chandler. In 2011, the English High Court ruled that Cape Plc was liable to 
Chandler on the basis of the common law concept of assumption of responsibility.33 Applying 
the three-stage test in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman (1990) for determining whether the 
situation gives rise to a duty of care, the High Court found that Cape Plc owed, and had 
breached, a duty of care to Chandler. First, the defendant should have foreseen the risk of 
injury to the claimant. Second, there was sufficient proximity between Chandler and Cape 
Plc. Third, it was fair, just, and reasonable for a duty of care to exist. Cape Plc appealed 
against that decision. 
 
In 2012, the Court of Appeal upheld the English High Court’s decision and found that Cape 
Plc owed a direct duty of care to the employees of Cape Products. 34  Given Cape Plc's 
superior knowledge about the nature and management of asbestos risks, it was appropriate to 
find that Cape Plc assumed a duty of care either to advise Cape Products on what steps it had 
to take in light of the knowledge then available to provide those employees with a safe 
system of work or to ensure that those steps were taken. In this case, Cape Plc failed to 
advise on precautionary measures.35 Importantly, the Court of Appeal provided guidance on 
the conditions under which a parent company could be held liable for harm suffered by its 
subsidiaries’ employees: 
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In summary, this case demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances the law may 
impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s 
employees. Those circumstances include a situation where, as in the present case, (1) 
the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the 
parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health 
and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as 
the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought 
to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that 
superior knowledge for the employees’ protection. For the purposes of (4) it is not 
necessary to show that the parent is in the practice of intervening in the health and 
safety policies of the subsidiary. The court will look at the relationship between the 
companies more widely. The court may find that element (4) is established where the 
evidence shows that the parent has a practice of intervening in the trading operations 
of the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues.36 
 
Chandler is a landmark case in the development of parent company liability for the harm 
caused by their subsidiaries in the context of corporate group activities. However, in this case, 
both the parent company and the subsidiary were registered in England and the subsidiary’s 
activities took place in England. Therefore, it remains uncertain whether the reasoning in 
Chandler would apply to a situation where a parent company is registered in England while 
the subsidiary is registered in a different country. While waiting for a case to raise such an 
issue in England, the first interpretation of Chandler was given in 2013 by the District Court 
of The Hague in the Netherlands in the case against Shell, an energy MNE.37 As will be seen 
in Chapter 6, the Dutch Court refused to apply the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in 
Chandler to situations where the subsidiary is established in a different country than the 
parent company. 
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Flexible rules on access to evidence and group action have contributed to make England an 
attractive forum for transnational claims against MNEs. Nonetheless, the high costs of these 
lawsuits remain problematic, and recent reforms regarding legal aid and cost-recovery are 
likely to reduce accessibility of English courts by victims of business-related abuse in host 
countries. 
 
2.3.1 Access to evidence 
Plaintiffs must be able to prove that the parent company had a role in causing the harm to 
have a cause of action for liability against the parent company. However, MNEs are often in 
possession of documents containing important evidence. Therefore, it is crucial for plaintiffs 
to be able to gain access to such material. In England, despite the existence of a number of 
restrictions, disclosure rules have proved to be advantageous to plaintiffs. 38 Furthermore, 
English courts have showed inclination to order disclosure of documents needed by 
claimants. For instance, in Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd,39 the English High 
Court held that if no orders were to be made requiring the MNE to produce documents, ‘there 
[was] a very great risk that the claimants [would] be contesting the jurisdiction issue at an 
unfair disadvantage and that must be addressed.’40 As a result, the English disclosure system 
has been the most favourable to plaintiffs in transnational litigation against MNEs in Europe 
to date. It has allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate the parent company’s role in the cause of the 
harm. Importantly, it has reduced the inequality of arms between the parties by improving 
both plaintiffs’ opportunities to put pressure on MNEs to reach a fast resolution of the 
dispute, and their capacity to negotiate strategically. Furthermore, when coupled with the 
existence of transnational activist networks working on corporate accountability issues, the 
English disclosure system has benefitted plaintiffs in other European countries.  
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In Bodo Community v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd case,41 in April 
2011, Leigh Day filed a tort claim before the English High Court on behalf of a Nigerian 
fishing and farming community known as the Bodo City community (Bodo community) 
against Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC). The claimants 
sought compensation for the harm they suffered following two successive oil spills, as well 
as an extensive clean-up of the oil spills and environmental remediation. During the English 
proceedings, SPDC was required to disclose a number of documents. As will be seen later in 
this thesis, this had consequences for the proceedings against SPDC and the parent company 
of Shell in the Netherlands where Nigerian plaintiffs have subsequently raised the 
information disclosed in England as evidence before the Dutch courts.42 
 
2.3.2 Group action 
The availability of collective redress in England has allowed large numbers of victims of 
corporate abuse to seek justice. For instance, 30,000 claimants brought a group action in 
Motto43 while 15,600 plaintiffs filed a tort claim in Bodo. Court procedural rules usually 
determine the process for seeking collective redress and two routes are possible: 1) the 
representative action; and 2) the Group Litigation Order (GLO).44 In most claims against 
MNEs, litigants have favoured GLO, which has various advantages. GLO is flexible, obliges 
the lawyer representing the lead claimants to take instructions from all members of the group, 
and it binds those who ‘opt-in’ by decisions made for the group. However, GLO requires 
considerable negotiation between lawyers of each party to the case and courts have a lot of 
discretion in deciding whether to allow it.45 Furthermore, in Motto, the MNE required that a 
minimum of 75% of the claimants accept the terms of the settlement before it could become 
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enforceable.46 This practice can pressure claimants into accepting settlements with which 
they disagree. 
 
2.3.3 Litigation costs 
The transnational nature of claims against MNEs and the complexity of the legal issues at 
stake render this type of litigation particularly costly for plaintiffs. In particular, evidence 
gathering and representation of large groups of claimants exacerbate litigation costs and 
lawyers’ fees. Excessive litigation costs raise a number of issues relating to accessibility of 
English courts by poor foreign victims. For instance, they generally deter law firms from 
engaging in transnational claims against MNEs. 
 
In Motto, Leigh Day undertook to represent 30,000 claimants on a conditional fee basis, also 
known as a ‘no win no fee.’ This means that, in general, if the plaintiff loses, the lawyer will 
recover no fees, and, if the plaintiff wins, the lawyer will claim fees, but they will almost 
always be paid by the defendants. 47 When acting on such a basis, lawyers can charge a 
‘success fee,’ which is capped at a maximum of 100% of the lawyer’s ordinary fee, and the 
success fee is treated as part of the recoverable costs if the defendants have to pay the 
claimant’s costs.48 Moreover, Leigh Day also took on the full costs of evidence gathering in 
Ivory Coast.49 Ultimately, the group action took a huge amount of logistical organization and 
required a large sum of financial resources.50 In the out-of-court settlement, Trafigura agreed 
to pay the costs of the claimants.51 Nonetheless, a new judicial battle took place when Leigh 
Day presented a £105m bill to Trafigura for the entirety of its costs and sought a 100% 
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success fee.52 Trafigura contested the bill, which, it found, was ‘staggeringly high.’53 The 
costs claim also stirred controversy amongst lawyers and litigation experts.54 Leigh Day came 
under attack for unusually high costs, seeking what was perceived as a huge success fee, and 
for lack of costs management.55 In October 2011, the Court of Appeal upheld an earlier ruling 
which had reduced Leigh Day’s success fee from 100% to 58%. 56 However, the parties 
reached a confidential agreement in December 2011.57 
 
The recent entry into force of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 (LASPO) is likely to affect funding in transnational claims against MNEs. To date, 
Leigh Day was able to fund its cases based on its ability to recover the full legal costs, 
success fees, and litigation insurance premiums from the defendant. However, LASPO has 
generally eliminated the recovery of success fees and insurance premiums.58 Furthermore, 
legal fees for a successful claimant will now have to be paid out of the claimant’s damages 
and they cannot exceed 25% of the damages. 59  Finally, it introduced a new test of 
proportionality in costs assessment. Lawyers and NGOs have contended that LASPO is 
likely to restrict funding in transnational claims against MNEs, making claims against MNEs 
even less attractive for other law firms.60 In 2011, Ruggie, in his capacity as SRSG, also 
wrote to the UK Minister of Justice to express his concerns that the proposed reforms would 
‘constitute a significant barrier to legitimate business-related human rights claims being 
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brought before UK courts in situations where alternative sources of remedy are 
unavailable.’61 
 
2.4 Out-of-court settlements 
In England, a large number of transnational claims against MNEs have ended in out-of-court 
settlements between claimants and MNEs. 62  Settlements are generally hailed by cause 
lawyers, as they are said to offer a faster solution to lengthy and complex disputes, provide 
plaintiffs with financial compensation, and limit litigation costs. However, the practice of 
out-of-court settlements in England demonstrates that they can be difficult to negotiate and 
implement. Furthermore, they do not ensure that victims have access to remedy and they 
commonly lead to a denial of liability by MNEs. Chapter 8 of this thesis provides a detailed 
analysis of the issues arising out of out-of-court settlements. 
 
3 Description of transnational claims against MNEs in France and the Netherlands 
Over the last decade, transnational litigation against MNEs has significantly grown in other 
European countries, including France and the Netherlands. The emergence of cause lawyers 
and NGOs specifically dedicated to corporate accountability issues has contributed to such 
developments. In particular, these actors have demonstrated considerable ability and 
flexibility to use various legal strategies to hold the parent companies of MNEs to account. 
As a result, noteworthy legal developments have taken place, particularly in relation to court 
jurisdiction and liability of parent companies. However, plaintiffs continue to face a number 
of obstacles (eg the prosecution’s reluctance to initiate criminal proceedings against MNEs; 
restricted access to evidence). 
 
This section describes the proceedings in the various transnational cases against MNEs which 
have taken place in France and the Netherlands to date. An analysis of the legal and 
procedural aspects of these cases is provided in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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3.1 Case studies in France 
Transnational litigation against MNEs in France has been noticeable in recent years. French 
litigation is characterized by the diversity of proceedings used by cause lawyers to hold 
parent companies of MNEs to account, and the nature of the successes achieved to date.  
 
3.1.1 Illegal deforestation in Cameroon (Rougier)  
In the Rougier case, in March 2002, a group of Cameroonian villagers and les Amis de la 
Terre, with advice from Sherpa, a French NGO, initiated criminal proceedings against 
Rougier (a French timber company), SFID (its Cameroonian subsidiary), and their executive 
directors by bringing a civil action (plainte avec constitution de partie civile) before the 
examining magistrate (juge d’instruction) for Paris.63 The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered 
harm from the destruction of their agricultural resources and source of income after SFID had 
illegally cut down trees and built roads on their plantations. They accused the defendants of 
various criminal offences, including criminal destruction of property, forgery and use of 
forgery (faux et usage de faux), fraud, receiving (recel), and corruption of governmental 
officials. In particular, they alleged that Rougier and its directors had committed receiving64 
by accepting dividends from SFID which resulted from the commission of the illegal acts. 
 
In June 2003, the examining magistrate dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed this 
decision before the Paris Court of Appeal, which upheld the dismissal65 on the grounds that, 
pursuant to Article 113-8 French Criminal Code, the prosecution of misdemeanours could 
only be instigated at the behest of the prosecutor. In addition, pursuant to Article 113-5 
French Criminal Code, there could be no proceedings in France since there had not been any 
final judicial decision in Cameroon.66 Prior to the proceedings in France, the plaintiffs had 
sought to initiate criminal proceedings in Cameroon. However, in August 2000, the 
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prosecutor in Cameroon had dismissed their complaint. The plaintiffs lodged an appeal with 
the French Court of Cassation, which dismissed it in April 2005.67 
 
3.1.2 Forced labour in Myanmar (Total) 
In the Total case, in August 2002, a group of Burmese villagers, with advice from Sherpa, 
initiated criminal proceedings against three executive directors of Total, a French oil and gas 
MNE, by bringing a civil action before the examining magistrate for Nanterre. The claim was 
related to the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline, a natural gas development project in 
Myanmar operated by various foreign and national companies, including Total. The project 
was, and continues to be, plagued by various human rights abuses, including forced labour, 
land confiscation, forced relocation, rape, torture, and murder.68 The plaintiffs faced a major 
obstacle to finding an appropriate legal basis for the human rights abuses they had suffered. 
Indeed, at the time of the facts, the French Criminal Code did not criminalize forced labour, 
in breach of France’s obligations under international human rights law. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs had to find alternative legal bases. Ultimately, they alleged the defendants were 
criminally liable for abduction and illegal confinement (séquestration). Although it was not 
directly concerned by the proceedings, Total contested the admissibility of the civil action. It 
requested the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that illegal confinement did not 
include forced labour. It also invoked the application of a statute of limitations. 
 
In May 2004, the prosecutor requested the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the 
facts did not qualify as criminal offences under French law. Nonetheless, the examining 
magistrate rejected the prosecutor’s request and continued the judicial enquiry. The 
prosecutor appealed this decision before the Versailles Court of Appeal, which dismissed the 
appeal and ordered the continuation of the judicial enquiry in June 2004. The Court of 
Appeal held that the prosecutor did not have jurisdiction to request the dismissal of the case 
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at this stage. However, in November 2005, the plaintiffs and Total settled out-of-court. The 
examining magistrate subsequently dismissed the complaint in June 2006.69 
 
3.1.3 International law violations in Palestine (Alstom & Veolia)  
In the Alstom case, in February 2007, Association France Palestine Solidarité (AFPS) and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) brought a civil claim against Alstom and Veolia, 
two French energy and transportation MNEs, before the Nanterre Regional Court (Tribunal 
de grande instance).70 The plaintiffs sought the annulment of various concession contracts 
concluded between Israel and Citypass, a joint venture in which Alstom and Veolia 
participated, to build a light rail system in the occupied West Bank. They also requested an 
injunction prohibiting the defendants from performing the contract and claimed damages. 
The plaintiffs argued that the contracts were illicit because they related to a project which 
violated international law, including international humanitarian law conventions and 
customary international law.71 
 
On 15 April 2009, the Nanterre Regional Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the 
claim.72 However, it rejected that PLO had legal standing as well as the plaintiffs’ request to 
force the defendants to disclose a number of documents. The defendants appealed this 
decision, but the Versailles Court of Appeal 73  and the French Court of Cassation 74 
successively upheld it. The proceedings on the merits nevertheless continued. However, on 
30 May 2011, the Nanterre Regional Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim,75 and the Versailles 
Court of Appeal76 and the French Court of Cassation successively upheld the ruling. Finally, 
the plaintiffs lodged an application with the ECtHR, which was rejected in April 2015. In 
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parallel to these civil proceedings, AFPS initiated proceedings before the Paris 
Administrative Court (Tribunal administratif) in which it raised the liability of the French 
State for support provided to the two MNEs. However, the Administrative Court and, later on, 
the French Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’État) rejected the claim.77 
 
3.1.4 Labour rights abuse in Gabon (COMILOG)  
In the COMILOG case, COMILOG is a Gabonese mining company created in 1953 when the 
country was under French colonial rule. It partly belongs to Eramet, a French mining MNE. 
COMILOG was in charge of the exploitation of manganese in Gabon, and its transportation 
to the Republic of Congo, until 1991 when it suddenly stopped its activities in the Republic 
of Congo following a transportation accident. More than 1,000 Congolese employees were 
left without employment and did not receive any financial compensation from COMILOG. In 
2003, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and COMILOG reached an agreement to compensate 
the former employees. However, none of the employees received any compensation. 
 
In November 2007, with Sherpa’s legal advice, around 900 employees filed a civil claim 
before the Paris Labour Court against COMILOG and some of its subsidiaries, including 
COMILOG International and COMILOG France. The plaintiffs alleged that COMILOG had 
dismissed them without just and sufficient cause and claimed damages. They also alleged 
they had been unable to obtain justice in their country. Moreover, they requested that 
COMILOG France and COMILOG International produced a number of documents.78 
 
On 26 January 2011, the Paris Labour Court (Conseil de prud'hommes) ruled it was 
incompetent to hear the claims and rejected that the plaintiffs had faced a denial of justice in 
their own country.79 However, on 20 June 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned this 
judgement and recognized that the French courts had jurisdiction to hear the claims against 
COMILOG France and COMILOG International while postponing its decision regarding 
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COMILOG. 80  In addition, it ordered COMILOG France and COMILOG International to 
disclose a number of documents. On 28 January 2015, the French Court of Cassation upheld 
the Court of Appeal’s ruling.81 On 10 September 2015, in a landmark ruling, the Paris Court 
of Appeal accepted to hear the claims against COMILOG and condemned the Gabonese 
company to pay financial compensation to around 600 plaintiffs who proved that they had 
been unable to obtain justice in the Republic of Congo.82 
 
3.1.5 Occupational disease in Niger (AREVA)  
In the AREVA case, in October 2010, the family of Serge Venel brought a civil claim for 
damages against AREVA, the French parent company of a nuclear energy MNE, and 
AREVA Nc, its subsidiary, before the Melun Social Security Tribunal (Tribunal des affaires 
de la sécurité sociale or TASS).83 The plaintiffs alleged that Venel was exposed to dangerous 
levels of radioactive substances while working at the Nigerien uranium mine of COMINAK, 
a joint venture between AREVA Nc and the State of Niger, between 1978 and 1984. As a 
result of exposure, Venel died of a lung cancer in 2009. Although COMINAK was the 
contractual employer of Venel, the plaintiffs argued that AREVA Nc, as the co-employer of 
Venel,84 knew the risk Venel was exposed to and failed to act according to its duty to protect 
him, for example by ensuring Venel wore a mask or other types of protection. The 
defendants held the claim was inadmissible because there was no legal relationship between 
COMINAK, and AREVA Nc and AREVA. Furthermore, they claimed that Nigerien law, and 
not French law, was applicable to the dispute, because Nigerien law governed the 
employment contract between Venel and COMINAK, which had been furthermore enforced 
in Niger. 
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On 11 May 2012, the TASS accepted that AREVA Nc was Venel’s co-employer and was 
liable for gross negligence (faute inexcusable).85 Furthermore, it considered AREVA Nc’s 
voluntary commitments in the field of CSR to find the company liable. However, on 24 
October 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned the judgement.86 It rejected that AREVA 
Nc was Venel’s co-employer and held that, as a result, only COMINAK could be held liable. 
Moreover, it rejected that AREVA Nc’s voluntary commitments could demonstrate the 
company’s liability. On 22 January 2015, the French Court of Cassation upheld the ruling of 
the Court of Appeal.87 
 
3.1.6 Other cases 
Overall, around a dozen claims alleging human rights abuse or environmental damage have 
been brought against MNEs in France. While the French courts have heard some of these 
claims, many of them have been dismissed during the early stages of the proceedings. This 
section gives an overview of claims which were dismissed at an early stage or have known 
limited progress to date. 
 
3.1.6.1 Toxic waste dumping in Ivory Coast (Trafigura) 
Following the toxic waste dumping in Abidjan,88 in June 2007, FIDH, a French NGO, filed a 
criminal complaint on behalf of a group of Ivorian victims against Claude Dauphin 
(Trafigura’s chairman) and Jean-Pierre Valentini (a senior manager) with the prosecutor for 
Paris. 89  FIDH’s complaint alleged administration of noxious substances, manslaughter, 
corruption, and criminal offences related to transboundary movements of hazardous waste.90 
 
In April 2008, the prosecutor declined to investigate further after having conducted a 
preliminary enquiry. According to NGO reports, this decision was made on various grounds, 
including the lack of lasting attachment to the French territory of Dauphin and Valentini, the 
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fact that the companies involved were established outside the French territory, and the 
existence of simultaneous criminal proceedings in Ivory Coast and the Netherlands.91 While 
FIDH appealed this decision, no further progress has been made on this case.92 
 
3.1.6.2 Illegal deforestation & war crimes in Liberia (DLH) 
In the DLH case, in November 2009, various French and British NGOs (Sherpa, Greenpeace 
France, les Amis de la Terre, and Global Witness) and a Liberian national filed a criminal 
complaint with the prosecutor for Nantes against DLH France and DLH Nordisk A/S, two 
companies of the timber MNE DHL.93 The plaintiffs argued that, between 2001 and 2003, the 
companies purchased, imported into France, and distributed across Europe timber from 
Liberian companies which were directly involved in human right abuse and war crimes under 
Charles Taylor’s regime. The complaint alleged influence peddling and destruction of 
property. 
 
In 2010, the prosecutor opened a preliminary enquiry. However, in February 2012, the case 
was transferred to the prosecutor for Montpellier where DLH France had the head office of 
its second factory. In February 2013, the prosecutor dismissed the claim for lack of evidence. 
In March 2014, the plaintiffs initiated new criminal proceedings by bringing a civil action 
before the examining magistrate for Montpellier against the companies. 94  The case was 
pending at the time of writing. 
 
3.1.6.3 Misleading commercial practices in France (Samsung & Auchan) 
In two cases, a group of French CSOs brought criminal proceedings against MNEs for 
misleading commercial practices. First, in February 2013, three CSOs (Sherpa, Peuples 
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solidaires, and Indecosa-CGT) filed a criminal complaint against Samsung France, the 
French subsidiary of the South Korean MNE Samsung, with the prosecutor for Bobigny. This 
complaint was brought following a report of China Labor Watch describing labour rights 
abuse in Samsung’s factories in China. 95  Second, in April 2014, three NGOs (Sherpa, 
Collectif éthique sur l’étiquette, and Peuples solidaires) filed a criminal complaint against 
Auchan, a French retailing MNE, with the prosecutor for Lille.96 This complaint was brought 
following the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh in April 2013.97 In both cases, 
the CSOs alleged that the companies had deceived French consumers by providing false 
information about the working conditions in their factories. They also accused the companies 
of violating their voluntary commitments in the field of CSR. In both cases, the prosecutor 
opened a preliminary enquiry, but the complaints were dismissed in 2015. However, the 
plaintiffs in the second case initiated new criminal proceedings by bringing a civil action 
directly before the examining magistrate for Lille in June 2015.98 The case was pending at the 
time of writing. 
 
The characteristics of these two complaints differ from those of other transnational claims 
against MNEs. First, the legal proceedings did not aim at providing financial compensation 
to victims. Instead, the plaintiffs were CSOs seeking to challenge the veracity of MNEs’ 
statements with regard to their social commitments and to demonstrate the limits of CSR 
instruments in regulating MNEs. Second, the plaintiffs sought to pressure the MNEs to 
change their behaviour vis-à-vis victims. This was particularly visible in the case against 
Auchan, as, until the complaint, the MNE had refused to participate in a financial fund 
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created to compensate the victims of the Rana Plaza collapse. Third, the complaints also 
raised visibility around parallel corporate accountability campaigns, such as the Bill relating 
to the duty of care of parent and controlling companies (French Bill on duty of care),99 which 
was, at that time, before the French Parliament. Fourth, the complaint against Samsung did 
not target the South Korean parent company, but the French subsidiary. This demonstrates 
the adaptive capacity and legal creativity of French CSOs to hold MNEs accountable. 
 
3.1.6.4 Protection of privacy & torture in Libya (Amesys) 
In the Amesys case, in October 2011, FIDH and LDH filed a criminal complaint against 
Amesys, a French IT company, with the prosecutor for Paris. They alleged that Amesys was 
complicit in acts of torture, prohibited under French law and international law, committed by 
the Gaddafi regime before the Arab Spring. The NGOs accused Amesys of providing the 
Libyan government with software, equipment, and assistance, which subsequently led to the 
arrest and torture of several individuals.100  
 
In April 2012, the prosecutor dismissed the complaint, stating that the alleged acts did not 
qualify as crimes.101 However, in May 2012, an examining magistrate of the War Crimes Unit 
of the Paris Regional Court ordered a criminal investigation. The prosecutor appealed this 
decision, but, in January 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal rejected this appeal. The case was 
pending at the time of writing.102 
 
3.1.6.5 Forced labour and modern slavery in Qatar (Vinci) 
In the Vinci case, in March 2015, Sherpa filed a criminal complaint against Vinci, a French 
construction company, and the French executive directors of its Qatari subsidiary with the 
prosecutor for Nanterre.103 Sherpa claimed that Vinci was involved in human rights abuses 
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committed during the construction of arenas for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. The 
complaint alleged forced labour, slavery, and receiving stolen property.  
 
In April 2015, the prosecutor opened a preliminary enquiry. 104 In parallel, Vinci brought 
various libel actions against Sherpa and its staff members, claiming significant damages. 
However, in June 2015, the Paris Regional Court rejected Vinci’s claims.105 The case was 
pending at the time of writing. Importantly, Sherpa’s complaint coincided with the debate on 
the French Bill on duty of care in the French Parliament. Sherpa used this complaint as an 
opportunity to urge French policy-makers to enact the bill.106 
 
3.1.6.6 Land grabbing in Cambodia (Bolloré) 
In the Bolloré case, in July 2015, a group of Cambodians brought a tort claim against Bolloré, 
a French MNE, and Compagnie du Cambodge, a subsidiary of Bolloré, before the Nanterre 
Regional Court. 107  The plaintiffs claimed damages for land grabbing, environmental 
destruction, and human rights abuse in Cambodge. This is the first tort claim against an MNE 
in France since the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs. The case was 
pending at the time of writing. 
 
3.2 Case studies in the Netherlands 
Over the past decade, transnational litigation against MNEs in the Netherlands has received a 
lot of international attention. The tort claim against Shell for oil pollution in Nigeria, the first 
tort claim to occur in Europe outside of England, and the criminal claim against Trafigura for 
toxic waste dumping in Ivory Coast have been particularly emblematic. Nevertheless, the 
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development of transnational litigation against MNEs in the Netherlands has been less 
spectacular in comparison with litigation in France in terms of number of claims, litigation 
strategies, and results. 
 
3.2.1 Toxic waste dumping in Ivory Coast (Trafigura)  
Following the toxic waste dumping in Abidjan,108 various proceedings have taken place in the 
Netherlands. Given the complexity of the proceedings, the following section offers a 
simplified description of the litigation against Trafigura. 
 
A first set of criminal proceedings focused on the events that occurred in the Netherlands. In 
June 2008, the Dutch prosecutor brought charges against Trafigura Beheer BV (Trafigura BV) 
and one executive of Trafigura Ltd for illegal export of hazardous waste to Ivory Coast and 
other criminal offences. 109  In July 2010, the Amsterdam District Court found that the 
defendants were guilty of delivering and concealing hazardous goods, and condemned 
Trafigura BV to pay a €1m fine.110 In December 2011, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
upheld the ruling and the fine against Trafigura BV. It held that ‘Trafigura BV failed to 
disclose the harmful nature of the waste to APS, knowing that the waste was harmful for life 
and/or health and moreover that Trafigura BV illegally exported the waste to Ivory 
Coast.’111 Trafigura BV and the prosecutor appealed this ruling to the Dutch Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad).112 
 
In parallel, in 2008, Claude Dauphin, Trafigura’s chairman, was initially charged with 
various criminal offences, including the illegal export of waste from the Netherlands. No 
progress was made until January 2012 where the Amsterdam Court of Appeal decided that 
Dauphin could be prosecuted. Dauphin challenged the jurisdiction of the Dutch Court and the 
absence of evidence, but the Court of Appeal dismissed his claim. 
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Ultimately, in November 2012, the prosecutor and Trafigura BV reached an out-of-court 
settlement after which the criminal proceedings against Trafigura BV and Dauphin were 
withdrawn. Neither the MNE nor its chairman faced any conviction or admitted liability. The 
prosecutor stated in justification of his decision that ‘continuing the proceedings might take 
many more years,’ but ‘the cases will be concluded in a way that makes clear that violation 
of international regulations for hazardous waste will not be tolerated.’113 However, NGOs, 
such as Greenpeace, criticized the settlement for being ‘a very weak slap on the wrist for a 
large corporation like Trafigura.’114  
 
A second set of criminal proceedings focused on the events that occurred in Ivory Coast. In 
2008, the Dutch prosecutor decided not to investigate potential criminal offences in Ivory 
Coast. However, in 2009, Greenpeace appealed this decision. In April 2011, the Court of 
Appeal of The Hague held that the Dutch courts did not have jurisdiction for events in Ivory 
Coast and rejected Greenpeace’s complaint.115 
 
A new set of civil proceedings was recently initiated. In February 2015, a group of French 
and Dutch lawyers brought a tort claim against Trafigura on behalf of more than 110,000 
Ivorian victims before the Dutch courts.116 They alleged that the MNE caused bodily, moral, 
and economic injury to the plaintiffs and they requested that Trafigura pay each plaintiff 
€2,500 in damages and clean up the pollution. It appears that the victims in these proceedings 
did not receive compensation following the out-of-court settlement in England. The case was 
pending at the time of writing. 
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3.2.2 Oil pollution in Nigeria (Shell)  
In the Shell case, in May 2008, several victims of oil spills in Nigeria and Milieudefensie, the 
Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth, brought a tort claim against Royal Dutch Shell Plc 
(Shell Plc), the parent company of Shell,117 and SPDC, its Nigerian subsidiary, before the 
Dutch courts. The plaintiffs claimed that both companies were liable for the environmental 
and economic damages they had suffered. The defendants denied Shell Plc’s liability for the 
harm caused by its Nigerian subsidiary and contested the Dutch courts’ competence to hear 
tort claims against SPDC.118 However, in December 2009, the District Court of The Hague 
held it had jurisdiction to hear the claims.119 Despite this first success, the claimants suffered 
a blow in September 2011 when the District Court rejected their request to access evidence in 
the defendants’ possession.120 
 
In January 2013, the District Court sentenced SPDC to pay damages in one of the claims 
while dismissing the other claims. In the first claim, the District Court held that, pursuant to 
Nigerian Law, SPDC had violated its duty of care and was therefore liable in tort for 
negligence.121 In the other claims, the District Court found that the contested oil spills had not 
been caused by defective maintenance by SPDC, which had taken sufficient precautions to 
prevent sabotage from its underground oil pipelines, but by sabotage from third parties. 
Applying Nigerian law, the District Court found that an oil company is not liable for oil spills 
caused by sabotage.122 As regards the liability of Shell Plc, the District Court dismissed all the 
claims, since, under Nigerian law, a parent company is not obliged to prevent its subsidiaries 
from harming third parties abroad. Both the claimants and the corporate defendants appealed 
this ruling. 
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In September 2013, the claimants filed a motion to request the defendants to produce specific 
documents.123 In October 2014, new information emerged from the Bodo case in England. It 
appeared that the documents made public by SPDC during the disclosure stage of the English 
litigation showed that the company did not take precautionary steps to avoid oil spills in the 
Niger Delta as it had claimed before the Dutch courts. 124 Some of this information was 
directly relevant to the Dutch case and used by plaintiffs during the proceedings. The case 
was pending at the time of writing. 
 
3.2.3 War crimes and crimes against humanity in Palestine (Riwal) 
In the Riwal case, March 2010, Al-Haq, a Palestinian NGO, submitted a criminal complaint 
to the prosecutor for Rotterdam against Lima Holding BV and other companies of the Riwal 
group, as well as a number of executive directors.125 Al-Haq alleged that, since 2004, the 
companies had contributed to the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
the Netherlands and/or the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The complaint referred directly to 
contributions of the Riwal companies to the construction of the wall and illegal settlements 
by Israel in the West Bank.126  
 
Following the complaint, the prosecutor opened an investigation into the Riwal group’s 
activities in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. However, in 2013, he decided that 
it would not initiate criminal proceedings against the Riwal group, despite evidence that 
Lima Holding BV had been involved in renting out cranes and aerial working platforms used 
in the construction of the wall and the settlements. 127  The prosecutor explained that the 
company had provided a limited contribution to the building of the wall and the settlements. 
Furthermore, the company had confirmed that it was no longer working in Israel and the 
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West Bank. Finally, the prosecutor held that the case was very complex, would require a 
significant amount of resources, and that further required investigation in Israel would 
probably not be possible due to lack of cooperation from the Israeli authorities. 
 
4 Conclusions 
When access to justice in the host State is impossible, it is said that transnational litigation 
against MNEs in the home country may offer victims of corporate abuse the most viable 
opportunity to access justice. To date, this type of litigation has mainly occurred in common 
law countries, such as the US. Nonetheless, the restrictive interpretation of the ATS by the 
US courts and the increasing number of claims in European civil law States may result in 
Europe becoming the primary venue for transnational claims against MNEs. 
 
Until now, England has been the leading European country where MNEs have faced 
transnational liability claims. The existence of active cause lawyers, flexible rules on access 
to evidence and group action, the abandonment of the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the 
opportunity to secure financial compensation through out-of-court settlements with MNEs 
have contributed to the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs in England. 
However, this type of litigation presents a number of limits. Litigators have relied 
exclusively on the use of tort law as a litigation strategy, neglecting the opportunities offered 
by other types of proceedings. They have also focused excessively on obtaining financial 
compensation through out-of-court settlements, limiting the pursuit of other objectives such 
as the development of legal standards of corporate accountability for MNEs.  
 
By contrast, litigators in France and the Netherlands have used diverse legal strategies, such 
as criminal or labour proceedings, to hold companies liable in the context of MNE activities. 
Nonetheless, if some victories have been won on various aspects, such as court jurisdiction, a 
number of obstacles still exist, such as accessing evidence and reluctance by prosecutors and 
judges to hold MNEs to account. As a result, the success of transnational litigation against 
MNEs to hold parent companies liable in the context of their foreign activities and to secure 
remediation to victims remains limited in European civil law countries. Ultimately, it appears 
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that both host and home States face some obstacles to holding MNEs liable for human rights 
and environmental abuse and offer remediation to victims.   
 
The next chapter focuses on issues of jurisdiction and applicable law in the context of civil 





Jurisdiction and applicable law in transnational claims against multinational 
enterprises in France and the Netherlands 
 
1 Introduction 
Transnational litigation against MNEs raises a number of legal questions regarding whether 
the host or the home State courts should have jurisdiction to hear tort or civil claims, and 
whether to apply the host or the home State law to the case. Similarly, criminal authorities in 
home countries must decide whether they are competent to pursue companies for criminal 
offences taking place in host countries. Therefore, the rules governing such aspects are 
crucial, as they directly affect whether victims of corporate harm can access the legal system 
of MNEs’ home country to obtain a remedy.1 In European home countries, the harmonization 
of private international law in the EU has had a direct effect on the content of these rules in 
civil matters at the domestic level. As a result, France and the Netherlands share, to some 
extent, similar rules relating to jurisdiction and the law applicable to civil claims.  
 
The aim of Chapter 5 is to understand the effect of rules governing the exercise of 
jurisdiction by French and Dutch courts and the choice of the law applicable to transnational 
civil transnational claims against MNEs. It also explores the situations where French and 
Dutch criminal authorities may be entitled to sue MNEs for criminal offences taking place in 
host countries. Chapter 5 starts by describing the EU regime of private international law and 
its impact on domestic litigation against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. It then 
provides a summary of domestic procedural rules regarding the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction by both French and Dutch courts over extraterritorial criminal offences. 
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2 The influence of European private international law on transnational civil claims 
against MNEs  
Private international law governs transnational disputes that arise from the interactions 
between private persons. Therefore, it is directly relevant to the study of transnational civil 
claims against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. First, this type of litigation involves 
private parties from various countries, including host State plaintiffs and MNEs with their 
statutory seat, central administration, or main place of business in France or the Netherlands. 
Second, in some cases, the damage may have occurred in the host country while the event 
giving rise to the damage may have occurred in the home country. Third, litigators have 
brought transnational claims against MNEs under various branches of civil law, including 
tort and labour law, to which private international law applies. 
 
When faced with a civil claim against an MNE for harm occurring in a host country, French 
and Dutch courts must assess whether they are competent to hear the claim and which law 
should be applied. Domestic rules of private international law normally guide judges in this 
exercise. However, a number of EU regulations have harmonized such rules across Member 
States, including France and the Netherlands. In particular, two regulations have a direct 
impact on whether civil claims can be brought against MNEs in EU home countries: 
Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I Regulation),2 which defines the rules domestic courts must 
apply when they assess whether they are competent to hear a claim; and Regulation 864/2007 
(Rome II Regulation),3 which defines the rules domestic courts must apply when they assess 
the law applicable to a claim. Each will be described in turn below. 
 
2.1 Court jurisdiction over civil claims against MNEs  
The Brussels I Regulation provides that domestic courts in EU Member States, including 
France and the Netherlands, have jurisdiction over companies domiciled in their territory.4 
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However, each Member State is free to determine which court is competent to hear civil 
claims against defendants domiciled outside of the EU, such as companies based in host 
States. 
 
2.1.1 The Brussels I Regulation 
Under the Brussels I Regulation, different rules of court jurisdiction will apply to 
transnational civil claims against MNEs depending on whether the corporate defendant is 
domiciled in an EU Member State. 
 
2.1.1.1 EU defendant 
According to Article 2(1) Brussels I Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, 
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State. When the defendant is 
a company, or a legal person, the defendant is domiciled wherever it has its statutory seat, its 
central administration, or its principal place of business.5 Therefore, the court of a Member 
State will have jurisdiction to hear a civil claim against the member of an MNE if it has its 
statutory seat, its central administration, or its principal place of business in that State. For 
instance, in Alstom, the Nanterre Regional Court held it had jurisdiction to hear the claims 
against Alstom and Veolia, as both defendants had their statutory seat in France.6 Similarly, 
in Shell, the District Court of The Hague decided to exercise jurisdiction over the parent 
company Shell Plc because it was headquartered in the Netherlands.7 
 
2.1.1.2 Non-EU defendant 
The situation is different for defendants which are not domiciled in a Member State, such as 
foreign subsidiaries of MNEs. Article 4(1) Brussels I Regulation provides that the law of 
each Member State determines the jurisdiction of its courts in such a situation (ie subsidiary 
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jurisdiction). Therefore, there is no uniform approach between Member States in determining 
whether to exercise jurisdiction over defendants domiciled in foreign countries.8 
 
In France, jurisdiction over defendants domiciled in a foreign country is determined by a 
combination of rules on ordinary jurisdiction and privileged jurisdiction contained in the 
French Code of Civil Procedure (Code de procédure civile). 9  Under French law, the 
‘territorially competent court is .. that of the place where the defendant lives.’10 In tort 
matters, a plaintiff may also bring a claim, at his choosing, before ‘the court of the place of 
the event causing liability’ or before the court of the place where the damage was suffered.11 
In the context of transnational civil litigation against MNEs, French law does not allow 
foreign plaintiffs to sue a non-EU domiciled subsidiary before French courts, as French law 
requires a nexus with France. 
 
Nonetheless, based on Article 42(2) French Code of Civil Procedure, French courts have 
developed rules for the consolidation of claims in cases including co-defendants.12 As a result, 
a defendant domiciled in a foreign State can be sued before a French court as a co-defendant 
in proceedings brought against another defendant domiciled in France. If the plaintiffs decide 
to sue a French parent company and its foreign subsidiary together, they may choose to bring 
the case before the court of the place where one of the entities is domiciled (eg France if the 
parent company is domiciled in France).13 However, a number of criteria must be met for 
French courts to have jurisdiction. First, the claims against both defendants must bear ‘close 
connected links.’ Therefore, the object of the dispute has to be identical. Second, one of the 
defendants must be domiciled in France. As a result, French courts lack jurisdiction if the 
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only basis for jurisdiction lies in a choice-of-court clause or if one of the defendants is a 
French national. Third, the defendant must be ‘an actual, serious defendant in order to avoid 
any fraudulent choice of jurisdiction by initiating a fictitious claim against a French 
resident.’14 
 
French courts have also developed the rule of ‘denial of justice’ (déni de justice), which is 
similar to the forum necessitatis rule.15 Accordingly, French courts may exercise jurisdiction 
over claims for which they would normally have no jurisdiction as long as two requirements 
are met. First, the plaintiff must prove it is impossible for him to bring the case in a foreign 
court. Impossibility can be based either on factual grounds (eg the plaintiff would be 
seriously threatened if he returned to the foreign country) or legal grounds (eg the plaintiff 
can show that the foreign court has already ruled it does not have jurisdiction). If a foreign 
court rules that the case is inadmissible or dismisses the case on the merits, a denial of justice 
cannot be found, as the exercise of forum necessitatis would be deemed inappropriate.16 
Second, there must be some nexus with French courts.17 This requirement is usually easily 
achieved, as the most stringent case-law merely requires that the plaintiff has his habitual 
residence in France.18  
 
In transnational civil claims against MNEs, until recently, jurisdiction based on denial of 
justice had received mixed reception from French courts. However, this trend appears to be 
changing. 
 
In COMILOG, the plaintiffs claimed that the Paris Labour Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
claims against COMILOG on various grounds.19 First, they argued that, pursuant to Article 
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15 French Civil Code (Code civil),20 French courts had jurisdiction over COMILOG, since 
the company was French at the time of its creation. They also alleged that the Paris Labour 
Court was the relevant tribunal to hear the claims on the grounds of Article R 1412-1 French 
Labour Code (Code du travail), which provides that an employee may bring a claim before 
the labour court of the place where the agreement was contracted or of the place where the 
employer is established. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that French courts should exercise 
jurisdiction over an international dispute when one of the parties cannot possibly bring a 
claim before a foreign court, even in the absence of significant links with France or when the 
defendant does not have French nationality. This was the case for the plaintiffs who had been 
denied justice in the Republic of Congo. To support their claim, they invoked the right to a 
fair trial and the right to access a court under Article 6(1) ECHR. In particular, they held that, 
‘pursuant to Article 6(1) ECHR, the right of access to a court is breached when one of the 
parties cannot bring a claim in front of any courts. In such situation, French courts have 
international jurisdiction based on the principle of denial of justice.’21  
 
However, in 2011, the Paris Labour Court ruled it was incompetent to hear the claims against 
all the defendants, including COMILOG.22 It found the case had no nexus with France, given 
that COMILOG was a Gabonese company and that all the plaintiffs were of Congolese 
nationality. Furthermore, it rejected the existence of denial of justice in the plaintiffs’ country: 
 
The denial of justice cannot be based on the fact that French judges would have 
reasons to suspect foreign courts or the manner in which justice is administered in the 
country which normally has jurisdiction, or the fact that the outcome of the merits of 
the case in the way it could be obtained abroad goes against French public policy.23 
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The Labour Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently demonstrated that they 
could not materially access courts in Gabon or the Republic of Congo. 
 
However, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned the Labour Court’s ruling, and accepted that 
the French courts had jurisdiction over COMILOG France and COMILOG International 
pursuant to Article 15 French Civil Code and Article 42(2) French Code of Civil Procedure.24 
Importantly, in a landmark ruling of September 2015, the Paris Court of Appeal accepted that 
the French courts had jurisdiction over COMILOG on the grounds that around 600 claimants, 
proving they had brought a claim in the Republic of Congo, had been denied justice.25 
 
In Alstom, in 2009, the Nanterre Regional Court held it had jurisdiction over the corporate 
defendants, as both companies were French and had their statutory seat in France. However, 
it raised that: 
 
Given the risk of a denial of justice inherent in the nature of this dispute, the French 
court is, prima facie, competent to solve the dispute in order to guarantee the free 
access to justice by the parties involved, in pursuance of Article 6(1) ECHR. It is well 
established that the risk of denial of justice is a criterion for the jurisdiction of French 
courts as soon as the dispute has a connection with France, which is the case in the 
circumstances of the present case, the defendants being French companies based in 
France, Alstom recognizing that its plants in La Rochelle, Le Mans, Le Creusot, 
Villeurbanne, and Tarbes are producing 46 cars of the Jerusalem tramway.26 
 
In the Netherlands, Articles 2 and 3 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke 
Rechtsvordering) provide for general rules of jurisdiction over foreign companies not 
domiciled in the EU. Two situations can be distinguished. First, if the legal proceedings are 
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initiated by a writ of summons, the Dutch courts will have jurisdiction if the defendant has 
his domicile or habitual residence in the Netherlands.27 Second, if the legal proceedings are 
initiated by a petition, the Dutch courts will have jurisdiction under three circumstances: 1) 
when the petitioner, or one of the petitioners, has his domicile or habitual residence in the 
Netherlands; 2) when the petition relates to proceedings which are, or have to be, initiated, by 
a writ of summons and which fall under the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts; or 3) when the 
legal proceedings are otherwise sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal sphere.28 
 
The application of these rules of jurisdiction rather limits the number of situations where 
domestic courts will be competent to hear transnational claims against foreign subsidiaries. 
First, the foreign subsidiary and the plaintiffs are usually domiciled in the host country, not in 
the Netherlands. Second, plaintiffs may struggle to demonstrate that the legal proceedings are 
sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal sphere in cases where they have limited access to 
evidence.  
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of additional grounds on which Dutch courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over transnational claims against MNEs involving host State subsidiaries. For 
instance, in the context of tort proceedings, Dutch courts have jurisdiction if the event that 
caused the damage occurred in the Netherlands. 29  Furthermore, Dutch law enables 
consolidation of claims in cases of co-defendants and, as a result, plaintiffs may sue a parent 
company together with its foreign subsidiary before the Dutch courts. Article 7(1) Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure provides that, when the Dutch court has jurisdiction over one of the 
defendants, it has also jurisdiction over the other defendants involved in the same 
proceedings, provided that the claims against the various defendants are connected to such an 
extent that reasons of efficiency justify a joint hearing. For instance, in Shell, the District 
Court of The Hague found that, since the same set of facts in Nigeria had to be assessed in 
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respect of the claims against both Shell Plc and SPDC, there was a connection to such an 
extent that reasons of efficiency justified a joint hearing of the claims.30 
 
Another useful provision for plaintiffs is Article 9 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure which 
provides for the application of the forum necessitatis rule. Dutch courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over claims that have no nexus with the Dutch legal order if, for instance, a civil 
case outside the Netherlands appears to be impossible.31 Similar to France, impossibility may 
be based on factual or legal impossibility. Factual impossibility may include circumstances 
beyond the foreign country’s control, such as natural disasters or war, while legal 
impossibility may be demonstrated by denial of access to a tribunal due to race or religion.32 
Moreover, Dutch courts may have jurisdiction if the legal proceedings have sufficient 
connection with the Dutch legal sphere and it would be unacceptable to demand from the 
plaintiff that he submits the case to the judgement of a foreign court.33 While Dutch courts 
have used the forum necessitatis rule to accept jurisdiction, even when no sufficient 
connection with the Netherlands exists, they have also refused to accept jurisdiction over 
claims based on prohibitively high litigation costs in the alternative forum.34 
 
2.1.2 The recast Brussels I Regulation  
Following the review of the Brussels I Regulation, a recast version came into force on 10 
January 2013.35 The basic jurisdictional rules in the recast Brussels I Regulation remain the 
same as in the original version. The starting point is the domicile of the defendant. Persons 
domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that 
Member State. 36  Furthermore, if the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the 
jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall be determined by the law of that 
                                                 
 
30
 Shell (n 7) [3.4-3.7]. 
31
 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 9 (b). 
32
 Redfield (n 15) 913. 
33
 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 9(c). 
34
 Redfield (n 15) 914. 
35
 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters 2012 OJ 
L351/1 (recast Brussels I Regulation). 
36




Member State.37 Ultimately, the recast Brussels I Regulation did not extend the general rules 
of jurisdiction to non-EU domiciled defendants, as had been suggested by the EC.38 During 
the review, this suggestion had been highly contested by corporate accountability CSOs and 
litigators, who claimed it would restrict the opportunities for foreign victims of business-
related abuses to be heard in courts of EU Member States.39 It should also be noted that the 
recast Brussels I Regulation did not incorporate a proposal to include the rule on forum 
necessitatis as suggested by the EC.40 
 
The recast Brussels I Regulation did, however, introduce novel provisions on lis pendens.41 
The courts of Member States have discretion to stay proceedings in favour of foreign courts 
of non-EU countries, but only in limited circumstances, such as in the case of pending 
proceedings before foreign courts. Interestingly, these new rules apply only to proceedings 
over which the courts of Member States have jurisdiction based on the EU domicile of the 
defendant. Furthermore, they distinguish between two situations. First, a Member State’s 
court is seized of an action involving the same cause of action and between the same parties 
as the proceedings pending before the court of a third State (Article 33). Second, a Member 
State’s court is seized of an action related to the action in the court of a third State (Article 
34). 
 
The new rules on lis pendens introduced by the recast Regulation may be problematic for 
bringing transnational claims against MNEs. One of the main difficulties faced by a majority 
of plaintiffs is to satisfy the requirement of jurisdictional nexus with the courts of Member 
States, to which the application of Articles 33 and 34 adds further difficulty. Even when it 
has jurisdiction to hear a claim against either an EU-domiciled parent company or an EU-
domiciled parent company together with its foreign subsidiary, a Member State’s court can 
stay proceedings if proceedings are pending before the host State court. Consequently, the 
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new rules on lis pendens can seriously impede the opportunities for victims to bring a claim 
against an MNE in the home country. At the same time, the new provisions provide for a 
flexible mechanism allowing the court to stay or continue the proceedings. This could be 
helpful from the plaintiffs’ perspective. Indeed, a Member State’s court must consider several 
aspects before staying the proceedings, including the proper administration of justice. When 
doing so, the court should assess all the circumstances of the case before it, such as whether 
the third State’s court can give judgement within a reasonable time.42 Courts of Member 
States may continue proceedings based on the proper administration of justice when legal 
proceedings against MNEs may be lengthy and questionable in terms of fairness and 
impartiality in host countries with a weak legal and judicial system. 
 
2.2 Law applicable to civil claims against MNEs 
The Rome II Regulation defines the conflict-of-law rules applicable to non-contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters in cross-border disputes. It extends the European 
harmonization of private international law already advanced by the Brussels I Regulation.43 
The Rome II Regulation is directly relevant in determining the law governing a civil claim 
against an MNE in France and the Netherlands. However, the Rome II Regulation applies to 
events giving rise to damage which occur after its entry into force (11 January 2009). 44 
Consequently, the Rome II Regulation does not apply to claims raising the liability of an 
MNE for an event giving rise to damage which occurred before 11 January 2009. For those 
claims, Dutch and French domestic rules prior to the Rome II Regulation govern the 
determination of the substantial applicable law. 
 
                                                 
 
42
 Recast Brussels I Regulation, Recital 24. 
43
 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations’ COM(2003) 427 final, 4 (Proposal Rome II Regulation). 
44
 Rome II Regulation, Articles 31 and 32. Furthermore, the CJEU interpreted that the Rome II Regulation 
applies only to events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009. See Case C-412/10 Deo Antoine 




2.2.1 Domestic rules 
French private international law has not been codified yet and, as a result, most French 
conflict-of-law rules mainly derive from case-law.45 Pursuant to a consistent case-law from 
the French Court of Cassation,46 the law of the place where the tort (delict) occurred (lex loci 
delicti commissi) applies to a dispute raising a delict or a quasi-delict.47 This rule can only be 
derogated from when the foreign law is adverse to public policy.48 However, French courts 
have faced difficulties applying lex loci delicti commissi in practice. This is particularly true 
when the delict occurred in different countries.49 To solve this issue, French courts have 
chosen to apply the law of the country with the closest connection with the delict or quasi-
delict. They have also elected to apply the law of the forum (lex fori) when one element of 
the delict was located in France.  
 
One problem arises in the case of ‘complex’ delicts. For these delicts, the place of the 
harmful event and the place where the loss is sustained are spread over several countries. 
This can be the situation in some transnational civil claims against MNEs, especially when 
the parent company, based in the home country, made or contributed to the act leading to the 
damage in the host country. When the applicable law is the law of the place where the delict 
occurred, it can be the law of both the place of the act itself (lex loci actus) and the place of 
the resulting damage (lex damni). French courts have been inconsistent in choosing between 
the law where the act itself occurred and the law where the damage was sustained.50 The 
French Court of Cassation usually rejects lex damni in favour of the application of lex loci 
actus.51 At the same time, French courts have also applied lex fori in some cases, and the 
French Court of Cassation has confirmed this on several occasions.52 
 
                                                 
 
45
 Yvon Loussouarn, Pierre Bourel and Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, Droit International Privé (9th edn, 
Dalloz 2007) 186. 
46
 Cass civ 25 May 1948, D 1948 357 (Lautour v Guiraud). 
47
 Under French law, a delict involves a tort that is intentionally caused, while a quasi-delict involves a tort that 
is negligently caused. 
48




 ibid 549. 
51
 Cass civ 23 January 2007, D 2007, AJ 503; ibid 550.  
52




Two specific situations should be distinguished here: damage resulting from environmental 
pollution and damage resulting from a criminal offence. First, regarding situations of 
environmental damage, which are complex and diffuse, French scholars have expressed a 
strong preference for a system of alternative connections. This would favour victim access to 
compensation and better represent the international and domestic evolution towards a system 
of ‘objective’ liability. This is particularly true in the situation of massive pollution or 
ecological catastrophe caused by MNEs. Applying the law of the place where the defendant 
has his domicile may appear more appropriate. Nonetheless, French courts have been 
reluctant to apply alternative principles of conflict of law.53 Second, when a civil claim is 
brought for a damage arising out of a criminal offence, lex loci delicti commissi continues to 
apply to the conditions and effects of the compensation.54 However, some French scholars 
have argued that lex fori should apply in this context.55 
 
The Dutch regime of private international law distinguishes between two situations regarding 
the applicable law. First, in 2001, the Netherlands enacted a law specifying the rules that will 
apply in matters of private international law (Wet Conflictenrecht Onrechtmatige Daad, or 
WCOD).56 One of the basic rules of WCOD is the application of the law of the State where 
the act occurred in matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict.57 However, when an act has 
an harmful impact upon a person, property, or the natural environment outside the State 
where the act occurred, the law applicable is that of the State where the impact occurred.58 In 
cases of complex delicts or torts with a multiple locus, such as in transnational cases against 
MNEs, the applicable law is the law of the place where the damage occurred.59 An injured 
party cannot choose the law of the place in which the tort occurred, even if it offers greater 
protection to the victim.60 In the context of civil claims against MNEs, the applicable law 
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should be the law of the country where the corporate harm occurred (the host State law). It is 
important to note that WCOD accepts party autonomy in the field of tort, delict, or quasi-
delict. Parties are entitled to agree and choose the law that shall apply between them. 61 
However, in civil cases against MNEs, chances are slim that parties will agree on the 
applicable law. Claimants may seek to apply Dutch tort law whereas corporate defendants 
may prefer applying the host country law. 
 
Second, following the codification of Dutch rules of private international law, Book 10 of the 
Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek)62 contains new domestic rules on conflict-of-law. As 
of 1st January 2012, this new regime applies to disputes involving non-contractual obligations 
that do not fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation.63 Under the new regime, the 
Rome II Regulation is applicable to non-contractual obligations that arise from a tort or a 
delict. This means that lex loci damni is applicable as a rule.64 However, Dutch law applies to 
the conduct and procedure of legal proceedings in Dutch courts.65 
 
In Shell, the District Court of The Hague found that the claims fell outside the temporal 
scope of the Rome II Regulation, since the alleged harmful events occurred before 11 
January 2009.66 It decided that WCOD should determine the applicable law, given that the 
claims had been brought before January 2012. It should be noted that the plaintiffs argued for 
the application of Dutch law whereas the defendants argued for the application of Nigerian 
law. The plaintiffs contended that the application of Nigerian law would be manifestly 
incompatible with the Dutch public order. Nonetheless, the District Court found that the 
plaintiffs had insufficiently demonstrated that this exception occurred in the instance. 
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Ultimately, it chose to assess the substance of the claims under Nigerian law, because of their 
connection with Nigeria: 
 
In the event of a tort that has been committed by SPDC, this tort occurred on the 
territory of Nigeria. In the event that [Shell Plc] allegedly committed tort with regard 
to the occurrence of these two oil spills, this tort by [Shell Plc] had harmful effects in 
Nigeria. Therefore, the District Court is of the opinion that based on Section 3(1) and 
(2) of WCOD, the claims in the main action must be substantively assessed under 
Nigerian law, more in particular the law that applies in Akwa Ibom State, where these 
two oil spills occurred.67 
 
2.2.2 The Rome II Regulation  
Lex loci damni is the cornerstone of the Rome II Regulation. The law applicable to a non-
contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict must be the law of the country in which the 
damage occurs.68 This rule applies irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise 
to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occurred. In the context of transnational civil claims against 
MNEs, this means that French and Dutch courts must apply the law of the host country. This 
may be problematic for plaintiffs when the law of the host country is less favourable to them 
in areas of corporate liability, evidence, or financial compensation.69 During the drafting of 
the Rome II Regulation, the EC rejected the application of the law of the place where the 
harmful event occurred, which covers both the act itself and the resulting damage.70 This 
would have enabled both the laws of the host and home States to apply to transnational civil 
claims against MNEs. Ultimately, the rule adopted under the Rome II Regulation reflects the 
general on-going practice of some EU Member States, including France and the 
Netherlands.71  
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Nonetheless, the Rome II Regulation provides for exceptions to the application of lex loci 
damni, some of which are relevant in the context of transnational civil claims against MNEs. 
First, Article 7 Rome II Regulation provides for an environmental exception. Accordingly, 
the person seeking compensation for environmental damage72 can choose to base his claim on 
the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred. If plaintiffs can 
prove the involvement of the parent company and that such an event took place in France or 
the Netherlands, they may be able to choose the law of the home country.  
 
Second, Article 4(3) Rome II Regulation contains a general escape clause.73 It provides that, 
where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more 
closely connected with another country, the law of that country shall apply. A manifestly 
closer connection with another country might be based on a pre-existing relationship between 
the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question. 
Article 4(3) can potentially open the door to the application of French and Dutch law to civil 
cases. However, a strong connection with the home country must be manifest, a difficulty 
which plaintiffs face when bringing a claim against MNEs in Europe. 
 
Third, under Article 14 Rome II Regulation, the parties are allowed to agree on the law 
applicable to their dispute. However, this choice must be expressed or demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty by the circumstances of the case and cannot prejudice the rights of third 
parties. The practicality of this provision appears limited in the context of transnational civil 
litigation against MNEs. It is unlikely that victims and MNEs will agree on a law that will 
govern their relationship. Furthermore, they may have opposed interests in the choice of 
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applicable law. MNEs are usually interested in a law that limits their liability and the 
compensation they should pay to victims. 
 
Fourth, Article 26 Rome II Regulation provides that the application of the law of any country 
specified by the Rome II Regulation may be refused if such application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum. Therefore, Article 26 allows 
a court to discard the law whose effect would be to award non-compensatory, exemplary, or 
punitive damages of an excessive nature.74 One consequence is that the application of this 
provision will depend on the legal order of the forum, which may vary from one country to 
another.75 
 
3 The prosecution of extraterritorial crimes in France and the Netherlands  
Victims of business-related human rights and environmental abuse, and CSOs, have sought 
to hold MNEs criminally liable in their home country. However, under the principle of 
territoriality, which is the cornerstone of the law of criminal jurisdiction, jurisdiction is 
primarily granted to the courts of the State where the criminal offence took place. Therefore, 
the prosecution of MNEs in their home country is often limited when criminal offences are 
committed in host countries. Nevertheless, continental European countries put far less 
emphasis on the territoriality principle in criminal law than common law countries,76 and 
France and the Netherlands apply alternative principles of jurisdiction. As a result, French 
and Dutch courts may exercise their competence over the extraterritorial offences committed 
by MNEs. 
 
It is important to point out that applicable law and jurisdiction are intertwined in criminal law. 
For instance, a French court’s exercise of jurisdiction follows from the application of French 
criminal law on the grounds of the ‘solidarity between jurisdiction and legislative 
competence’ principle (principe de solidarité des compétences législative et 
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juridictionnelle).77 As a result, the French and Dutch courts are competent once French and 
Dutch criminal law applies to a criminal offence. 
 
3.1 General rules  
The French Criminal Code (Code pénal) and Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de 
procédure pénale) state the general rules regarding the application of French criminal law to, 
and the jurisdiction of French courts over, criminal offences committed outside the territory 
of France. Under Article 689 French Code of Criminal Procedure, perpetrators of, or 
accomplices to, offences committed outside the French territory may be prosecuted and tried 
by French courts either when French law is applicable under the Book I of the Criminal Code, 
or any other statute, or when an international convention gives jurisdiction to French courts 
to deal with the offence. Book I of the French Criminal Code contains the specific principles 
regarding the territorial applicability of French criminal law to offences committed outside 
the territory of France. Therefore, French courts have jurisdiction over criminal offences to 
which French criminal law applies. 
 
Articles 2 to 8 Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) generally provide for the rules 
of application of Dutch criminal law to, and jurisdiction of Dutch courts over, criminal 
offences committed abroad. These provisions apply not only to all offences under the Dutch 
Criminal Code, but also to those defined in other statutes, unless the statute provides 
otherwise.78 In addition, the International Crimes Act (ICA),79 which came into force in 2003, 
contains specific rules concerning the violations of international humanitarian law.80 The ICA 
replaced fragmented legislation on international crimes and incorporated crimes included in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)81 in Dutch law. Under 
the ICA, Dutch criminal law applies to a number of criminal offences committed outside of 
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the Netherlands in three situations: 1) the suspect is present in the Netherlands; 2) the crime 
is committed against a Dutch national; 3) the crime is committed by a Dutch national.82 
Criminal prosecution against a Dutch national may also take place if the suspect became a 
Dutch national after committing the crime.83 
 
3.2 Prosecuting legal persons  
Article 706-42 French Code of Criminal Procedure establishes specific rules on jurisdiction 
for legal persons, such as companies. When a legal person is investigated or prosecuted, the 
court of the place where the offence was committed, or where the legal person’s head office 
is located, has jurisdiction. However, when a natural person is charged along with the legal 
person for the same, or a connected, offence, the court where the natural person is prosecuted 
may also hear the case against the legal person. As a result, the legal person may be brought 
before the court of the place where the arrest took place or where one of the natural persons 
charged resides. Nevertheless, this principle does not apply in reverse, and a court will not 
have jurisdiction over a natural person just because it has jurisdiction over a legal person.84 
Furthermore, Article 40 French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the French 
prosecutor can decide whether or not to press charges against a legal person similar to those 
being pursued against natural persons. Moreover, he may decide to only charge one or the 
other suspect. Finally, if the law so provides, the prosecutor may propose an exchange 
similar to a plea bargain.85 
 
Regarding the application of Dutch provisions on criminal jurisdiction to companies, the 
Dutch Supreme Court does not distinguish between natural or legal persons.86 As a result, 
general provisions on Dutch criminal jurisdiction also apply to legal persons. When 
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applicable, the following rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction apply to the conduct of either 
Dutch or foreign companies in host countries. 
 
3.3 Relevance of the territoriality principle  
Article 113-2(1) French Criminal Code states that French criminal law is applicable to all 
offences committed within the French territory. 87  However, the French Criminal Code 
interprets this territoriality principle in an extensive manner. For instance, Article 113-2(2) 
French Criminal Code provides for the application of the theory of ubiquity (théorie de 
l’ubiquité). As a result, an offence is deemed to have been committed within the French 
territory where one of its constituent elements took place in France.88 French courts have 
broadly interpreted the notion of constituent elements and have accepted that preparatory acts, 
or even effects, within the French territory are sufficient to apply French criminal law, even 
when these acts or conditions are not constituent elements of the offence.89 It should be 
pointed out that the French Court of Cassation takes into account the place of the statutory 
seat to locate the business decisions which constitute a criminal offence.90 As a result, French 
criminal law may apply when the business decisions of a company whose statutory seat is 
within French territory, such as the French member of an MNE, are a constituent element of 
the offence. It should also be noted that the French Criminal Code also applies the theory of 
ubiquity to accomplices. Furthermore, French courts have developed the theory of 
indivisibility through which they may exercise territorial jurisdiction over autonomous 
criminal offences committed abroad that are sometimes only remotely connected with France, 
such as concealment abroad of goods obtained through fraud in France.91 
 
Under Article 113-5 French Criminal Code, French criminal law is also applicable to any 
person who, within the French territory, is guilty as an accomplice to a felony or 
misdemeanour committed abroad if 1) it is punishable both by the French and foreign law, 
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and 2) if it was established by a final decision of a foreign court. Plaintiffs in Rougier and 
DLH relied upon Article 113-5 to justify the criminal prosecution in France of French 
companies for criminal offences occurring abroad. However, the application of Article 113-5 
presents a number of challenges. First, it applies only to accomplices to a criminal offence 
committed abroad. Second, it requires ‘double (or dual) criminality’ (double incrimination), 
which means that both countries must punish the criminal offence. Third, a foreign court 
must have rendered a final judgement. In general, French courts strictly interpret these 
requirements, thus limiting the application of Article 113-5.92 
 
The Rougier case demonstrates that Article 113-5 provides limited opportunities as a basis 
for jurisdiction to sue parent companies and gain access to justice. Pursuant to Article 113-5, 
the plaintiffs alleged that French criminal law was applicable to the French company Rougier 
for complicity in the commission of various criminal offences by SFID, its Cameroonian 
subsidiary. The plaintiffs contended they had been unable to gain access to justice in 
Cameroon, because of corruption and lack of independence of local and judicial authorities.93 
However, the Paris Court of Appeal dismissed their claim on the grounds that Article 113-5 
requires a final ruling from a foreign court, which was missing in this instance.94 It found that 
the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that it was impossible to obtain a final ruling in Cameroon. 
Such requirement is an obstacle to transnational criminal claims against MNEs in France 
when access to justice in the host country is limited by corruption or political instability. 
 
The principle of territoriality is the prime basis for the application of Dutch criminal law and 
the jurisdiction of Dutch courts in criminal matters. Article 2 Dutch Criminal Code provides 
that Dutch criminal law is applicable to anyone who commits any criminal offence within the 
Netherlands. The determining factor is locus delicti, meaning the place where the criminal 
offence was committed. Unlike the criminal codes of some other European countries, the 
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Dutch Criminal Code does not describe the place where an offence is committed.95 Therefore, 
Dutch courts have had to clarify the scope of locus delicti under Dutch law. On several 
occasions, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a criminal offence could be committed in 
more than one place.96 Furthermore, it is not necessary that all the constituent elements of the 
criminal offence took place on Dutch territory to establish jurisdiction of the Dutch courts. 
They may exercise jurisdiction over a criminal offence when one of its elements took place 
in the Netherlands. Therefore, a legal person who committed a criminal offence abroad may 
be prosecuted in the Netherlands when one element of the criminal offence took place in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that Dutch courts could exercise 
jurisdiction over accomplices acting abroad in support of crimes that took place in Dutch 
territory.97 However, whether Dutch courts have jurisdiction over accomplices acting in the 
Netherlands for an offence committed abroad is not entirely clear.98 Nonetheless, scholars 
assume that the location where the complicity takes place can be considered the locus delicti 
for the crime of complicity.99 As for joint-wrongdoing, scholars have inferred from case-law 
that the location where the acts of joint-wrongdoing took place could be seen as the locus 
delicti.100 In addition, Dutch courts have jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts which aggravate 
the territorial offence, but not over extraterritorial acts that constitute separate crimes.101 
 
3.4 Application of the extraterritoriality principles  
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction based on principles of extraterritoriality is relevant to 
criminal offences committed by MNEs in host countries. The French and Dutch criminal 
codes provide for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction based on various principles of 
extraterritoriality. However, domestic courts are usually reluctant to assert extraterritorial 
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jurisdiction in criminal cases, especially in the Netherlands. The extraterritorial jurisdiction 
of Dutch criminal law has been traditionally limited to the application of the protective 
principle (Article 4 Dutch Criminal Code) and the active personality principle (Article 5 
Dutch Criminal Code).102 In general, the Netherlands has consistently been adverse to the 
principles of passive personality and universal jurisdiction, even in the context of its 
obligations under international conventions.103 This attitude is partly due to the Dutch legal 
views on the practice of criminal justice.104 Four concerns guide Dutch theory and practice in 
the field of criminal law: legal security, proper administration of justice, avoidance of 
conflicts of jurisdiction, and non-interference. 105  As a result, reasonable and responsible 
treatment of offenders, if possible within their own social environment, is an important 
aspect of criminal justice in the Netherlands.106 
 
3.4.1 Active personality principle 
Under the active personality principle, a State has jurisdiction over criminal offences 
committed by its nationals. The active nationality principle appears to be the most justifiable 
basis for exercising jurisdiction to regulate MNEs’ conduct abroad.107 
 
3.4.1.1 France 
Article 113-6 French Criminal Code provides that French criminal law is applicable to 
criminal offences committed by French nationals outside the French territory. However, it 
distinguishes between felonies and misdemeanours. French criminal law is applicable to any 
felony without any further conditions108 while it is applicable to any misdemeanour if the 
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conduct is also punishable under the legislation of the country in which it was committed.109 
Therefore, Article 113-6 requires the application of the double criminality theory to 
misdemeanours committed by French nationals outside of France. Another important aspect 
is that Article 113-6 only applies to French companies and, therefore, foreign subsidiaries are 
excluded. French legal experts suggest that the foreign subsidiary should be considered to be 
of French nationality when a number of elements, including the control of the French parent 
company over the foreign subsidiary, demonstrate that, in reality, the foreign subsidiary is 
French.110 
 
Article 113-8 French Criminal Code provides that the French prosecutor has absolute 
discretion to decide whether to pursue prosecution of misdemeanours in the cases set out 
under Article 113-6. This provision is a major obstacle to transnational criminal litigation 
against MNEs, particularly when the French prosecutor is reluctant to sue companies. In 
Rougier, the plaintiffs used Article 113-6 as a basis for their claim. However, the prosecutor 
refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the French parent company. Both the Paris 
Court of Appeal and the French Court of Cassation respectively dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
appeal on the grounds that, pursuant to Article 113-8, only the prosecutor can initiate 
criminal proceedings based on Article 113-6.111 As a result of Article 113-8, plaintiffs cannot 
successfully use the active personality principle as a jurisdictional basis to regulate French 
companies’ conduct abroad in spite of its broad adoption in France. The prosecutor’s 
absolute discretion to refuse cases appears questionable because it places significant power in 
the hands of one entity.112 In particular, prosecutors may be subjected to political pressure, as 
they lack independence from the French executive power. 113 Furthermore, the attitude of 
prosecutors seems to be reinforced by the lack of financial resources to conduct 
investigations in host countries and the potential ‘negative’ impacts on career advancement.  
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3.4.1.2 The Netherlands 
Article 5 Dutch Criminal Code provides that Dutch criminal law is applicable to offences 
committed by Dutch nationals outside the Netherlands. However, Article 5 distinguishes 
between two situations. First, Article 5(1)1° lists a number of criminal provisions which, 
when violated by Dutch nationals abroad, automatically trigger the application of Dutch 
criminal law.114 In this context, whether these acts constitute criminal offences in the foreign 
State is not relevant.115 Second, Article 5(1)2° provides that Dutch criminal law applies to the 
commission of all crimes under Dutch law by Dutch nationals abroad when the requirement 
of double criminality is satisfied.116 When the offender is a legal person, it is assumed that the 
legal person must have a link with the Netherlands, such as incorporation or registration 
under Dutch law.117 Double criminality is determined in abstracto, which means that it is 
sufficient that the act falls within the scope of a foreign criminal provision.118 The Dutch 
Supreme Court held that the Dutch Criminal Code is applicable to every Dutch legal person 
who commits a crime outside the Netherlands, where this act constitutes a criminal offence 
according to the law of the State on whose territory the crime is committed.119 In addition, the 
fact that a legal person is not recognized as such in the other country does not bar prosecution 
in the Netherlands.120 Furthermore, it is not relevant whether the law of the State where the 
crime is committed recognizes the criminal liability of natural persons for crimes committed 
by legal persons.121 
 
In the case against Trafigura, in 2008, the Dutch prosecutor declined to prosecute Trafigura 
BV, Puma Energy International BV (Puma) (another Dutch company), and Claude Dauphin 
(Trafigura’s chairman) for the criminal offences related to toxic waste dumping in Ivory 
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Coast. The main reason was that it appeared impossible to conduct an investigation in Ivory 
Coast, most notably due to the lack of cooperation of the Ivorian authorities.122  
 
In 2009, Greenpeace lodged a complaint with the Court of Appeal of The Hague against the 
Dutch prosecutor’s decision.123 It claimed that the Netherlands had jurisdiction to prosecute 
Trafigura BV and Puma: 
 
The locus delicti of the offences is (partly) in the Netherlands, precisely because two 
‘suspected’ legal persons have their offices in the Netherlands and the offences 
objected to and described in this complaint were committed entirely in the Dutch 
‘context’ of these legal persons. The Netherlands, at any rate, has jurisdiction to try 
Trafigura and Puma pursuant to Article 5(1)2° of the Dutch Criminal Code. After 
all the persons who committed offences which are also punishable in Côte d’Ivoire 
are Dutch legal persons. In this case, the fact that Dauphin does not have Dutch 
nationality does not affect the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. For, if the legal person 
has the Dutch nationality, the executive ‘in fact’ can be prosecuted in the Netherlands, 
irrespective of his nationality.124 
 
In 2011, the Court of Appeal rejected Greenpeace’s complaint,125 concluding that the Dutch 
courts did not have jurisdiction for several reasons. First, the facts did not take place in the 
Netherlands. Second, although Trafigura BV had its formal establishment in the Netherlands, 
the actual business of the company occurred in the UK and Switzerland. Therefore, Trafigura 
BV could not be considered a Dutch legal person under Article 5 Dutch Criminal Code. 
Third, none of the natural persons targeted by the complaint were of Dutch nationality or 
residents in the Netherlands. Fourth, the Court of Appeal questioned the feasibility of both an 
investigation and a prosecution and raised the impossibility to conduct a proper criminal 
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investigation in Ivory Coast. Fifth, it held that the toxic waste dumped by Tommy Company, 
and not by Trafigura BV. In the court’s view, Greenpeace did not demonstrate that Trafigura 
BV knew that Tommy Company would commit such acts.126 Overall, there was insufficient 
evidence justifying an investigation into, and prosecution of, the alleged criminal offences. 
 
The ICA also provides that Dutch criminal law applies to a Dutch national who commits any 
of the crimes defined in ICA outside of the Netherlands.127 Therefore, Dutch courts have 
jurisdiction to apply Dutch criminal law to the commission of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and torture by a Dutch company in a host country after 2003. 
Importantly, it does not matter if the suspect became a Dutch national only after committing 
the crime.128  
 
In the Netherlands, no Dutch company has been tried for the commission of international 
crimes abroad. However, two Dutch businessmen have been prosecuted for business 
activities directly related to international crimes.129 In both cases, the Dutch courts held they 
had jurisdiction based on the active nationality principle. In Public Prosecutor v Van 
Anraat,130 the Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat was accused of complicity in genocide 
and war crimes before the Dutch criminal courts. From 1985 until 1988, van Anraat delivered 
large quantities of thiodiglycol, a chemical used in the production of chemical weapons, to 
the regime of Saddam Hussein. Later, the Iraqi regime deployed chemical weapons against 
Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq, as part of a larger genocidal campaign to annihilate the 
Kurdish population.131 On 23 December 2005, the District Court of The Hague found van 
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Anraat guilty for complicity in war crimes, but acquitted him of complicity in genocide.132 On 
9 May 2007, the Court of Appeal of The Hague upheld the District Court’s ruling, also 
acquitting van Anraat in respect of genocide, albeit for different reasons.133 Ultimately, on 30 
June 2009, the Dutch Supreme Court confirmed the conviction.134 
 
During the trial, van Anraat challenged the jurisdiction of the Dutch criminal courts. He 
argued that, because of the accessory character of complicity to genocide and war crimes, the 
District Court was not competent, as it lacked jurisdiction over the main offences. However, 
the District Court dismissed van Anraat’s argument. First, it held that complicity in a crime, 
even if it concerns genocide or war crimes, is an independent indictable offence. Second, 
given that van Anraat was staying in the Netherlands and was a Dutch national, and that the 
indicted offences of complicity were considered to be criminal offences, the District Court 
found that van Anraat could be prosecuted in the Netherlands pursuant to Article 5 Dutch 
Criminal Code. 
 
In Public Prosecutor v Kouwenhoven,135 the Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven was 
accused of complicity in war crimes and illegal supply of arms to Charles Taylor, the former 
President of Liberia, in violation of UN and Dutch embargos prohibiting arms trade with 
Liberia. On 7 June 2006, the District Court of The Hague found Kouwenhoven guilty for 
illegal supply of arms, but acquitted him of complicity in war crimes.136 However, on 10 
March 2008, the Court of Appeal of The Hague overturned the District Court’s ruling and 
acquitted Kouwenhoven of all charges. 137  On 20 April 2010, the Dutch Supreme Court 
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quashed the judgement of the Court of Appeal and referred the case to another court.138 The 
case was pending at the time of writing. In this instance, the Dutch courts based their 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the active nationality principle. However, scholars have 
suggested that the practical exercise of this jurisdictional basis presented difficulties 
regarding the collection of evidence abroad, mutual legal assistance, and the complexity for 
Dutch judges to form a judgement based on the facts.139 Ultimately, these obstacles have 
prevented the Dutch courts from convicting Kouwenhoven for extraterritorial crimes. 
 
3.4.2 Passive personality principle 
Under the passive personality principle, a State has jurisdiction over criminal offences 
committed by foreign nationals that affect its own citizens. 
 
Article 113-7 French Criminal Code provides that French criminal law is applicable to any 
felony, and any misdemeanour punished by imprisonment, committed by a French or a 
foreign national outside the French territory where the victim is a French national at the time 
the offence took place. In transnational criminal litigation against MNEs, Article 113-7 
enables French courts to have jurisdiction over criminal offences committed by foreign and 
French companies against French nationals abroad. This provision presents various 
advantages, as it confers automatic and exclusive jurisdiction to French criminal courts140 and 
does not require double criminality. However, Article 113-8 French Criminal Code also 
applies to Article 113-7, which means that the French prosecutor has absolute discretion to 
initiate criminal proceedings in cases alleging misdemeanours. 
 
Dutch criminal law applies to anyone on foreign soil who commits certain criminal offences 
against a victim of Dutch nationality. Two situations should be distinguished. First, Article 
5b Dutch Criminal Code provides for the application of the passive personality principle to 
certain criminal offences, such as human trafficking and offences relating to minors, which 
may be relevant in the context of MNEs’ activities. However, the exercise of such 
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jurisdiction is premised on the condition that the conduct constitutes a criminal offence in the 
foreign state as well (double criminality). Second, the ICA provides that Dutch domestic law 
shall apply to anyone who commits the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and torture outside the Netherlands if the crime is committed against a Dutch 
national.141 The ICA does not require double criminality.142  
 
However, the application of the passive nationality principle to transnational criminal 
litigation against MNEs in both France and the Netherlands is limited in practice. First, 
victims of MNE conduct in host States are often nationals of these countries. Unless the 
victim has dual nationality, this aspect limits the use of legislation based on the passive 
nationality principle to prosecute French, Dutch, and foreign companies of MNEs. Second, 
the passive personality principle is the most controversial of the five accepted bases of 
jurisdiction in international law.143 In France, Article 113-7 has been criticized for being an 
incongruous basis on which to prosecute extraterritorial crimes, as it is usually seen as 
intruding on the sovereignty of other nations and subjecting foreign nationals to an 
indeterminate threat of criminal responsibility in dealings with French nationals.144 In the 
Netherlands, by virtue of a long-standing tradition, domestic courts are particularly reluctant 
to apply jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle, thus limiting its potential 
benefits.145 
 
3.4.3 Universality principle 
Under the universality principle, a State has jurisdiction to prosecute and punish foreign 
nationals who commit crimes abroad against foreigners.146 
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France provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction (Articles 689-1 to 689-13 French 
Code of Criminal Procedure). These articles are an unusual combination of a domestic 
enabling clause (Article 689-1) and an enumeration of international conventions providing 
for universal jurisdiction (Articles 689-2 to 689-13). 147  Article 689-1 provides that, in 
accordance with the international conventions quoted in Articles 689-2 to 689-13, a person 
guilty of committing, or attempting to commit, any of the offences listed by these provisions 
outside of France and who happens to be in France may be prosecuted and tried by French 
courts. The most relevant international conventions for transnational criminal litigation 
against MNEs include the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture),148 the Rome Statute,149 
and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.150 Specific requirements apply to French jurisdiction over crimes under the 
Rome Statute, including French residency of the offender and double criminality. 
Furthermore, the foreign State must be a State Party to the Rome Statute. In addition, the 
French prosecutor has absolute discretion to prosecute. 
 
French courts have agreed to exercise universal jurisdiction over the commission of criminal 
offences by foreigners abroad in only a few cases. For instance, in July 2005, a Mauritanian 
army officer was sentenced to imprisonment for committing acts of torture and barbarity in 
Mauritania in the 1990s. 151  Under Articles 689, 689-1, and 689-2, and Article 7(2) 
Convention against Torture, French courts held they had jurisdiction to try the case and apply 
French law. They also overrode a Mauritanian amnesty law, as application of that law would 
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have resulted in a breach of France’s international obligations and rendered the principle of 
universal jurisdiction totally ineffective.152 
 
3.4.3.2 The Netherlands 
Traditionally, the Netherlands has had strong reservations concerning the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.153 Similar to France, only crimes of international concern and crimes 
under international criminal law can be subject to jurisdiction based on the universality 
principle. First, Article 4 Dutch Criminal Code provides for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction for a limited number of criminal offences. 154  Second, under the ICA, Dutch 
domestic law applies to anyone who commits genocide, torture, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity outside the Netherlands if the suspect is present in the Netherlands.155 Both the 
Dutch Criminal Code and the ICA offer a restricted application of the universality principle. 
The alleged offender must be present in the Netherlands. Moreover, pursuant to the scope of 
the ICA, the crimes must have been committed after its entry into force on 1st October 2003. 
Furthermore, Dutch courts will only exercise universal jurisdiction if neither the territorial 
courts nor the International Criminal Court (ICC) is exercising jurisdiction. Whether such 
rule may apply to legal persons, and under which conditions, has to be clarified. The Dutch 
Supreme Court demonstrated hostility to the application of the universal jurisdiction 
principle in the Bouterse case,156 in which it held that Dutch courts had jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial acts only when a nexus could be established or the suspect could be arrested 
in the Netherlands.  
 
In Riwal, Al-Haq accused the Riwal group of contributing to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in the West Bank within the meaning of the ICA.157 Following the complaint, the 
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Dutch prosecutor carried out a criminal investigation, after which he acknowledged the 
potential direct violations of international humanitarian law raised by the litigant: 
 
The construction of the barrier and/or a settlement may be considered to be a 
violation of International Humanitarian Law, among which the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, if, as in the aforementioned cases, this construction took place in occupied 
territory. … Participation in a violation of International Humanitarian Law by Dutch 
persons and legal entities is a crime proscribed in Article 5 of the ICA. When 
making considerations with regard to a settlement according to criminal law, the 
Public Prosecution Service considered in the first place that a violation of Article 5 of 
the ICA is a serious criminal offence. Persons and legal entities within the Dutch 
jurisdiction are required not in any way to be involved in, or contribute to, possible 
violations of the Geneva Conventions or other rules of International Humanitarian 
Law. They are also required to take decisions of authoritative international bodies and 
judicial institutions such as the International Court of Justice about the status, 
legitimacy and consequences of the barrier extremely serious.158 
 
Nevertheless, the Dutch prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against the 
Riwal group or its managing directors for practical reasons.159 
 
4 Conclusions 
The nature of transnational litigation against MNEs poses a number of legal challenges as to 
whether the home or the host State is competent to hear the claims, and whether the home or 
the host State law applies to the proceedings. 
 
In civil matters, France and the Netherlands are bound by the EU regime of private 
international law. With regard to jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation provides that 
domestic courts of a Member State are usually competent to hear civil claims against 
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defendants domiciled in that Member State. Therefore, the French and Dutch courts have 
jurisdiction to hear transnational civil claims against the member of an MNE which is 
domiciled in France and the Netherlands (usually the parent company).  
 
At the same time, the Brussels I Regulation foresees the application of different jurisdictional 
rules to companies domiciled outside the EU (such as host State subsidiaries). Domestic rules 
will normally determine the competent court. In France and the Netherlands, domestic courts 
have jurisdiction to hear transnational civil claims against host State subsidiaries in limited 
situations. French and Dutch courts may accept to hear claims against companies domiciled 
outside the EU in two situations: 1) when the existence of co-defendants justifies the 
consolidation of claims; or 2) as a result of the application of rules based on the forum 
necessitatis doctrine. When the claims satisfy a number of requirements, the application of 
these rules in transnational civil litigation against MNEs has received successful reception 
from French and Dutch courts. Finally, the effects of the recast Brussels I Regulation on 
transnational civil claims against MNEs, in particular the new lis pendens rules, have yet to 
be seen. 
 
With regard to applicable law, the Rome II Regulation provides that the law applicable to 
civil matters must be the law of the country in which the damage occurs. As a result, the host 
State law applies to transnational civil claims against MNEs in France and the Netherlands. 
Nonetheless, the Rome II Regulation provides for a number of exceptions. Consequently, 
French and Dutch law may apply in a number of situations, such as when there is an 
environmental damage. 
 
In criminal matters, French and Dutch law may apply to extraterritorial criminal offences 
involving MNEs in specific circumstances. In France, the territoriality principle remains 
relevant, in particular when one of the constituent elements of the crime was committed on 
the French territory. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 113-5 French Criminal Code, victims 
have brought criminal claims against French companies for complicity in crimes committed 
in host countries. However, a number of requirements must be met, including double 




possible to prosecute Dutch companies for extraterritorial crimes when one of the constituent 
elements of the crime was committed on the Dutch territory. Furthermore, Dutch courts 
accept that a criminal offence can have different locus delicti. However, the application of 
Dutch criminal law is uncertain when a Dutch company acts as an accomplice in the 
Netherlands to a criminal offence committed abroad. Ultimately, territorial jurisdiction is not 
always adapted to criminal offences committed by French and Dutch companies in host 
countries.  
 
French and Dutch laws also recognize the existence of alternative principles of jurisdiction 
based on the nationality of the perpetrator or of the victim, or the necessity to prosecute 
perpetrators of gross human rights abuses. Amongst them, the active nationality principle 
appears to be the most justifiable jurisdictional ground to regulate French and Dutch 
companies’ conduct in host countries. Nevertheless, procedural requirements, such as double 
criminality or a foreign court’s final judgement, as well as institutional obstacles, such as the 
reluctance of public prosecutors to initiate criminal proceedings against corporate offenders, 
limit the opportunities offered by the French and Dutch criminal systems to hold members of 
MNEs accountable for crimes in host States.  
 
Once French and Dutch courts are competent to hear transnational claims against MNEs, and 
their laws apply to the proceedings, the next question relates to the existence, and the content, 
of rules governing the liability of corporate groups in areas directly relevant to human rights 





Holding multinational enterprises liable in France and the Netherlands 
 
1 Introduction 
Corporate liability standards to punish human rights abuse and environmental damage 
occurring in the context of corporate group activities are crucial to the success of 
transnational claims against MNEs. However, the UNGPs provide that legal barriers can 
arise where the way in which liability is attributed among members of a corporate group 
under domestic criminal and civil laws facilitates the avoidance of appropriate 
accountability. 1 As a result, such legal barriers may prevent legitimate cases from being 
addressed, thus leading to corporate impunity. 
 
In France and the Netherlands, a number of plaintiffs have sought to hold parent companies 
liable for their direct or indirect involvement in activities harmful to humans and the 
environment in host countries. In most instances, cause lawyers and CSOs litigating these 
cases have attempted to demonstrate the absence of an effective regime of liability applying 
to MNEs. They have also raised the inadequacy of benefits related to the corporate form, 
such as ‘the limited liability for its members and a legal personality separate from that of its 
members,’2 when business-related abuse occurs in the context of corporate groups. 
 
Chapter 6 aims to provide an overview of civil and criminal legislation, and case-law 
applicable to corporate liability in France and the Netherlands. In particular, it focuses on the 
way existing legal rules may affect the attribution of liability among members of corporate 
groups and, therefore, access to remedies in the context of transnational litigation against 
MNEs. Chapter 6 starts by presenting a brief overview of legislation related to the separate 
legal personality of the company as well as limited liability companies in France and the 
Netherlands. Particular attention will be given to the problem they pose when plaintiffs seek 
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to hold parent companies liable for the harm caused by their subsidiaries. Chapter 6 then 
provides a comparative analysis of French and Dutch legislative and case-law standards 
applying to corporate liability in various legal fields, including competition, tort, commercial, 
environmental, employment, and criminal law. This analysis aims to understand whether 
existing standards allow, or may allow, parent companies to be held liable for the harm 
caused by their subsidiaries. The final section of Chapter 6 analyses the emergence of new 
standards of corporate liability, in particular the reception by French and Dutch courts of 
corporate liability arguments based on the CSR commitments of MNEs and legislative 
initiative on human rights due diligence. 
 
It should be pointed out that, as seen in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 5, pursuant to the Rome II 
Regulation, the host State law generally applies to transnational civil claims against an MNE. 
Therefore, it is less likely that French or Dutch law will apply to these claims. Nonetheless, 
the Rome II Regulation also creates a number of exceptions, which allow plaintiffs to choose 
the home State law, meaning the French or Dutch law, as the applicable law. Consequently, 
the study of corporate liability standards in France and the Netherlands remains relevant. 
 
2 The liability of MNEs  
The separate legal personality of the company as well as the emergence of limited liability 
are two important developments of modern company law. 3  However, they may pose 
problems in the case of corporate groups, especially where one company owns and controls 
another.4 This may be the case where the parent company is the shareholder, or one of the 
shareholders, of a subsidiary and, at the same time, controls or is engaged in the business 
activities of the subsidiary. The separate legal personality of the company and limited 
liability have often shielded the parent company from liability for human rights abuse and 
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environmental damage it committed through its subsidiary.5 Nonetheless, the technique of 
piercing the corporate veil may provide a solution to limit unfair consequences on victims of 
MNE abuse. 
 
2.1 Separate legal personality and limited liability  
It should be pointed out that the EU has adopted a number of directives governing various 
aspects of company law, such as the formation of public limited liability companies.6 As a 
result, a number of French and Dutch legislative provisions in the field of company law 
reflect EU law and present some similarities. 
 
2.1.1 Separate legal personality 
In this study, ‘separate legal personality’ means that domestic legislation and/or case-law 
may foresee that some types of companies become autonomous legal entities once they are 
incorporated. As such, they exercise rights and assume certain obligations. The law ignores 
the artificial nature of these companies by giving them a legal personality which is separate 
from that of the persons who manage it (directors) or own it (shareholders when the company 
is limited by shares).7  
 
In France, Article 1842 French Civil Code states that partnerships (sociétés)8 enjoy legal 
personality from the time of their registration.9 Furthermore, the French Commercial Code 
                                                 
 
5
 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Limited Liability and Multinational Enterprises: A Case for Reform?’ (2010) 34 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 915, 917. 
6
 On EU company law, see Thomas Papadopoulos and Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Company Law’ in David 
Vaughan, Aidan Robertson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Law of the European Union (OUP 2012). 
7
 On the separate legal personality of the company, see Paddy Ireland, ‘Capitalism Without the Capitalist: The 
Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality’ 
(1996) 17 Legal History 40. 
8
 Pursuant to Article 1832 French Civil Code, a ‘partnership is created by two or several persons who agree by a 
contract to appropriate property or their industry for a common venture with a view to sharing the benefit or 
profiting from the saving which may result therefrom.’ The partners bind themselves to contribute to the losses. 
For a translated version of the French Civil Code, see David Gruning, ‘Civil Code’ (Legifrance, 1 July 2013) 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations> accessed 30 November 2015. 
9





(Code de commerce)10 provides that trading companies (sociétés commerciales) shall have 
legal personality with effect from their registration in the commercial and companies 
register. 11  In the Netherlands, Article 2:3 Dutch Civil Code provides that a number of 
companies possess legal personality, including companies limited by shares (naamloze 
vennootschappen or NV) and private companies with limited liability (besloten 
vennootschappen or BV). Both types of companies are legal persons with an authorized 
capital divided into transferable shares.12 However, BV shares must be registered shares.13  
 
2.1.2 Limited liability 
In this study, ‘limited liability’ means that domestic legislation and/or case-law may foresee 
that, for certain types of companies, the liability of investors, owners, or shareholders is 
limited to the amount of their investment, contribution, or shares in the company.14 
 
In France, Article L223-1 French Commercial Code states that a limited liability company 
(société à responsabilité limitée) may be established by one or more persons who shall bear 
its losses only up to the amount of their contributions. In addition, Article L225-1 French 
Commercial Code provides that the main form of joint-stock company (société anonyme) is a 
company whose capital is divided into shares and which is formed among members who 
shall bear any losses only up to the amount of their contributions. In the Netherlands, in both 
companies limited by shares and private companies with limited liability, the shareholders 
shall not be personally liable for acts performed in the name of the company and shall not be 
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liable to contribute to losses of the company in excess of the amount which must be paid up 
on their shares.15  
 
2.2 Corporate groups  
There is no general definition of the ‘corporate group’ (also called ‘group of companies’ in 
this thesis).16 Vandekerckhove explains that: 
 
the corporate group is one of the forms of concentration of companies. Such a 
concentration may be the result of very different evolutions. The group may have 
grown through new incorporations or other forms of establishment abroad. It may 
also have grown by way of international mergers and acquisitions or through joint 
ventures. Groups are further characterised by their organisational structure, the 
territorial distances between group members, ownership pattern, intensity of intra-
group transactions, profitability, and technical circumstances. This results in the 
existence of very different types of groups, from highly centralised to decentralised, 
from very specialised to largely diversified.17 
 
Ultimately, Vandekerckhove broadly defines the corporate group as ‘an aggregate of legally 
independent corporations that are related to each other through patrimonial, contractual or 
personal links and that come under a common centre of control.’18 
 
As seen in Chapter 1, MNEs ‘usually comprise companies or other entities established in 
more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various 
ways. One or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the 
activities of others and their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from 
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one multinational enterprise to another.’19 The type of business relationships that members of 
an MNE have with each other vary from one MNE to another. In the context of transnational 
litigation against MNEs, plaintiffs have repeatedly challenged the relationship between the 
parent company based in a home country, such as France or the Netherlands, and foreign 
subsidiaries under its control or ownership and operating in host countries.20  
 
In France, there is no statutory definition of the corporate group. While French courts have 
attempted to compensate by adopting various definitions, there is a lack of consistency 
amongst these definitions, as they reflect the priorities of different legal branches. For 
instance, the criminal chamber of the French Court of Cassation found that the corporate 
group exists when its companies share a common economic, social, or financial interest 
(intérêt économique, social ou financier commun), which must be appreciated with regard to 
the policies elaborated for the whole group.21 At the same time, the commercial chamber of 
the French Court of Cassation held that a corporate group is characterized by an economic 
unity and a community of indivisible interests led by one person.22 French courts have also 
developed various rules to govern corporate group conduct and protect creditors in specific 
circumstances. As a result, the French law governing corporate groups is fragmented and 
inconsistent.23 Nonetheless, an important feature of the corporate group is that it does not 
have legal personality and, as a result, it cannot be held liable in the context of civil or 
criminal proceedings. 24  The French Court of Cassation recently reaffirmed that, in the 
absence of legal personality, corporate groups cannot have rights and obligations or be bound 
to pay damages.25 
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Even if there is no statutory definition of the corporate group, the French Commercial Code 
still defines various situations where a company may control another. First, when a company 
owns more than 50% of the capital of another company, the second company shall be 
regarded as a subsidiary (filiale) of the first company (Article L233-1). Second, when a 
company owns between 10 and 50% of another company’s capital, the first company shall be 
regarded as having a holding (ayant une participation) in the second company (Article L233-
2). Third, Article L233-3 defines other situations where a company is deemed to control 
another one: 1) the company directly or indirectly holds a fraction of the capital that gives it a 
majority of the voting rights at that company’s general meetings; 2) the company holds a 
majority of the voting rights in that company by virtue of an agreement; 3) the company 
effectively determines the decisions taken at that company's general meetings through its 
voting rights; 4) the company is a partner in, or member or shareholder of, that company and 
has the power to appoint or dismiss the majority of the members of that company's 
administrative, management or supervisory structures; 5) the company directly or indirectly 
holds a fraction of the voting rights above 40% and no other partner, member, or shareholder 
directly or indirectly holds a fraction larger than its own.26 As will be seen in the analysis of 
the AREVA case later in this Chapter, the type of control that a company has over another one 
influences the possibility to hold a parent company liable for the actions of its foreign 
subsidiary. 
 
In the Netherlands, Article 2:24b Dutch Civil Code provides that a ‘group is an economic 
unit in which legal persons and partnerships are united in one organization. Group companies 
are legal persons and partnerships which are united in one group.’27 Furthermore, Article 
2:24a(1) Dutch Civil Code defines the subsidiary (dochtermaatschappij) of a legal person, 
such as a parent company, in two ways. First, a subsidiary is a legal person in which the 
parent company, or one or more of its subsidiaries, ‘can exercise, solely or jointly, more than 
one half of the voting rights at a general meeting.’28 Second, a subsidiary is a legal person of 
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which the parent company, or one or more of its subsidiaries, is ‘a member or shareholder 
and […] can appoint or dismiss, solely or jointly, more than one half of the directors or 
officers or of the supervisory board members,29 also if all persons entitled to vote were to cast 
their vote.’30 The parent company’s rights may be derived from its majority as a shareholder 
or from a shareholders’ agreement and may be held either by the company alone or jointly 
with any of its other subsidiaries.31 The Dutch Civil Code also foresees situations where a 
legal person participates, or has a participating interest, in another legal person. This is the 
case ‘if it or one or more of its subsidiaries, solely or jointly and for its own account, 
contributes, or causes the contribution of, capital with the object of a long-lasting relationship 
with such legal person or the furtherance of its own activities. If one-fifth or more of the 
issued capital is contributed, the existence of a participation shall be presumed.’32 
 
In the context of MNE activities, the application of separate legal personality and limited 
liability generally prevents one MNE member from being held liable for the activity of 
another member of the same MNE, even when the former member owns and controls the 
latter one. For instance, a parent company is not liable for the harm caused to humans or the 
environment by its subsidiary, even when the parent company owns and controls the 
subsidiary.33 MNEs may use complex and confusing corporate structures to distance and 
separate the parent company from the local operating subsidiaries, thereby protecting the 
MNE from legal liability.34  
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Scholars have criticized the strict application of separate legal personality and limited 
liability where human rights abuse or environmental damage are involved.35 They have also 
suggested that the traditional image of the company as ‘an isolated and free-standing 
commercial entity with a sole aim of making profit, often at any cost’ should be revised. 
Policy-makers should recognize that companies are integrated parts of society and that their 
economic persona should not be separated from their social and political persona.36 
 
2.3 Piercing the corporate veil 
The expression ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ or corporate veil piercing, emerged from the 
lexicon of company law. It refers to the situation where a corporate shareholder is held liable 
for the debts of the company of which it is a shareholder notwithstanding separate legal 
personality and limited liability. 37  However, there is a lot of confusion as to the exact 
meaning of corporate veil piercing. For instance, courts often do not distinguish between 
statutory rules and corporate veil piercing theories when they hold parent companies liable. 
As a result, parent companies are sometimes held liable based on corporate veil piercing 
theories where the case could have been solved by reference to existing rules of company or 
civil law.38 Moreover, corporate veil piercing theories are less developed outside of common 
law countries. Therefore, courts in France and the Netherlands have frequently relied on 
fraud or abuse of the purpose of the corporate form to hold parent companies liable for harm 
caused by other companies. 39  In France, there have been several attempts to introduce 
theories equivalent to the corporate veil piercing into legislation. For instance, a bill was 
presented to the French Parliament in 1973, which would have recognized the specificities of 
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corporate groups and would have created a special court to rule over all legal issues relating 
to them.40 However, this bill was never adopted.  
 
There are also instances of ‘voluntary piercing’ which occurs when the parent company, as 
the shareholder of its subsidiary, voluntary abandons its right to limited liability and agrees to 
be held jointly liable for its subsidiary’s acts.41 Voluntary piercing is accepted under French 
and Dutch law. For instance, in the Netherlands, the parent company can declare that it 
assumes joint and several liability for any obligations arising from the legal acts of its 
subsidiary in order to allow the latter to obtain an exemption from the duty to publish its 
annual accounts (Article 2:403(f) Dutch Civil Code).42 In France, voluntary piercing may 
result from a guarantee of the parent company for liabilities of its subsidiaries to the benefit 
of third parties.43 
 
Some commentators have argued that corporate veil piercing should be extended to cases 
raising human rights abuse or environmental damage by MNEs through amendments to 
national company laws.44 However, piercing the corporate veil is a problematic solution for a 
number of reasons. First, it involves judicial discretion, 45  and scholars have argued that 
criteria for corporate veil piercing are not very clear-cut. It may also be very difficult to 
establish the factual relation required to pierce the corporate veil.46 Furthermore, complex 
corporate structures, coupled with the use of separate legal personality and limited liability, 
have an influence on the legal strategies used by plaintiffs to hold MNEs to account. For 
instance, limited liability forces plaintiffs to focus on acts or omissions of parent companies 
rather than seeking to pierce the corporate veil. However, an emphasis on parent companies 
limits the potential for holding to account corporate groups that operate under a vertically 
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hierarchical management structure. In more complex management structures, it is even more 
difficult to match existing legal principles of negligence to the reality of control.47 
 
3 The civil liability of French and Dutch MNEs 
In France and the Netherlands, there is substantial litigation practice of attempting to make 
the parent company liable for harm caused by its subsidiaries in various areas of civil law. 
Therefore, a comparative analysis of legislation and case-law in each area for both countries 
allows the reader to understand the variety of standards applicable, or potentially applicable, 
to MNEs and the differences existing across fields and between both countries. These 
standards may have implications for transnational litigation against MNEs. 
 
3.1 Competition law 
Although competition law is not an area of civil law, its treatment of parent companies’ 
liability for their subsidiaries’ acts is instructive. EU law influences French and Dutch 
competition rules. Over the years, EU competition law has progressively accepted the 
recognition of parent companies’ liability for their subsidiaries’ acts in specific 
circumstances. 48  In the landmark Akzo Nobel NV case, 49  the CJEU ruled that a parent 
company could be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of the fine imposed on its 
wholly-owned subsidiary. This solution was based on the grounds that the parent company 
exercises, either directly or indirectly, a decisive influence over the commercial policy of the 
subsidiary.50 The parent company has the burden of rebutting that presumption by showing 
that its subsidiary acts independently on the market.51 When the parent company does not 
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wholly own the subsidiary, the CJEU must seek additional evidence of the absence of the 
subsidiary’s autonomy and of the determining influence of the parent company on its 
subsidiary’s behaviour on the market. Such evidence can be demonstrated by showing the 
parent company’s influence on fixing prices or on the subsidiary’s management and 
commercial strategy.52 
 
The reception of EU case law by domestic courts is relevant here. In France, courts have 
adopted an interpretation that slightly departs from the Akzo Nobel NV judgement,53 seeking 
additional proof of the lack of autonomy of the wholly-owned subsidiary.54 For example, 
French courts will take into account the parent company’s financial participation in the 
capital of the subsidiary, the nomination of the managing body, or the possibility for the 
subsidiary’s managing body to freely determine an autonomous industrial, financial, and 
commercial strategy.55 In the Netherlands, Dutch courts have established that, if a parent 
company exercises ‘decisive influence’ over its subsidiary’s commercial behaviour, then 
both form part of the same economic undertaking. As a result, the parent company and the 
subsidiary can be fined for infringement of competition law. It is irrelevant whether the 
parent company was itself involved in the infringement. However, automatic liability for a 
parent company is not assumed in a private enforcement action.56 
 
3.2 Tort law 
Two main situations to hold a parent company liable in tort for harm caused by its 
subsidiary’s activities should be distinguished. First, the parent company is liable for its own 
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In France, Articles 1382 and 1383 French Civil Code govern the liability for one’s own act 
(la responsabilité du fait personnel).58 Pursuant to Article 1382, ‘any act whatever of man, 
which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate 
it.’59 Furthermore, Article 1383 states that ‘everyone is liable for the damage he causes not 
only by his intentional act, but also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.’60 Both 
articles require three elements to trigger liability: damage, causation, and a fault (faute).61 
Articles 1382 and 1383 apply to legal persons. They provide a basis for holding a parent 
company liable in the context of corporate group activities. However, the parent company 
must have committed a fault either intentionally or negligently.62 The liability of a parent 
company as a corporate shareholder on the basis of Article 1382 has been encountered in 
various situations. This was the case when the parent company maintained its subsidiary’s 
operations although insolvency was clearly inevitable or when it gave harmful instructions to 
its subsidiary.63 A parent company can also be held liable towards its subsidiary’s creditors 
when it has interfered in the management of its subsidiary.64 If a parent company makes 
decisions for its subsidiary, the latter cannot be considered an autonomous legal entity. 
However, French courts are reluctant to recognize such interference.65 Corporate groups often 
share a common strategy, which makes it difficult to assess the degree of the parent 
company’s interference in the management of its subsidiary. 66  Furthermore, the parent 
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company is not required, by the mere fact of its participation in its subsidiary, to support its 
subsidiary in fulfilling its financial obligations. This applies even if the subsidiary is 
responsible for a public service that can pose a risk to the public interest.67 In the Ademe v Elf 
Aquitaine case,68 the French Court of Cassation dismissed a claim to extend the liability of a 
subsidiary to its parent company for the clean-up of a landfill site. In the court’s view, there 
was no evidence that the parent company had committed a fault that would have justified 
making it liable under Article 1382. The simple fact of controlling another company does not 
suffice to demonstrate the parent company’s fault. Moreover, it is difficult to provide not 
only the evidence of such fault, but also the evidence of causation between the parent 
company’s fault and the damage caused by its subsidiary. 
 
Article 1384 French Civil Code provides for vicarious liability (responsabilité du fait 
d’autrui). Accordingly, a person is liable not only for the damage he causes by his own act, 
but also for the damage caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible.69 Article 
1384 enumerates a number of situations in which vicarious liability applies, such as 
employer/employee relationships. However, the relationship between a parent company and 
its subsidiary is excluded. Although the French Civil Code provides a legal basis for 
vicarious liability, the absence of a specific mention of the relationship between a parent 
company and its subsidiary prevents holding parent companies liable for their subsidiaries’ 
activities pursuant to Article 1384. Nonetheless, scholars have argued that French courts may 
apply vicarious liability beyond the employer/employee relationship to ‘any relationships 
capable of meeting the tests of subordination or the right to give instructions.’70 For instance, 
in ‘a blatant example of judicial creativity,’ French courts have extended Article 1384(1) to 
render one party (usually an institution or association) strictly liable for the torts of persons 
under its control or whose activities it controls.71 However, it remains uncertain whether 
French courts would be audacious enough to extend vicarious liability principles to the 
relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary. 
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It should be pointed out that, over the last decades, a number of official reports, which aimed 
to reform French tort law, have made various proposals regarding the liability of parent 
companies for their subsidiaries’ acts. For instance, in 2005, the Catala report72 suggested that 
the category of persons under Article 1384 should be extended to natural or legal persons 
who organise and have an interest in the activity of professionals or businesses (not being 
their employees). Furthermore, it suggested that a new Article 1360 extend such liability to 
the relationship between parent companies and subsidiaries. Interestingly, the Catala report 
promoted the creation of a strict liability regime. Similarly, in 2012, the working group led 
by Professor Terré suggested the creation of a fault-based liability regime for corporate 
groups (ie Article 7).73 However, both proposals have been criticized and, to date, the French 
government has not acted on the changes suggested. 
 
3.2.2 The Netherlands 
Under Article 6:162(1) Dutch Civil Code, a person who commits a tort against another which 
is attributable to him must repair the damage suffered by the other in consequence thereof. 
The Dutch Civil Code lays down a rule of fault liability on the basis of which both natural 
and legal persons can be held liable for their own intentional or negligent conduct. 74 
Furthermore, Article 6:162(3) Dutch Civil Code provides that a tortfeasor is responsible for 
the commission of a tort if it is due to his fault or to cause for which he is accountable by law 
or pursuant to generally accepted principles. As a result, tortious liability is incurred not only 
in case of subjective fault, but also in case of objective ‘answerability.’ Article 6:162(2) 
Dutch Civil Code specifies the types of acts which are deemed tortious. There are mainly 
three categories: the violation of a right; an act or omission breaching a duty imposed by law; 
an act or omission breaching a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct. First, 
there is a tort where the right of a person is infringed, such as the right to life, the right to 
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physical integrity, or the right to freedom.75 This category is directly relevant to transnational 
tort claims against MNEs in which plaintiffs raise human rights abuse. Second, liability 
arises where a wrongful act or omission violates a clear legal norm, such as Dutch laws and 
regulations or directly applicable norms of public international law.76 However, few Dutch 
statutory norms are applicable in the context of transnational tort claims against MNEs.77 
Third, transnational claims raising the liability of a parent company for its subsidiary’s 
activities abroad might also be built on the breach of unwritten norms pertaining to 
acceptable social behaviour.78  
 
The Dutch Civil Code also provides other potential bases for the liability of the parent 
company in the context of MNE activities. According to Article 6:166(1), ‘if one out of a 
group of persons unlawfully causes damage and the risk of thus causing damage should have 
restrained such persons from their collective conduct, they shall be jointly and severally 
liable if they can be held accountable for such conduct.’79 Furthermore, the Dutch Civil Code 
foresees the vicarious liability for other persons and things, such as children, subordinates, or 
movable things. 80  However, similar to the French Civil Code, it does not mention any 
relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary. 
 
In Shell, the plaintiffs claimed that the Dutch parent company Shell Plc violated a duty of 
care by failing to properly oversee its Nigerian subsidiary SPDC.81 They alleged that Shell 
Plc has an obligation to act in a socially responsible manner and ‘should exert its influence 
and control over its subsidiary SPDC in such a way that it is prevented as much as possible 
that its subsidiary SPDC causes damages to human beings and the environment during the 
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oil extraction.’82 In 2013, the District Court of The Hague dismissed all the claims against 
Shell Plc. It ruled that, pursuant to Nigerian law, a parent company is not obliged to prevent 
its ‘(sub-)subsidiaries’ from harming third parties abroad.83 It used a narrow definition of the 
duty of care of parent companies in the context of MNE activities. The District Court 
distinguished the relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary’s employees 
when both companies operate in the same country, which was the situation in Chandler,84 
from the relationship between the parent company and the people living around the oil 
pipelines and facilities of its subsidiary operating in another country. As a result, it found that: 
 
The duty of care of a parent company in respect of the employees of a subsidiary that 
operates in the same country further only comprises a relatively limited group of 
people, whereas a possible duty of care of a parent company of an international group 
of oil companies in respect of the people living in the vicinity of oil pipelines and oil 
facilities of (sub-)subsidiaries would create a duty of care in respect of a virtually 
unlimited group of people in many countries. The District Court believes that in the 
case at issue, it is far less quickly fair, just and reasonable than it was in Chandler v 
Cape to assume that such a duty of care on the part of Shell Plc exists.85 
 
It should be pointed out that, in this instance, the District Court applied Nigerian law, and not 
Dutch law. However, this ruling informs the reasoning of the District Court when 
considering the parent company’s duty of care.  
 
3.3 Company law 
In France and the Netherlands, statutory company law may provide for the liability of parent 
companies for their subsidiaries’ acts in a limited number of situations. In general, French 
and Dutch courts have had to develop some theories to face the reality of corporate groups. 
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Nonetheless, they remain reluctant to hold parent companies liable in the context of corporate 
group activities.  
 
3.3.1 France 
French company law offers a number of options under statutory law for holding parent 
companies liable for their subsidiaries. 
 
Article L621-2(2) French Commercial Code provides that commenced safeguarding 
proceedings (procédure de sauvegarde)86 may be extended to one or more other persons 
where their assets are intermingled with those of the debtor (commingling of assets – 
confusion de patrimoine), or where the legal entity is a sham (fictitious legal person – fictivité 
de la personne morale). However, the French Court of Cassation adopted a narrow 
interpretation of commingling of assets and fictitious legal persons in Theetten v SA 
Metaleurop.87 First, it ruled that a cash management system, foreign exchange agreements, 
and important fund advances by the parent company might be justified in a corporate group. 
These acts do not automatically prove the existence of abnormal financial relations 
demonstrating the commingling of assets of the parent company with those of its subsidiary.88 
Scholars have suggested that this case-law makes it even more difficult to prove a 
commingling of assets in a transnational case.89 Second, a company is fictitious when it lacks 
decisional autonomy, most notably its ability to make decisions with regard to the 
commenced safeguarding proceedings. As a result, exchange of staff does not necessarily 
characterize a fictitious subsidiary. Ultimately, the Court of Cassation held that the parent 
company, acting as de facto director, could be held liable if it had interfered in the 
management of its subsidiary. 
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The second situation where a parent company may be liable for its subsidiaries’ acts is in the 
context of liability for excess of liabilities over assets (responsabilité pour insuffisance 
d’actif). Article L651-2(1) French Commercial Code provides:  
 
Where the judicial liquidation proceedings of a legal entity reveals an excess of 
liabilities over assets, the court may, in instances where management fault faute de 
gestion has contributed to the excess of liabilities over assets, decide that the debts of 
the legal entity will be borne, in whole or in part, by all or some of the de jure or de 
facto managers, or by some of them who have contributed to the management fault. If 
there are several managers, the court may … declare that they are liable in 
solidarity.90 
 
Importantly, the managers can be either natural or legal persons. As a result, a parent 
company may be required to pay the debts of its subsidiary if it contributed to the 
management fault while acting as the de jure or de facto manager of its subsidiary.91 French 
courts appear to have considerable flexibility to find parent companies liable in such cases.92   
 
French courts have also developed various theories, based on the theory of identification, to 
hold a parent company liable for its subsidiary’s acts.93 The theory of identification requires 
that, in the context of a corporate group, abstraction is made of the difference in the identity 
between two companies. As a result, these two companies are considered as one company, 
and acts and liabilities of one company may be attributed to the other company.94 
 
First, under the ‘theory of false appearances’ (la théorie de l’apparence), where a third party 
acted in good faith upon an appearance that the two companies were only one legal person 
from their behaviour, the court will treat them as one. For instance, in the context of 
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insolvency, a parent company may be liable to its subsidiary’s creditors if the creditor had a 
good faith reason to believe the two companies were the same entity. Generally, French 
courts use a ‘bundle of indicators’ (faisceau d’indices) to determine whether a parent 
company intervened in its subsidiary’s activities (eg similar telephone numbers, email 
addresses, head offices or managers, or important cash flows between the companies). The 
French Court of Cassation recently held that a simple interference in the subsidiary’s 
activities is not enough to hold the parent company liable. Interference must appear in a way 
that allows others to legitimately believe that the parent company was the cocontractor of the 
subsidiary.95 More recently, the Court of Cassation ruled that a parent company was obliged 
to pay its subsidiary’s debts in a case where the parent company had directly intervened to 
settle with the creditor.96 This interference created the appearance that the parent company 
had substituted for the subsidiary and that the creditor had to deal with the parent company. 
The Court of Cassation also observed that the subsidiary was wholly-owned by the parent 
company and that both companies had the same email address, domicile, and director. 
 
Second, under the ‘theory of the fictitious corporation’ (la théorie de la société fictive), a 
company is deemed to be fictitious where its sole purpose is to serve the interests of the 
natural or legal person behind it, this person engaging in high-risk activities under the cover 
of separate legal personality and limited liability.97  
 
Third, the ‘theory of commingling of assets’ (la théorie de la confusion des patrimoines) is 
used when it is no longer possible to distinguish between the assets of the parent company 
and those of its subsidiary.98 Both the theories of the société fictive and of confusion des 
patrimoines involve the notion of fraud.99  
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Practice demonstrates that French courts often apply or mix these three theories 
inconsistently.100 At times, similar facts in distinct cases may lead to different outcomes, as a 
result of arbitrary application of these theories.101 Scholars have criticized French courts for 
being more concerned with the result of corporate veil piercing rather than its legal 
underpinning. However, French courts are generally reluctant to hold parent companies liable 
for their subsidiaries’ activities and the use of these theories remains exceptional.102  
 
The French courts have attempted to use alternative theories to hold parent companies liable. 
On several occasions, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that corporate veil piercing should be 
allowed when the parent company and its subsidiary form an economic unity.103 Such an 
economic unit exists when corporate group members are, to a large extent, intermingled from 
a financial and economic point of view. 104 However, the French Court of Cassation has 
consistently rejected this view. 105  In addition, based on the theories of ‘the de facto 
corporation’ and ‘the apparent de facto corporation,’ scholars have also suggested that 
corporate groups should be considered one corporation when they share a common corporate 
interest. However, these theories have had limited success to date.106  
 
3.3.2 The Netherlands 
Tort is usually the principal basis for establishing the liability of parent companies for their 
subsidiaries’ acts.107 In the landmark Osby case of 1981,108 the Dutch Supreme Court found 
that a parent company may commit a tort vis-à-vis its subsidiary’s creditors when it has such 
an influence over the management of the subsidiary that, at the time of the creation of the 
security, the parent company knew, or should have foreseen, that new creditors would be 
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harmed by the lack of the subsidiary’s assets but nevertheless failed to satisfy the debts of 
those creditors.109 Since this case, Dutch courts have refined the idea that a parent company 
may have a legal duty of care towards its subsidiary’s creditors. As such, it must prevent a 
subsidiary from taking on a new debt if it is clear that this debt will not be satisfied.110 Dutch 
courts usually ask two questions. First, did the parent company know, or should it have 
known, that its act or omission would harm the creditors of the subsidiary (duty of care)? 
Second, what was the degree of involvement of the parent company in the management of its 
subsidiary (control)? When the parent company intensively influences the subsidiary’s daily 
management, it may be considered as a quasi-director and it may incur the same liabilities in 
the event of a breach of duty of care.111 Following this reasoning, a number of cases raising 
corporate veil piercing issues have been solved on the basis of tort rules.112 Scholars studying 
transnational claims against MNEs have suggested that a parent company may generally have 
a duty of care to prevent foreseeable damage harming stakeholders by its subsidiaries.113  
 
A parent company acting as a director of its subsidiary may also be held liable for the 
subsidiary’s acts and omissions. Pursuant to Article 2:11 Dutch Civil Code, any legal person, 
which, at the time the liability arose, was an officer or director of another company, shall be 
jointly and severally liable with that company for its liability. The Dutch Civil Code provides 
that, when a company limited by shares114 and a company115 becomes bankrupt, each director 
shall be held liable for the amount of liabilities that cannot be satisfied out of the liquidation 
of the other assets if the management has manifestly performed its duties improperly and it is 
plausible that the improper management was an important cause of the bankruptcy. 
Importantly, these provisions apply to a parent company acting as a de jure or a de facto 
director of its subsidiary. For instance, a parent company may be considered as a de facto 
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manager when it has had a direct influence over the subsidiary’s management and when, in 
reality, the subsidiary’s formal management has been set aside. 116 This also applies to a 
foreign company acting as director of a Dutch company.117  
 
Dutch courts may also apply the theory of identification to hold a parent company liable for 
corporate group activities.118 Dutch courts have identified various circumstances or factors 
that may give rise to identification, such as dominance of one company over another, 
intensive involvement in the management of a company, creation of expectations vis-à-vis 
third parties, commingling of assets, or close intermingling.119 However, Dutch courts remain 
reluctant to apply the identification theory and require sufficient reasons to conclude to 
identification (eg a close commingling of assets is not enough). Also, the fact that all the 
shares of a company are in the hands of one shareholder, and that this shareholder forms an 
economic unit with this company, does not generally provide sufficient ground to hold the 
shareholder liable for the contractual liabilities of the company.120 
 
3.4 Environmental law 
French and Dutch laws and courts require the existence of fault to hold the parent company 
liable for environmental damage caused by corporate group activities. 
 
3.4.1 France 
In 2010, France enacted the Grenelle II Law, an environmental statute which contains two 
important provisions on the parent company’s liability for its subsidiary.121 First, Article 227 
Grenelle II Law modified Article L512-17 French Environmental Code, which now provides 
that, when a subsidiary122 is in judicial liquidation, a tribunal can hold its parent company 
liable for cleaning up the subsidiary’s operation site if the parent company committed a 
‘characterized fault’ (faute caractérisée) that contributed to the insufficient assets of the 
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subsidiary. When the parent company is itself insolvent, the tribunal can hold the ‘grand-
parent’ company, meaning the company owning the parent company, liable. This provision 
prevents parent companies from using insolvent subsidiaries as a way to avoid liability. 
However, scholars have criticized this provision on several grounds. First, commentators are 
uneasy with the concept of characterised fault, arguing it does not exist in bankruptcy 
proceedings.123 As a result, the necessary criteria to prove that the parent company committed 
a characterized fault, which contributed to the subsidiary’s insufficient assets, are 
uncertain.124 Second, only a limited number of individuals, such as the liquidator or the State, 
can request such procedure, thus limiting opportunities for other actors, such as 
environmental NGOs, to bring a claim before a tribunal. 
 
Second, Article 227 Grenelle II Law created Article L233-5-1 French Commercial Code, 
which allows a company to assume liability for the environmental obligations of another 
company when the latter has defaulted. Accordingly, a company, which holds more than 50% 
of the capital of another company, or has a holding, or controls another company, may elect 
to bear responsibility, in the event of the affiliated company’s failure, for all or part of the 
obligations to prevent and restore damage caused to the environment by that company.125 
However, this provision does not create an obligation for the parent company. Moreover, it 
only targets a limited number of damages caused to the environment.126 
 
French courts recently held the parent company of an oil MNE liable for environmental 
pollution committed by its subsidiary in the landmark Erika case. 127  However, Erika is 
concerned with oil pollution on the high seas, which is an area governed by specific rules of 
international law. The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
                                                 
 
123
 François-Guy Trébulle, ‘Entreprise et Développement Durable (1ère Partie) Juin 2009/Juillet 2010’ (2010) 
12 Environnement, para 25. 
124
 Sabrina Dupouy, ‘La Responsabilisation Environnementale des Groupes de Sociétés par le Grenelle: Enjeux 
et Perspectives’ (2012) 11 Droit des Sociétés. 
125
 The French Court of Cassation had previously accepted that a parent company could voluntarily bear 
responsibility for its subsidiary’s environmental obligations. See Cass com 26 March 2008, n° 07-11.619. 
126
 Dupouy (n 126).  
127





(CLC Convention)128 establishes a specific system of civil liability that deals with damage 
resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying ships. Erika was a complex case 
raising various legal and procedural issues. However, the following summary focuses mainly 
on the search for civil and criminal liability of the French parent company Total SA.129 On 12 
December 1999, the 25 year-old Maltese-flagged tanker Erika sank off the coast of Brittany. 
It spilled 31,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, belonging to the Panama subsidiary of Total SA, on 
400 kilometres of the French coast.130 Following the oil spill, civil and criminal claims were 
brought against various actors, including the parent company Total SA, in France. The Paris 
Regional Court, the Paris Court of Appeal, and the French Court of Cassation successively 
ruled in this case.131 Eventually, Total SA was found criminally and civilly liable. 
 
The Paris Court of Appeal found that Total SA was criminally liable for the discharge of 
pollutants (Article L218-12 French Environmental Code) 132 , and the French Court of 
Cassation later upheld this point of the ruling. Article L218-12 normally applies to the person 
responsible for the operation of the ship. In this instance, Total SA’s subsidiary was directly 
in charge of the operation of the Erika through a charter party.133 Nonetheless, the Court of 
Appeal deduced that the parent company had control over the management of the ship based 
on the provisions of the charter party. First, although it was not a party to the charter party, 
Total SA had to enforce a number of the obligations in the contract. For example, in the 
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event of an accident, the captain of the ship had to inform Total SA immediately. Second, 
Total SA had retained a right to check vessel compliance under its vetting procedure. The 
charter party allowed Total SA to verify the care and the diligence with which the shipment 
was transported, as well as the ways in which the ship and the crew were managed. In Erika, 
the French courts held the real decision-maker, meaning the parent company, liable.134 The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the subsidiary in Panama was ‘an empty shell,’ as it did not 
have any team or building in Panama where it was registered and lacked legal and financial 
autonomy.135 Furthermore, the French courts found that Total SA had made an abusive use of 
the charter party to separate the legal and financial risks from the tanker management and, 
therefore, avoid liability.136 Another important aspect of Erika is that the Court of Appeal 
assessed Total SA’s behaviour on the basis of its own internal rules of control.137 Total SA 
had voluntarily set up a number of procedures for its own activities, including a specific 
vetting procedure to control the quality of tankers. The Court of Appeal concluded that, by 
ignoring this procedure and not vetting the Erika, Total SA had neglected its duty of care. 
Total SA’s voluntary commitment to control the quality of tankers became a norm to assess 
the faulty behaviour of the company.138  
 
However, the Court of Appeal rejected that Total SA could be held civilly liable for the 
damage caused by the pollution.139 The Court of Appeal held that the CLC Convention places 
the liability for damage resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying ships on the 
owner of the ship from which the polluting oil escaped or was discharged. This liability is 
strict and exonerates other potential parties from being held civilly liable, unless these parties 
committed gross negligence. The Court of Appeal did not find that Total SA had committed 
any gross negligence, as it had not expected that pollution would occur, even though it did 
not respect its own vetting rules. However, the Court of Cassation overturned this point of 
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the ruling, holding that Total SA had acted recklessly (faute de témérité) within the meaning 
of the CLC Convention and that it was necessarily aware that damage would probably result 
from such behaviour. 
 
The Erika case demonstrates that French judges can creatively hold parent companies liable 
in the context of corporate group activities. However, if the Court of Cassation’s ruling was 
innovative, it was, at the same time, quite unusual. Commentators have argued that the 
French Court of Cassation’s ruling was probably influenced by the ‘symbolic nature’ of 
Erika and the public attention the case received in France. Therefore, it is uncertain whether 
the French Court of Cassation could reach similar conclusions in a transnational case against 
an MNE. 
 
3.4.2 The Netherlands 
Dutch courts have been hesitant to find to ‘an appropriate delineation of the rules on tort and 
the identification theory’ in cases where companies attempt to evade environmental liability 
through the abusive use of the corporate group structure.140 
 
In the Roco BV v De Staat der Nederlanden case, Rouwenhorst was the owner of premises 
that were heavily polluted. In order to escape liability, he transferred the business to a newly 
incorporated limited liability company, Roco BV, which continued to operate at another 
location. Rouwenhorst’s spouse and Hoekstra BV (a holding controlled by Rouwenhorst and 
his spouse and of which Rouwenhorst was the sole director) held the shares of Roco BV. The 
Dutch State claimed reimbursement for costs related to the environmental clean-up. In first 
instance, the District Court dismissed the State’s claim because Roco BV had been 
incorporated after the pollution had been caused and it had not accepted liability for the 
pollution upon the business transfer.141 However, the Court of Appeal held Roco BV liable 
since the sole purpose of the transfer was to evade potential claims by the State, as Roco BV 
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continued the business of its predecessor.142 Eventually, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld that 
Roco BV was liable for the environmental clean-up.
143
 However, it rejected the use of the 
theory of identification as a basis for liability since ‘the case did not concern an identification 
of two legal or natural persons but rather an identification of an “enterprise” with the 
company.’144 Furthermore, Roco BV could not be held liable on the basis of a successor 
liability theory, as it did not exist under Dutch law. Ultimately, the Dutch Supreme Court 
held Roco BV liable in tort for having continued the business with the clear intent of 
frustrating the State’s claim for damages.145 
 
In the Bato’s Erf BV v De Staat der Nerderlanden case, 146  which concerned soil and 
groundwater pollution, the parent company had modified its charter and name, and had 
transferred its operations to a newly incorporated wholly-owned subsidiary in order to escape 
liability. The Court of Appeal decided that the parent company and the subsidiary must be 
identified because both companies were closely intermingled. In doing so, it took into 
account the following factors: the parent company had incorporated the subsidiary; it had 
transferred most assets and liabilities; the subsidiary was the true operating company 
conducting the business of the parent company, which controlled the subsidiary’s activities; 
both companies had the same directors; the subsidiary was wholly-owned; and the financial 
statement of both companies were consolidated. 147  However, the Dutch Supreme Court 
overturned the ruling, holding that the mere fact that a parent company determines the 
business policy of a subsidiary, and directs or influences its implementation, either by having 
its managing directors also acting as managing directors of the subsidiary or in its capacity as 
managing director and/or sole shareholder, does not mean that these activities become the 
activities of the parent company. As a result, the parent company cannot automatically be 
held liable for the tortious activities of the subsidiary.148  
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3.5 Employment law  
French and Dutch courts have ingeniously used the theory of ‘co-employment’ (co-emploi) to 
find parent companies liable towards their subsidiaries’ employees. Nonetheless, recent 
transnational litigation in France has demonstrated that this theory may have limited success 
protecting employees in the context of MNE activities. 
 
3.5.1 France 
The theory of co-employment has prompted renewed interest in France over the last few 
years.149 This judicial creation challenges not only the separate legal personality and the 
limited liability of companies, but also the contractual foundation of the employment 
relationship.150 Co-employment is generally raised by the employees of a company, often a 
subsidiary belonging to a corporate group, when the company is ceasing its activities and the 
employees’ labour rights are at risk of being violated. In general, the contractual employer 
has specific obligations towards its employees, such as providing termination compensation, 
which it may not be able to respect if it becomes insolvent. To get around this situation, 
employees have sought to hold the parent company liable for such obligations, claiming that 
it was actually their real employer and, therefore, had obligations towards them. French 
courts have applied the theory of co-employment not only to protect employees, but also to 
sanction abnormal practices within corporate groups, especially when parent companies are 
also holding companies that benefit from an advantageous tax regime.151  
 
Originally, French courts required plaintiffs to demonstrate a relationship of subordination 
between the parent company and the subsidiary’s employees, for instance, by the parent 
company’s interference in the management of the subsidiary’s employees.152 However, the 
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French Court of Cassation progressively accepted that a ‘commingling of interests, activities, 
and control’ (confusion d’intérêts, d’activité et de direction) between the two companies was 
sufficient to qualify these companies as ‘co-employers.’153 Generally, French courts look at 
various indicators, such as the parent company’s economic control of the subsidiary, the 
absence of the subsidiary’s independence to define its own strategy, etc.154 For example, 
French courts have found commingling between a parent company and its subsidiary when ‘a 
subsidiary is totally dependent on a corporate group that absorbs 80% of its production and 
determines its prices, when the parent company of this group owns almost all its capital, 
manages its staff, dictates its strategy, and constantly intervenes in its economic and social 
management while the subsidiary is ceasing its activities, while leading the operational 
direction and the administrative management of the subsidiary.’155 The co-employment theory 
applies to MNEs, as the French Court of Cassation accepted that a German parent company 
was the co-employer of its French subsidiary’s employees.156 
 
Scholars have criticized the French courts for lacking consistency or clarity in their 
application of co-employment. This led the French Court of Cassation to clarify which 
requirements are necessary to demonstrate the existence of co-employment. It recently found 
that two companies belonging to the same group is not enough to justify co-employment.157 
Furthermore, it found that ‘a company belonging to a corporate group cannot be considered 
the co-employer of the employees of another company, outside the existence of a relationship 
of subordination, unless there is between them, beyond the necessary coordination of 
economic actions between companies belonging to a same group and the state of economic 
domination that belonging to the same group may produce, a commingling of interests, 
activities, and control demonstrated by the interference in the economic and social 
management of the latter.’ 158  French courts seem to require strict criteria to prove such 
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interference.159 Moreover, the mere fact that the parent company wholly owns its subsidiary’s 
capital and exercises decisive influence over its subsidiary (the capital presumption) is not 
enough to justify co-employment.160  
 
The AREVA case showed the limits of the co-employment theory as a basis for parent 
company liability. Pursuant to Article L454-1 Code of Social Security (Code de la sécurité 
sociale), the plaintiffs brought a compensation claim for occupational disease against 
AREVA Nc for ‘inexcusable fault’ or gross negligence (faute inexcusable)161 towards Venel, 
an employee of its Nigerien subsidiary COMINAK. 
 
In 2012, the TASS held that AREVA Nc, as the co-employer of Venel, was liable for gross 
negligence. First, it found that AREVA Nc was the co-employer of Venel, since COMINAK 
and AREVA Nc ‘pursued, in collaboration, simultaneously, indivisibly, and permanently, a 
common activity in a common interest, under a single authority.’ 162  Indicators included 
COMINAK’s charter, the identity of its main shareholder, and interconnections between 
COMINAK and AREVA Nc (same address, same activities, same involvement in the 
exploitation of the same mining site). Moreover, AREVA Nc appeared to assume technical, 
economic, social, and financial liability for the potential impact on the health and safety of 
individuals working in its uranium mines by setting up ‘health observatories’ and signing a 
memorandum of understanding on occupational disease caused by ionizing radiation with 
Sherpa in 2009. 163  AREVA NC’s voluntary commitment demonstrated that, while 
COMINAK acted as the contractual employer of Venel, AREVA Nc acted as the employer 
with the authority and power to control and organize working conditions, especially with 
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regard to occupational risk management. Therefore, a subordinate relationship existed 
between AREVA Nc and the employee. Second, the TASS found that AREVA NC had 
committed gross negligence by not setting up safety measures to protect workers in its mines, 
which caused the development of the disease. 
 
However, in 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned the TASS’ judgement, rejecting that 
AREVA Nc was the co-employer of Venel. 164  It found that there was no subordinate 
relationship between AREVA Nc and Venel, as it could not be proved that AREVA Nc had 
exerted any power of direction, control, or discipline over Venel. Furthermore, it held that 
there was no commingling of activities, interests, and control between COMINAK and 
AREVA Nc. First, COMINAK could not be considered AREVA Nc’s subsidiary pursuant to 
Article L233-1 French Commercial Code, which requires that a company owns more than 
50% of the capital of another company in order for the second company to be regarded as a 
subsidiary. However, AREVA Nc only owned 34% of COMINAK’s shares while the 
Nigerien State and other foreign companies owned the rest. Second, there was no evidence 
demonstrating that COMINAK had lost the autonomy to manage its own activities. The fact 
that both companies shared a common interest, as a result of AREVA Nc being COMINAK’s 
shareholder, did not constitute a commingling of management or activities. Third, even 
though AREVA Nc owned COMINAK’s mining concession, the Court of Appeal rejected 
there were interconnections between COMINAK and AREVA Nc demonstrating dependence. 
Fourth, the Court of Appeal rejected that AREVA Nc’s voluntary commitment made it the 
co-employer of Venel. The French Court of Cassation upheld this ruling in 2015.165 
 
The position of the Court of Appeal of the Court of Cassation in AREVA appears to be in line 
with the approach recently adopted by the French Court of Cassation, which requires the 
demonstration of strict criteria showing the existence of co-employment. However, a lack of 
consistency, clarity, and certainty remains as to the exact criteria required. Furthermore, this 
approach restricts the situations that may qualify for co-employment. For instance, it appears 
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that the parent company must own 50% of the subsidiary’s capital within the meaning of 
French Commercial Code in order for the relationship between the parent company and the 
subsidiary to qualify for co-employment. This criterion does not allow a parent company to 
be held liable for its subsidiary’s abuse in the context of a joint venture, such as in AREVA. 
Ultimately, such a position reduces the possibilities the co-employment theory could 
potentially provide to victims of labour rights abuse by MNEs in host countries. 
 
3.5.2 The Netherlands 
The Dutch courts have accepted the application of co-employment in cases involving 
MNEs.166 For instance, a Dutch company was held to be the co-employer of an employee of 
its Cypriot subsidiary in Saudi Arabia.167 The two companies were closely intermingled and 
the court had doubts about the true existence of the subsidiary.168 
 
4 The criminal liability of French and Dutch MNEs 
Plaintiffs have sought to hold parent companies of MNEs, or their directors, criminally liable 
in France and the Netherlands for human rights abuse and environmental damage taking 
place in host countries. Aspects, such as the existence of corporate criminal liability, 
especially for criminal offences committed in the context of corporate group activities, and 
the conditions required to engage it, play a crucial role in the success of transnational 
criminal claims against MNEs.  
 
4.1 Corporate criminal liability and corporate groups 
The criminal liability of legal persons is relatively new in France and the Netherlands. Both 
countries were amongst the first European countries of civil law tradition to adopt a 
comprehensive regime of corporate criminal liability.169  
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In France, discussions over the use of criminal sanctions to regulate corporate misconduct 
emerged in the 1980s after the country was confronted with the increase in MNEs’ power 
and their ability to evade local regulatory requirements.170 The new French Criminal Code 
introduced corporate criminal liability in 1994. At that time, companies could be held 
criminally liable only when statutory law explicitly stated that legal persons could be liable 
as such. This legal restriction had a direct impact on transnational claims against MNEs. In 
Total, the plaintiffs targeted Total’s executives, and not the company, as the French Criminal 
Code did not provide for corporate criminal liability for the alleged offences.171 It was not 
until 2004 that the criminal liability of legal persons was extended to all criminal offences.172 
Article 121-2 French Criminal Code now provides that legal persons are criminally liable for 
the offences committed on their account by their organs or representatives. 
 
Can corporate groups be held criminally liable in France? Pursuant to Article 121-2 French 
Criminal Code, only business entities that have legal personality can be held criminally liable. 
Since corporate groups do not enjoy legal personality, they cannot be criminally liable.173 
Furthermore, Article 121-1 French Criminal Code states that no one is criminally liable 
except for his own conduct.174 Therefore, this principle of personal liability prevents the 
emergence of criminal vicarious liability in the context of corporate group activities.175 This 
is reinforced by the fact that it may be difficult to determine which company of the group 
committed the offence.176 However, French courts have occasionally taken into account the 
economic reality of the corporate group to hold the parent company criminally liable. In 
Erika, for instance, the parent company was held criminally liable, as it had an effective 
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power of control over the tanker.177 Furthermore, in theory, a parent company may be held 
criminally liable as an accomplice to a criminal offence committed by its subsidiary abroad 
pursuant to Article 113-5 French Criminal Code (Rougier).   
 
In the Netherlands, in 1951, the Economic Offences Act (Wet Economische Delicten) 
recognized that legal persons, including companies, could be criminally liable for a number 
of economic crimes. However, in 1976, a major criminal reform introduced general corporate 
criminal liability. Since then, Article 51 Dutch Criminal Code provides that both natural and 
legal persons can commit criminal offences.  
 
Similar to France, only business entities with legal personality can be criminally liable. 
Nonetheless, Article 51(3) Dutch Criminal Code states that criminal offences may also be 
committed by certain entities without legal personality, such as unincorporated companies or 
partnerships. The Dutch Criminal Code also provides potential grounds to engage the 
criminal liability of the parent company in the context of corporate group activities. For 
instance, Article 51(2) Dutch Criminal Code states that, when a legal person commits a 
criminal offence, criminal proceedings may be instituted, and punishments may be imposed 
not only on the legal person but also on persons who ordered the commission of the criminal 
offence or directed the unlawful acts. Moreover, pursuant to Article 48 Dutch Criminal Code, 
in theory, a parent company may be held criminally liable as an accomplice to a criminal 
offence committed by its subsidiary. 
 
4.2 The elements of criminal offences committed by companies 
Corporate criminal liability will be established when the objective (actus reus) and the 
subjective (mens rea) elements of the criminal offence are gathered.  
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4.2.1 Actus reus 
Article 121-2 French Criminal Code states that legal persons are criminally liable for the 
offences committed on their account by their organs or representatives. Two conditions are 
therefore required. First, the criminal offence must have been committed on behalf of the 
company.178 This means that the criminal offence must have been committed for the benefit 
of the company and not just for the individual benefit of the organ or the representative. It is 
not required that the company gained a financial benefit from the criminal offence.179 Second, 
an organ or a representative of the company must have committed the criminal offence. An 
organ may be defined as the person, either an individual or a group, who has the power of 
direction or organization within the company, such as a director, a board of directors, or a 
general assembly.180 A company can also be liable when the criminal offence was committed 
by a de facto director.181  
 
The situation is more complex when a representative commits the criminal offence. 
Previously, a representative was an individual possessing the power, either general or special, 
to represent the company. Nonetheless, French courts recently extended the concept to 
individuals, whether employees or not, which intervene on behalf of the company. 182 
Historically, the French Court of Cassation also rejected that a company could be liable if the 
perpetrator of the criminal offence could not be identified or was not its representative.183 
However, it now accepts that a company is liable, even though it is not possible to identify 
the perpetrator. 184  In addition, a company used to be criminally liable only when its 
representative committed fault.185 But, on several occasions, the French Court of Cassation 
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has held companies liable, even though their representatives did not commit fault.186 Scholars 
suggest that French courts assume that a company automatically committed fault when it was 
responsible for respecting certain rules and regulations, such as health and safety regulation. 
If human intervention is still required, the condition is automatically satisfied due to the 
nature of the offence. 187  Ultimately, recent case-law demonstrates that French courts are 
progressively broadening the situations where they accept corporate criminal liability. 
 
In France, the delegation of authority within a company may play an important role in 
determining corporate criminal liability. French courts accept that the person who holds a 
delegation of authority is a representative of the legal person acting on behalf thereof. As a 
result, a legal person can be held criminally liable for any offences a delegatee committed on 
its behalf. However, when there is delegation of authority within a group of companies, the 
French Court of Cassation has consistently held that, in health and safety matters, the 
criminal offence committed by a delegatee only engages the criminal liability of the company 
which is the employer of the victim.188 This position has been criticized for presuming that 
the delegatee, although not an employee of the company that employed the victim, was a 
representative of this company.189 In the context of transnational litigation against MNEs, this 
means that only the company that has employed the victim, usually the subsidiary, can be 
held liable. As a result, the parent company cannot be held liable, even when it benefits from 
the delegation. 
 
In the Netherlands, the criteria required to establish the criminal liability of legal persons 
were inconsistent until 2003 when the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a legal person could 
be held criminally liable only if there was an illegal act or omission that could be reasonably 
imputed to the legal person.190 It provided a guiding principle to assess this ‘reasonable 
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attribution’: ‘the attribution of certain (illegal) conduct to the corporation may under certain 
circumstances be reasonable if the (illegal) conduct took place within the ‘scope’ of the 
corporation.’191 There are four situations in which conduct will, in principle, be carried out 
‘within the scope of a corporation.’ First, the act or omission was allegedly committed by 
someone who works for the legal person, whether or not under a formal contract of 
employment. Second, the conduct was part of the everyday ‘normal business’ of the legal 
person. Third, the legal person profited from the relevant conduct. Fourth, the alleged course 
of conduct was at the ‘disposal’ of the legal person which ‘accepted’ the conduct. In the latter 
situation, the failure to take reasonable care to prevent the conduct from being carried out 
may establish acceptance.192 Furthermore, any employee can cause its employer to commit an 
offence as long as the facts can be construed to show that the corporation ultimately 
‘committed’ the offence. Dutch scholars suggest that the Dutch Supreme Court’s approach 
towards corporate criminal liability can be characterized as ‘open,’ as there is no rigorous 
theory to turn to for guidance. In particular,  
 
The Dutch approach may put some pressure on legal certainty but it has several 
advantages. […] The open approach leaves room for “tailor-made” jurisprudence, in 
which the courts are free to weigh relevant circumstances and factors. It 
acknowledges that the possible variation in cases is, in fact, endless.193 
 
This approach may leave room for relevant jurisprudential developments in the context of 
transnational litigation against MNEs. 
 
4.2.2 Mens rea 
Specific categories of criminal offences, such as crimes, require proof of a subjective element 
(intent).194 As a result, there can be no liability without the intent of committing a crime. This 
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rule creates difficulties in the context of corporate criminal liability, as legal persons are 
incapable of possessing intent to commit a crime. Therefore, courts may adopt various 
approaches to establish the mens rea of a company. 
 
Under French law, corporate criminal liability is not dependent on the commission of fault by 
the legal person. Usually, the fault of the natural person, whether an organ or a representative 
of the legal person, will be sufficient. Nonetheless, some French courts also require fault of 
the legal person.195 Proof of fault may be found in the commercial or social policy of the legal 
person or its ‘defective’ organization. However, the French Court of Cassation explicitly 
rejected this line of reasoning.196 
 
Dutch case-law demonstrates two main approaches to prove corporate intent and negligence 
in the Netherlands.197 First, the mens rea of a natural person is attributed to the company.198 
Second, corporate mens rea can be derived from circumstances closely related to the 
company itself, such as its policies and decisions. A company may confess by means of its 
agents,199 for example, stating in court that management did not act whereas it knew that 
fraudulent acts were taking place within the company.200 The latter approach is particularly 
suited to cases of gross negligence, which can be derived ‘objectively’ from the failure to act 
according to standards of conduct. For instance, manslaughter by gross negligence may be 
established if the failure to meet the standards caused death.201 It should also be pointed out 
that intent is not required for misdemeanours under Dutch criminal law. The absence of 
intent is significant in the context of criminal claims brought against MNEs, as plaintiffs 
have raised commission of misdemeanours in past claims. 
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5 The emergence of new corporate liability standards  
Plaintiffs in transnational litigation against MNEs have used the CSR commitments of MNEs 
to allege liability for human rights abuse and environmental damage. However, their 
arguments have been met with a mixed reception from French and Dutch courts. Ultimately, 
legislative intervention seems necessary to ensure corporate liability. Recent developments in 
France seem to go in this direction. 
 
5.1 Corporate social responsibility: source of liability? 
The proliferation of CSR instruments and the trend towards corporate self-regulation may 
inadvertently contribute to the development of liability regimes.202 Some NGOs and scholars 
argue that CSR instruments create, to some extent, obligations on MNEs to abide by them, 
and the breach of which may trigger corporate liability before a court.203 In practice, CSR 
instruments are useful to courts in assessing specific situations.  
 
5.1.1 France 
In some cases, French labour courts have used ethical codes to demonstrate the employer's 
management power or to assess the gravity of the employee’s failure to comply with a 
professional duty.204 In some transnational cases against MNEs, judges have creatively used 
CSR instruments to assess MNEs’ breach of their duty of care. In Erika, the parent company 
Total SA had voluntarily set up a specific vetting procedure to control the quality of its 
tankers. The French courts found that, by ignoring this procedure, Total SA had neglected its 
duty of care. Total SA’s voluntary commitment to control the quality of tankers became a 
norm upon which to base the faulty conduct of the company.205 Similarly, in AREVA, the 
TASS held that, by setting up health observatories and signing a memorandum of 
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understanding on occupational disease caused by ionizing radiation with Sherpa, AREVA Nc 
appeared to assume liability for potential impacts on the health and safety of individuals 
working in its uranium mines. The TASS found, on the basis of the company’s CSR 
commitments, that AREVA Nc acted as the employer of Venel with the authority and the 
power to control and organize his working conditions. 
 
At the same time, arguments based on CSR commitments have produced limited results. In 
the same AREVA case, the Court of Appeal rejected that AREVA Nc’s voluntary 
commitments led either directly, or through its subsidiaries, to a situation where AREVA Nc 
automatically becomes the employer, or co-employer, of Venel. In Alstom, the plaintiffs 
argued that the companies failed to fulfil their commitments to observe relevant rules of 
public international law enshrined in their code of ethics and the UN Global Compact they 
signed.206 In 2013, the Versailles Court of Appeal rejected that the companies had violated 
international law with regard to commitments resulting from their adhesion to CSR 
instruments. First, it held that the UN Global Compact’s application is ‘based solely on the 
goodwill of the corporations. It has no binding effect .... The Global Compact being no 
more than a point of reference, non-compliance with its principles cannot be invoked to 
justify a claim for violation of international rights.’207 Second, the Court of Appeal found that 
the companies’ codes of ethics stated that they are of a ‘strictly voluntary’ and non-binding 
character. As these codes stem from a personal initiative and provide no sanction, they 
cannot be considered binding or relied upon by third parties. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal 
concluded: 
 
The Global Compact, as well as the codes of ethics, express values that the 
corporations wish their staff to apply in the exercise of their activities for the 
company. They are “framework” documents which contain only recommendations 
and rules of conduct, without creating obligations or commitments for the benefit of 
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third parties who may seek compliance [with such documents]. Thus, the appellant 
cannot rely on a breach of the Global Compact or of the standards of conduct 
provided for in the codes of ethics to claim that Alstom, Alstom Transport and Veolia 
Transport have committed a breach of international law.208 
 
Interestingly, the plaintiffs insisted upon the binding nature of the norms contained in the 
CSR instruments the companies had committed to respect. However, the French courts 
focused instead on the nature of the soft-law instruments to reject their direct applicability. 
 
5.1.2 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the OECD Guidelines were famously applied in the BATCO case.209 The 
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam annulled the decision to close down the Dutch subsidiary of 
an English parent company in order to concentrate production at the Belgian company of the 
group. It held that the lack of appropriate consultation with the trade unions by the Dutch 
subsidiary amounted to mismanagement in breach of the OECD Guidelines, to which the 
English parent had committed. For some authors, BATCO demonstrated that Dutch courts are 
prepared to consider the OECD Guidelines when determining the duty of care of companies 
under Dutch tort law.210  
 
In Shell, the plaintiffs argued that the parent company Shell Plc had a duty of care to 
influence and control its subsidiary SPDC to prevent damage to humans and the environment 
in Nigeria.211 This obligation was reinforced by the fact that the MNE had committed to 
implement various CSR instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines, the UN Global Compact, 
and Global Reporting Initiative, which prescribe an active duty of care for parent 
companies.212 For instance, pursuant to the OECD Guidelines, Shell Plc should have set up 
and maintained a suitable environmental management system making emergency plans as 
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well as best practices procedures and technologies available in case of oil spills. 213 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that Shell Plc failed to respect precautionary measures set 
in the UN Global Compact214 and to report the oil spills in accordance with the Global 
Reporting Initiative.215 In 2013, the District Court of The Hague dismissed the argument of 
the plaintiffs and concluded that: 
 
In the circumstances of this case, it cannot be assumed on other grounds, either, that 
Shell Plc in The Hague as parent company assumed the obligation to intervene in 
SPDC’s policy regarding the prevention of and response to sabotage of oil pipelines 
and oil facilities in Nigeria. The District Court is of the opinion that the general fact 
that Shell Plc made the prevention of environmental damage caused by operations 
of its (sub-) subsidiaries the main focus of its policy and that to some extent, Shell 
Plc is involved in SPDC’s policy constitutes insufficient reason to rule that under 
Nigerian law, Shell Plc assumed a duty of care in respect of the people living in the 
vicinity of the oil pipelines and oil facilities of SPDC.216 
 
The District Court rejected that CSR instruments may create legal obligations upon 
companies or may determine a duty of care in the context of corporate group activities, 
discontinuing the progressive interpretation adopted in BATCO.  
 
5.2 Towards human rights due diligence in France? 
In November 2013, several French deputies introduced a bill to create a duty of care of 
parent and controlling companies towards their subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers.217 
The French Bill on duty of care sought to hold MNEs accountable ‘to prevent the occurrence 
of tragedies in France and abroad and to obtain reparations for victims of damage detrimental 
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to human rights and the environment.’218 However, it stirred a lot of opposition, most notably 
from businesses, and the French government was at unease with the initiative. In January 
2015, the French deputies voted for the content of the bill to be reviewed and, in February 
2015, a group of socialist deputies introduced a new French Bill on duty of care (new Bill).219  
 
On 30 March 2015, the National Assembly adopted the new Bill. It provided that parent 
companies registered in France must draft and effectively implement a ‘vigilance plan’ (plan 
de vigilance). This document must contain measures to identify and prevent the occurrence 
of human rights abuses, and environmental and other health damage in both their activities 
and the activities of the subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers that they control. A 
company may be held civilly liable if it does not respect its obligation to draft and implement 
a vigilance map, and NGOs are allowed to bring a civil claim. The content of the new Bill 
was trimmed of controversial points, such as the existence of a duty of care per se, the 
criminal liability of parent companies, and the burden of proof on parent companies. 
However, on 18 November 2015, the Senate rejected the new Bill.220 As a result, its future 
remains uncertain. Nonetheless, if it were to be enacted, it would be one of the first 
legislative initiatives to translate the human rights due diligence provided by the UNGPs into 
a legally binding mechanism. 
 
6 Conclusions 
French and Dutch laws recognize the separate legal personality of specific companies and the 
existence of limited liability companies. In the context of MNE activities, the application of 
these legal standards generally prevents holding the parent company liable for its subsidiary, 
even when the parent company owns and controls the subsidiary. Plaintiffs in transnational 
claims against MNEs have challenged the strict application of these standards. However, 
French and Dutch courts have generally remained reluctant to hold parent companies liable.  
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Nonetheless, French courts may occasionally hold parent companies liable for their 
subsidiaries based either on statutory rules or jurisprudential theories. For instance, they are 
willing to punish abusive arrangements where the parent company sought to avoid liability 
by moving an activity abroad (Erika). However, the solutions adopted across legal fields lack 
consistency. In general, French courts do not accept the parent company’ liability where 
there was no misconduct of the parent company. As a result, the legal regime of corporate 
group liability is fragmented.  
 
In the Netherlands, Dutch courts are reluctant to use the theory of identification to hold 
parent companies liable for harm caused by their subsidiaries. The Dutch Supreme Court 
clearly indicated that identification should be allowed only when companies are closely 
intermingled or control exists within the corporate group. There must be additional elements, 
such as abuse, fraudulent intent, or wrongful creation of false appearances.221 In addition, in 
the absence of statutory rules, Dutch courts have preferred to use tort as a way to hold parent 
companies liable in the context of corporate group activities. Less stringent fault 
requirements may be an advantage for plaintiffs bringing claims against MNEs. Nonetheless, 
in Shell, Dutch courts have narrowly interpreted the duty of care in a transnational context. 
 
Both France and the Netherlands recognize the criminal liability of companies with legal 
personality. France does not generally accept that corporate groups can be held criminally 
liable. However, it may be possible to engage the criminal liability of a parent company for 
criminal offences committed in the context of corporate group activities, based either on the 
economic reality of the corporate group or on acts of complicity. In general, the criminal 
liability of a company is engaged when its organs or representatives have committed the 
criminal offence on its account. Similarly, even if the Netherlands remains silent as to the 
criminal liability of corporate groups, it may be possible to engage the criminal liability of a 
parent company in the context of corporate group activities when it ordered or directed the 
unlawful act or based on its complicity. Dutch courts have developed a flexible theory of 
corporate criminal liability. There is corporate criminal liability if there was an illegal act or 
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omission that could be reasonably imputed to the corporation. The absence of a rigorous 
definition of ‘reasonableness’ leaves the door ajar for ‘tailor-made’ jurisprudence where 
judges can assess corporate liability against the facts and circumstances of the case. 
 
At times, French and Dutch courts have taken into account the voluntary commitments of 
MNEs to assess the faulty conduct of the parent company. In Erika and AREVA, French 
courts assessed the behaviour of the parent company against its voluntary commitments. 
Similarly, Dutch courts considered the OECD Guidelines when determining the duty of care 
of a parent company in BATCO. Given the current predominance of soft norms and CSR 
policies to regulate business activities, this approach is an important step towards further 
corporate accountability. Nonetheless, French and Dutch courts make careful and sporadic 
use of voluntary norms to hold companies liable. Ultimately, legislative intervention may be 
necessary to create a specific regime governing the liability of parent companies in the 
context of group activities. In France, deputies are currently discussing a bill which would 
create mandatory human rights due diligence for large companies. 
 
The next chapter focuses on the procedural opportunities and barriers which affect access to 






Procedural opportunities and barriers to accessing effective remedy against 
multinational enterprises in France and the Netherlands 
 
1 Introduction 
The UNGPs reaffirm that access to effective remedy is not only of substantive but also of 
procedural nature. 1  In the context of transnational litigation against MNEs, various 
procedural aspects will affect the progress and the outcome of the proceedings. Standing has 
an impact on the ability of crucial actors, such as victims and CSOs, to participate in civil 
proceedings. Similarly, criminal procedures may allow some type of ‘private prosecution’ in 
the context of corporate criminal offences. Furthermore, the availability of collective redress 
mechanisms improves the opportunities for poor communities to hold MNEs liable or obtain 
remedy where victims may not have the resources to bring individual claims. The existence 
of strict rules restricting the access to information held by MNEs may also complicate the 
victims’ duty to produce sufficient evidence to establish corporate liability. Finally, litigation 
costs and limited availability of financial support may also influence victims’ decision to 
bring, or continue, a claim against an MNE. 
 
The aim of Chapter 7 is to provide an analysis of procedural opportunities and obstacles to 
accessing effective remedy in France and the Netherlands and assess how they impact 
feasibility of transnational claims against MNEs. Chapter 7 starts by exploring participation 
of victims and CSOs in civil and criminal proceedings and the opportunities to obtain 
collective redress. It also provides a summary of rules concerning the production of evidence. 
Chapter 7 looks then at costs and funding of transnational litigation against MNEs. Finally, it 
ends with a description of the various remedies available in courts. 
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2 The participation of plaintiffs in the proceedings 
To ensure access to remedy, procedural rules should facilitate the plaintiffs’ ability to bring a 
claim against an MNE in France and the Netherlands. Various aspects are important in this 
regard, including a right of action for victims of business-related abuse and NGOs in civil 
proceedings, the role plaintiffs may play in launching, or continuing, criminal proceedings, 
and the availability of collective redress. 
 
2.1 Initiating civil proceedings 
The way in which the law authorizes natural and legal persons to bring civil claims before 
domestic courts has a direct effect on the ability of these persons to gain access to remedy or 
to hold MNEs to account. Various types of plaintiffs may bring a civil claim against an MNE, 
including an individual who suffered direct damage from the business-related abuse, a 
representative of a particular group, such as an affected village, or an organization defending 
a collective interest related to the claim. 2  If victims of corporate abuse may usually be 
allowed to bring civil claims without particular problems, however, NGOs may face 
considerable obstacles to bring claims.3 
 
2.1.1 The right of action 
In France, ‘the action is the right of the plaintiff of a claim to bring an action to be heard on 
the merits of his claim so that the judge may declare it founded or unfounded.’4 Pursuant to 
Article 31 French Code of Civil Procedure, ‘the right of action is available to all those who 
have a legitimate interest in the success or dismissal of a claim without prejudice to those 
cases where the law confers the right of action solely upon persons whom it authorises to 
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raise or oppose a claim, or to defend a particular interest.’5 As a result, the law imposes three 
main requirements: a legitimate interest; standing; and legal capacity. 
 
First, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have a ‘legitimate interest’ to bring a civil claim 
(intérêt légitime) against an MNE, meaning that the claim may provide an advantage or a 
benefit to the plaintiff. Such interest must already exist when the plaintiff brings the claim.6 
Importantly, French courts have progressively accepted that the interest to bring a civil claim 
is not subordinated to the legitimacy, or well-foundedness, of the claim.7 
 
Second, Article 31 implies that plaintiffs must have standing to bring a civil claim (qualité à 
agir) against an MNE. However, the distinction between interest and standing to bring a 
claim is not always clear in French case-law.8 To have standing, plaintiffs must usually 
demonstrate a direct and personal interest, which may be problematic for NGOs when they 
seek to sue an MNE in defence of a collective or public interest.9 Nevertheless, the law may 
directly confer standing on NGOs in specific circumstances.10 
 
Third, legal capacity is a prerequisite for the right of action. 11  However, there is no 
requirement as to the plaintiff’s nationality and, as a result, foreign victims may be entitled to 
the right of action. 
 
Article 122 French Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the situations where a claim might 
be declared inadmissible for lack of a right of action, including lack of interest, lack of 
standing, statute of limitations, fixed time limit, or res judicata. One disadvantage of the 
French Code of Civil Procedure is that it emphasizes that any claim raised by, or against, a 
person deprived of the right of action is inadmissible, and a person bringing a claim deemed 
                                                 
 
5
 Translated French Code of Civil Procedure (n 4). 
6
 Serge Guinchard, Cécile Chainais and Frédérique Ferrand, Procédure Civile: Droit Interne et Droit de l’Union 
Européenne (32nd edn, Dalloz 2014) para 131-136.  
7
 ibid para 137. See also Cass civ (2) 13 January 2005, n° 03-13.531. 
8
 Guinchard, Chainais and Ferrand (n 6) para 122.  
9
 French law differentiates between individual, collective, and general interests. See ibid para 145. 
10
 ibid para 138-165.  
11




abusive may be condemned to a fine.12 In several cases, MNEs have used this as an argument 
against NGOs and victims seeking civil redress for human rights or environmental abuse. 
 
In the Netherlands, pursuant to Article 3:303 Dutch Civil Code, a person has no right of 
action where he lacks sufficient interest. However, the existence of sufficient interest is 
generally presumed and there is no requirement to address questions of substance before 
‘standing’ can be granted.13 Plaintiffs can be natural or legal persons, irrespective of whether 
they are Dutch nationals. However, legal personality is a prerequisite and, as a result, only 
companies, NGOs, and other foundations or associations that have legal personality may 
bring a civil claim. 
 
2.1.2 Standing of NGOs 
NGOs defending a collective or public interest often face obstacles in obtaining standing. For 
the purpose of this study, the words ‘association’ and ‘NGO’ are used interchangeably, as 
French and Dutch laws usually refer to NGOs as ‘associations.’ 
 
Article 1 French Act of 1st July 190114 defines ‘association’ (association) as the agreement 
between two or several persons who put together, permanently, their knowledge or their 
activity with a goal other than sharing profits.15 Article 6 French Act of 1st July 1901 states 
that a lawfully registered association can, without specific authorisation, be a party to legal 
proceedings.16 Therefore, an association has standing to bring a claim to protect its individual 
interest, such as its property. French law traditionally distinguished between the ‘individual 
interest’ of the association as a legal person and the ‘collective interest’ defended by the 
association.17 In 1923, the French Court of Cassation rejected that an association had standing 
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to defend the collective interest it aims to protect in its statutes. 18  However, it recently 
reversed its position and held that an association may bring a civil claim on behalf of the 
collective interest it protects in its statutes.19  
 
The French legislator has also progressively authorized associations to have standing in order 
to protect their collective interest.20 For example, Article L421-1 French Consumer Code 
(Code de la consommation) allows consumers associations to bring a civil claim to defend 
the collective interest of consumers. However, a number of criteria must be met. In some 
cases, the association must have been lawfully registered for at least five years. In other 
situations, the association must prove that it obtained the written consent of the victim after 
bringing specific information, such as the nature and purpose of the proposed action, to the 
attention of the victim. 
 
Finally, the French Court of Cassation has recognized that an association may bring a claim 
to protect its members’ individual interests.21 For instance, this is the case for associations 
defending the interests of victims of a specific harmful activity.22 However, a number of 
conditions are required. First, associations can only act for their members and cannot bring a 
claim for third parties. Second, an association’s statutes must clearly provide that it can bring 
a claim to protect its members’ interests.23  
 
The Alstom case demonstrates that the complexity and the formalism of the rules governing 
NGO standing in French civil procedure affect the ability for plaintiffs to gain access to a 
court in transnational litigation against MNEs. The corporate defendants challenged the right 
of action of AFPS and PLO. In first instance, the Nanterre Regional Court dismissed PLO’s 
claim on the grounds that it lacked standing under the power of attorney granted to PLO. At 
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the same time, it accepted AFPS’ claim on the grounds that it had the interest and standing to 
act in accordance with its statutes. Moreover, an infringement of a moral harm was sufficient. 
However, on appeal, both points of the ruling were overturned. The Versailles Court of 
Appeal declared PLO’s claim admissible, as PLO had been granted new power of attorney 
and could be considered as having the interest and standing to intervene. Nonetheless, it 
rejected that AFPS could bring a civil claim, holding that an association could not act for the 
general interest. The Court of Appeal24 held that, without a statutory basis, AFPS has the 
right to take legal actions only on behalf of the collective interest protected in its statutes.25 
However, the Court of Appeal found that, by seeking to annul international contracts 
performed on the Palestinian territory on the grounds that they violated rules of public 
international law, AFPS was not defending the collective interest of its members under its 
statutes. Instead, it sought to defend the collective interest of Palestinians, which it did not 
have authority to defend either in its statutes or on a statutory basis. 
 
This ruling seems to conform to the restrictive position adopted by French courts on the 
standing of NGOs. French civil procedure limits the opportunities for NGOs to gain access to 
a court, especially when they seek to defend interests broader than their own or that of their 
members. Ultimately, it prevents public interest litigation to challenge impunity and human 
rights abuse. An intervention of the legislator appears desirable to create a consistent and 
clear set of rules providing NGOs with standing, so they can play a more active role in 
defending societal interests. 
 
In Alstom, the Court of Appeal gave its own interpretation of the interplay between the right 
of action of NGOs and the right of access to a court.26 It held that a declaration that AFPS’ 
claim is inadmissible does not conflict with Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 EU Charter as: 
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the association has been able to bring its suit, it has thus had access to a court. But 
this right is not unlimited. If the formal and substantive conditions for bringing a 
lawsuit are lacking, it must be dismissed. On the facts, the AFPS fails to demonstrate 
that it fulfills the conditions allowing a charitable organization to bring a suit in 
defence of collective interests; thus, its suit must be declared inadmissible, without 
this prejudicing its right since it has had access to a court and a trial has taken place.27  
 
The position of the Court of Appeal on the right of access to a court is criticisable here. 
Although such a right is not absolute, limitations should not impair its very essence.28 The 
Court of Appeal’s view that AFPS had access to a court because it was able to bring its suit is 
erroneous in the light of the various interpretations given by the ECtHR of Article 6 ECHR. 
This ruling limits the right of access to a court to the practical possibility to file a claim. 
However, the scope of this right is much broader, and must be practical and effective.29 As 
such, the right of access to a court may be impaired by the existence of procedural rules 
barring certain subjects of law from bringing court proceedings30 or by excessive formalism.31 
Ultimately, French civil procedure currently impedes NGOs’ right of access to a court. 
 
In the Netherlands, traditionally, NGOs were barred from civil courts until the Dutch 
Supreme Court allowed them to bring an action to protect a public interest in a case related to 
environmental pollution.32 A number of requirements must be fulfilled: 1) the NGO must be a 
legal person, 2) its statutes must include the protection of the public interest on which the 
action is based, and 3) the action must aim to protect such an interest.33 Since 1994, Article 
3:305a Dutch Civil Code provides the possibility for an NGO to bring a representative action 
to protect interests similar to those it promotes. A foundation or an association with full legal 
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capacity can institute an action intended to protect similar interests of other persons to the 
extent that its articles promote such interests.34 Three basic requirements must be met: 1)  the 
NGO must be a foundation or an association with legal personality, 2) the NGO’s statutes 
and activities must promote the interests it seeks to further through the action, and 3) the 
interests defended must be analogous to be suitable for protection through the representative 
action. 35  Importantly, the NGO can be established after the dispute has arisen. 36  Other 
conditions shape this representative action. Through the action, the NGO must seek to protect 
interests others than its own and it must adequately promote the interests of those it 
represents. Furthermore, an NGO shall have no locus standi if it has not made a sufficient 
attempt to achieve the objective of the action through consultations with the defendant.37 
Therefore, Dutch civil procedure emphasizes the role of NGOs as conciliators and litigation 
should take place when consultations are not possible. 
 
In Shell, the corporate defendants challenged Milieudefensie’s standing pursuant to Article 
3:305a.38 They held that the NGO’s claim was inadmissible, as the case at issue involved a 
‘purely individual representation of interests.’39 Furthermore, the claim was not justified as it 
did not offer any advantages ‘whatsoever over litigating in the name of the interested parties 
themselves.’40 Finally, Article 3:305a was not intended to enable a Dutch NGO to seek 
protection for ‘a very limited, purely local foreign interest,’ meaning the interests of the 
Nigerian victims of the oil spills.41  
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These arguments were however rejected by the District Court of The Hague.42 It held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims rose above the individual interests of the parties, as the decontamination of 
the soil and the clean-up of the fishponds would benefit not only the plaintiffs but also the 
rest of the community and the environment. Furthermore, the District Court found that: 
 
the conducting of campaigns aimed at halting pollution of the Nigerian environment 
as an actual activity that Milieudefensie has engaged in to support the interests of the 
environment in Nigeria. Finally, the protection of the environment globally is an 
objective set down in Milieudefensie’s charter. There is no reason to assume that this 
objective is not sufficiently specific, nor is there any reason to assume that localised 
damage to the environment abroad falls outside that objective or outside the 
application of Article 3:305a …. All of the foregoing brings the court to the 
(provisional) opinion that Milieudefensie’s claims are admissible.43 
 
2.2 Initiating criminal proceedings 
The French and Dutch criminal systems recognize the principle of opportunity, under which 
the public prosecutor retains a right of discretion whether to initiate criminal proceedings. 
For example, the prosecutor may decide not to initiate criminal proceedings if there is a lack 
of evidence. This principle applies to all criminal offences. 
 
However, in some countries, victims of crimes and NGOs have the opportunity to initiate 
criminal proceedings. This form of action is an important way of getting around unwilling 
prosecutors and has increased in some countries, such as France, in recent years.44 
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Article 1 French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that judges and prosecutors have the 
power to initiate and exercise public prosecution for the imposition of penalties. However, 
this power is not exclusive, as ‘this prosecution may also be initiated by the injured party 
under the conditions determined by [the Code of Criminal Procedure].’45 As a result, victims 
of corporate abuse and NGOs have been able to directly initiate criminal proceedings against 
MNEs. Generally, they have two options.  
 
First, they can file a criminal complaint with the prosecutor. In this situation, the prosecutor 
is obligated to open a preliminary enquiry to decide whether prosecution is possible. 
However, the victims’ ability to initiate criminal proceedings is limited to this stage of 
investigation. Moreover, the prosecutor can still choose to terminate the criminal proceedings 
following the preliminary enquiry. In the context of transnational litigation against MNEs, 
French prosecutors have been particularly hostile to prosecute MNEs. As a result, this option 
has so far been unsuccessful. 
 
Second, victims and NGOs may initiate criminal proceedings by bringing a civil action 
(plainte avec constitution de partie civile) directly before the examining magistrate (juge 
d’instruction). Pursuant to Article 2 French Code of Criminal Procedure, a civil action aims 
at the reparation of the damage suffered because of a felony, a misdemeanour, or a petty 
offence. It is open to all those who have personally and directly suffered damage resulting 
from a criminal offence. The second option presents a number of advantages. It allows 
initiating not only criminal proceedings but also civil proceedings against MNEs. Plaintiffs 
sometimes prefer this option, as they can participate in the proceedings and can claim 
financial compensation. Furthermore, examining magistrates have typically been more 
receptive to plaintiffs’ claims.46 
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French law allows some NGOs to bring a civil action on behalf of victims of specific 
criminal offences. Articles 2-1 to 2-23 French Code of Criminal Procedure list the types of 
associations that can exercise the rights granted to a civil party, including associations 
fighting against racism or discrimination (Article 2-1), sexual violence and harassment 
(Article 2-2), violence committed against children (Article 2-3), war crimes and crimes 
against humanity (Article 2-4), sexual discrimination (Article 2-6), discrimination of persons 
with disabilities (Article 2-8), social exclusion and poverty (Article 2-10), occupational 
disease (Article 2-18), human trafficking and slavery (Article 2-22),47 and corruption (Article 
2-23).48 Similarly, associations must have been lawfully registered for at least five years. 
Moreover, Article L142-2 French Environmental Code provides that environmental NGOs 
can exercise the rights granted to a civil party in respect of facts creating direct or indirect 
damage to the collective interests they defend and constituting a criminal offence according 
to environmental legislation. However, the standing of environmental NGOs is limited by 
two requirements: the existence of damage to the collective interests the NGO defends and 
the commission of a criminal offence. Nonetheless, the French Court of Cassation has 
recognized that the commission of a criminal offence is not a sine qua non condition of the 
right of action of environmental NGOs. 49  Thus, environmental associations face fewer 
restrictions to bring a claim when environmental damage occurs.  
 
2.2.2 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, victims cannot initiate criminal proceedings. Contrary to the French 
system, the Dutch public prosecutor holds a monopoly on prosecution and is not obliged to 
prosecute. For instance, he may decline to prosecute when the suspect pays a sum of money 
in the form of a fine in order to settle the case (transactie). Likewise, the prosecutor may 
decide not to prosecute under the expediency principle, as laid down in Article 167 Dutch 
Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the prosecutor may waive prosecution for reasons 
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of public interest.50 The Dutch prosecutor tends to deal with some criminal offences, such as 
environmental offences, through transaction, settlement, or dismissal.51 The Dutch Code of 
Criminal Procedure does not provide the criteria for the exercise of this power, and no other 
authority will check whether discretion by the prosecutor was properly used. Nonetheless, the 
prosecution service is still bound by its own policies.52  
 
Nevertheless, Article 12 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure gives victims and NGOs a right 
to appeal the prosecutor’s decision not to initiate criminal proceedings. Accordingly, parties 
with a direct interest in the prosecution of criminal offences can apply to the Court of Appeal 
against the prosecutor’s decision. Article 12 is ‘the only way in which a private person 
(natural or otherwise) can formally influence the decision on prosecution.’53 However, the 
Court of Appeal has the last word. If it considers the complaint to be reasonable, it will order 
the prosecutor to launch the prosecution. To date, this has been done only in exceptional 
cases.54 Otherwise, it will turn down the complaint.55  
 
NGOs used this procedure in the case against Trafigura, but it produced limited results. In 
2009, Greenpeace appealed the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute Trafigura BV, as well 
as the chairman and various employees of the Trafigura group. On 13 April 2011, the Court 
of Appeal of The Hague rejected Greenpeace’s complaint, finding that Greenpeace had an 
insufficient direct interest to request prosecution of Trafigura BV, and that the criminal acts 
in question were beyond the scope of Greenpeace’s purpose as an organization. Therefore, 
the NGO lacked legal standing. In addition, the Court of Appeal held that the prosecutor had 
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a margin of discretion in deciding which offences are in the public interest to investigate and 
prosecute, and that he had sole authority to decide which cases to pursue.56 
 
2.2.3 European Union 
The EU recently enacted the Directive on the rights of victims of crimes, which aims ‘to 
ensure that victims of crimes receive appropriate information, support and protection and are 
able to participate in criminal proceedings.’57 This directive is applicable to transnational 
criminal litigation against MNEs. It does not require victims of crime to reside in, or to be a 
national of, EU Member States. Furthermore, the directive applies not only to criminal 
offences committed in the EU but also to criminal proceedings taking place in the EU, thus 
conferring rights on foreign victims of extraterritorial offences who are involved in criminal 
proceedings in EU Member States. 
 
Article 11 of the directive provides victims with specific rights in the event of a decision not 
to prosecute. In particular, Member States must ensure that victims have the right to a review 
of a decision not to prosecute.58 The EC clearly distinguished between the possibility for 
victims to pursue the prosecution as ‘a private or subsidiary prosecutor’ and the right to a 
review set out in Article 11. In supplementary guidance, it invited Member States to develop 
a clear and transparent procedure in their own criminal procedures to entitle victims to ask 
for a review.59  
 
2.3 Collective redress 
The UNGPs state that practical and procedural barriers to accessing judicial remedy can arise 
where there are inadequate options for aggregating claims or enabling representative 
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proceedings, such as class actions and other collective action procedures.60 Collective redress 
mechanisms61 can help a large number of victims, especially those with limited financial 
resources, have effective access to remedy. In EU Member States, their existence is very 
limited, however. When such mechanisms exist, domestic legislation strictly narrows their 
scope of application. Furthermore, collective redress mechanisms focus excessively on areas 
of law linked to economic life, such as consumer or competition law. Nonetheless, faced with 
rising demands for collective redress mechanisms, more EU Member States are considering 
adopting such mechanisms. 
 
2.3.1 France 
France has traditionally been reticent to allow collective redress mechanisms such as those in 
common law countries.62 As a result, there is no mechanism of collective redress per se, and 
only a small number of ‘representative action’ mechanisms have been adopted in consumer63 
and investment64 law. However, these mechanisms are of no use to plaintiffs in transnational 
litigation against MNEs. Over the last decades, the creation of a general collective redress 
mechanism, inspired by the American system of class action, has been much debated. 
Nevertheless, France remains reluctant to introduce such a mechanism.65  
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A small step was nonetheless recently made towards the creation of a group action ‘à la 
française.’ In 2014, the French Parliament passed a new law on consumption, which 
introduced a group action in the field of consumer law.66 The new Article L423-1 French 
Consumer Code provides that, under specific circumstances, a nationally representative 
consumer protection association may be entitled to bring a group action before a civil court 
to obtain compensation for individual losses sustained by a group of consumers ‘placed in a 
similar or identical situation and having for common cause the failure by one or several 
similar professionals of their legal or contractual obligations.’67 It has yet to be seen whether 
such a group action could be extended to other legal fields. However, French fears of 
perceived excesses of the US system of compensation and a French business lobby strongly 
opposed to the creation of collective redress mechanisms remain major obstacles to the 
creation of a general group action.68  
 
2.3.2 The Netherlands 
Similarly, the Dutch legislator has traditionally been suspicious of collective redress 
mechanisms. As a result, although collective redress mechanisms exist in the Netherlands, 
they are very different from US class action or UK group action, aiming to prevent 
transforming the Dutch legal system into a ‘perceived aggressive American litigating 
society.’69 They instead focus on limited representative action and settlement. One striking 
aspect of the Dutch practice of collective redress is the emphasis on mediation, which is 
highly relevant to transnational litigation against MNEs. 
 
Article 3:305a Dutch Civil Code provides the possibility for an NGO to bring a 
representative action to protect similar interests to those it promotes.70 One characteristic of 
this action is that only an NGO, not the individuals who suffered harm, may claim damages 
for the entire group. Furthermore, the NGO must adequately consult with the defendant 
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before initiating the action. Moreover, the ruling resulting from the action cannot affect a 
person whose interest the action intends to protect when this person opposes the ruling’s 
producing effect as regards himself, unless the nature of the ruling is such that its operation 
cannot be excluded as regards only that person.71 As was previously mentioned under Section 
2.1.2 of this Chapter, this action was used by Milieudefensie in Shell. 
 
The 2005 Dutch Act on Collective Settlements of Mass Claims (Wet Collectieve Afhandeling 
Massaschade or WCAM) provides for a settlement-only collective action.72 The idea behind 
the WCAM is to settle cases of mass damages in a smooth manner by enabling liable and 
injured parties to reach a collective settlement. 73  There are two main stages. First, an 
association, or a foundation, representing victims of a mass harm reaches a collective 
settlement with the tortfeasor. Second, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam approves the 
settlement. One advantage is that WCAM is not restricted to a particular area of law or to 
certain sectors, such as competition or consumer law.74 One disadvantage from a victim’s 
perspective is that all injured parties, including those who have not participated in the 
negotiations of the settlement, are bound by the court decision approving the settlement, 
unless they have opted out. Although it aims to ensure legal certainty and to prevent 
additional claims, this rule is problematic for injured parties who disapprove of the settlement 
or ignore the proceedings. Another disadvantage is that WCAM does not deal with the stage 
of reaching a settlement. It only provides that the settlement is a prerequisite that must be 
reached out-of-court. 75  In 2013, the WCAM was amended and a pre-trial hearing was 
introduced. To date, the Netherlands is the only European country to offer a procedure to 
declare a collective settlement binding on all class members on an ‘opt-out’ basis. The 
WCAM procedure may provide a cheaper and faster alternative than transnational litigation 
against MNEs to gain access to remedy. 
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2.3.3 European Union 
Collective redress mechanisms have been much debated at EU level over the last decade, 
especially in consumer and competition law. On 2 February 2012, the European Parliament 
(EP) adopted a resolution in which it called for a legally binding horizontal framework 
including a common set of principles that would provide uniform access to justice via 
collective redress within the EU.76 Amongst the areas listed where collective redress is ‘of 
value’ are not only consumer protection and competition, but also environmental protection, 
protection of personal data, financial services legislation, and investor protection. However, 
on 11 June 2013, the EC adopted a recommendation containing a series of non-binding 
principles for collective redress mechanisms ‘to ensure a coherent horizontal approach to 
collective redress in the EU without harmonising Member States’ systems.’77 Pursuant to this 
document, within two years, EU Member States should adopt collective redress mechanisms 
that allow multiple claimants to obtain compensation or injunctive relief on a collective basis 
or through a representative claimant. Such mechanisms should be available in different areas 
where EU law grants rights to citizens and companies, including in consumer protection, 
competition, and environmental protection. It remains to be seen whether and how EU 
Member States will implement this recommendation and the benefits produced for plaintiffs 
in transnational litigation against MNEs. 
 
3 Production of evidence 
The UNGPs provide that unbalanced access to information and to expertise between parties 
in business-related human rights claims create barriers to accessing judicial remedy.78 NGOs 
and scholars have also described how the lack of transparency and access to information, and 
formalistic rules on evidence are significant obstacles for victims of corporate abuse seeking 
remediation. 79  Access to, and production of, evidence in transnational litigation against 
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MNEs is problematic for several reasons. First, collecting evidence in transnational cases is 
costly for plaintiffs, as it is usually located in both host and home countries. In cases raising 
complex issues, such as environmental pollution, the intervention of experts may be required, 
necessitating additional financial resources to obtain sufficient evidence. Second, plaintiffs 
must usually prove corporate involvement in the production of the harm. Frequently, MNEs 
are in possession of such evidence and refuse to share compromising information with 
plaintiffs. Third, the rules governing the collection and admissibility of evidence may place 
an excessive burden on plaintiffs or fail to provide effective disclosure procedures to reduce 
potential inequality of arms between the parties. Ultimately, difficulties arising from the 
production of evidence reveal the asymmetric positions of both plaintiffs and corporate 
defendants in transnational litigation against MNEs. 
 
3.1 Civil proceedings 
Both French and Dutch codes of civil procedure provide rules governing burden of proof, 
admissibility of evidence, and disclosure procedures relevant to transnational litigation 
against MNEs. 
 
3.1.1 Burden of proof 
In France, as a general principle of civil procedure, each party must prove the facts necessary 
for the success of his claim.80 Similarly, the Netherlands follows the same principle that 
‘whoever asserts a fact must prove it.’81 Therefore, plaintiffs initiating a civil liability claim 
against an MNE must prove the facts and circumstances to substantiate that claim. 
 
However, in the Netherlands, there are a number of exceptions to this rule, such as when the 
law specifically provides otherwise, or when the application of such requirement would be 
contrary to the principles of reasonableness and fairness. Furthermore, under specific 
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circumstances, a reversal of burden of proof is possible during the proceedings or an 
aggravated burden of proof may be placed on the defendant to motivate his defence.82 
 
3.1.2 Admissibility 
In France, civil procedure is based almost exclusively on written evidence. The judge may 
invite the parties to provide factual explanations deemed necessary for the resolution of the 
dispute. He can also appoint an independent expert to further investigate technical matters or 
admit evidence from third parties by affidavit or oral testimony. However, this last option is 
less common. 
 
In the Netherlands, there is no restriction on the admissibility of evidence, which may be 
presented in any form, unless the law provides otherwise. 83  In some cases, evidence 
unlawfully obtained may be admissible. 84  Dutch courts usually have discretion to assess 
evidence.85 The absence of restrictions on the admissibility of evidence presents a benefit for 
victims bringing civil claims against MNEs. The flexibility of Dutch rules allows victims to 
present a large range of documents to substantiate their arguments. It also reduces the 
inequality of arms between the parties. However, the benefit of these rules appears to be 
limited in the absence of adequate disclosure procedures. To date, plaintiffs have had limited 
access to evidence proving the involvement of the parent company or the subsidiary in 
producing the harm, as the information to substantiate their arguments is often in the MNE’s 
possession. Furthermore, Dutch courts sometimes reject evidence that has been lawfully 
obtained when, for instance, it would violate the other party’s right to a private life.86  
 
3.1.3 Disclosure 
In France, parties must respect an obligation to cooperate in proceedings.87 Pursuant to the 
adversarial principle, French civil procedure requires parties to disclose in due time and 
                                                 
 
82
 Enneking (n 79) 138.  
83
 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 152(1). 
84
 Van Hooijdonk and Eijsvoogel (n 36) 22.  
85
 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 152(2). 
86
 Van Hooijdonk and Eijsvoogel (n 36) 22.  
87




spontaneously to one another the evidence they produce or rely upon.88 The judge may also 
request the disclosure of such means of evidence.89 The French code of civil procedure also 
considers the situation where a party holds evidence material. In transnational litigation 
against MNEs, corporate defendants may hold evidence that they possess when such 
evidence can substantiate the plaintiffs’ arguments. In such a situation, plaintiffs can request 
the judge to order corporate defendants to disclose material evidence.90 The judge enjoys 
broad powers in this regard. He can impose penalties on the party holding the evidence, if 
necessary, or may order third parties, such as other members of MNEs, to disclose 
documents. However, the plaintiff’s request must be specific and identify existing documents 
that the corporate defendant possesses. Any general requests are otherwise considered 
inadmissible.91 Furthermore, the judge has the discretion to appreciate the opportunity of such 
requests and controls tightly the procedure.92 
 
In COMILOG, the plaintiffs requested the disclosure of specific documents, including 
corporate bylaws and minutes of meetings, in order to establish the situation of co-
employment.93 The corporate defendants challenged such request. In 2013, the Paris Court of 
Appeal ordered the companies to disclose such documents and the French Court of Cassation 
later upheld this decision.94 This case demonstrates that plaintiffs can benefit from French 
disclosure procedures in transnational litigation against MNEs. 
 
In the Netherlands, parties are free to submit or withhold evidence to a large extent. There is 
no obligation on a party to disclose documents that are damaging to its own case. 
Furthermore, a party has limited options to request documents from the other party, as 
‘fishing expeditions’ are not allowed.95 However, pursuant to Article 843a Dutch Code of 
Civil Procedure, anyone who has records at his disposal or in his custody must allow a 
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person with a legitimate interest to inspect, have a copy of, or obtain an extract from, those 
records pertaining to a legal relationship to which he or his legal predecessors are party. If 
necessary, the court may determine how an inspection must be conducted or how a copy or 
extract must be produced. However, there are a number of limits to the application of Article 
843a. As a result, obtaining evidence from MNEs remains problematic when they are 
unwilling to disclose them.96 
 
Disclosure was, and continued to be, a major obstacle for plaintiffs in Shell. They requested 
documents demonstrating insufficient maintenance of oil pipelines and the control that Shell 
Plc had over SPDC’s environmental policy, including management reports and internal 
emails. However, the corporate defendants refused to provide access to the documents in 
their possession. As a result, plaintiffs requested disclosure based on Article 843a, but the 
District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ request. It held that Article 843a covers an exceptional 
obligation to produce evidence, and ‘there is no general obligation for the parties to 
proceedings to produce exhibits in the sense that they can be obliged as a rule to provide each 
other with all manner of information and documents.’97 Therefore, and to avoid ‘so-called 
fishing expeditions,’ the application of Article 843a is restricted by several conditions: 
 
Firstly, the party claiming the production of an exhibit must demonstrate a genuine 
legitimate interest, which legitimate interest can be explained as an interest in 
evidence. An interest in evidence exists when an item of evidence may contribute to 
the substantiation and/or demonstration of a concretely substantiated and disputed 
argument that is relevant to and possibly decisive for the claims being assessed. 
Secondly, the claims must concern “certain documents” which, thirdly, are at the 
actual disposal of the respondent, or can be put at its disposal. Fourthly, the party 
claiming the production of an exhibit must be party to the legal relationship covered 
by the claimed documents specifically. This includes legal relationship as a result of 
unlawful act. If all of these conditions are met, there nevertheless exists no obligation 
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to submit if, fifthly, there are no serious causes or if, sixthly, it can reasonably be 
assumed that due administration of justice is also guaranteed without such provision 
of information.98 
 
The District Court held that the demonstration of a concretely substantiated and disputed 
argument appears as a sine qua non condition to justify a legitimate interest. However, it 
found that the plaintiffs had insufficiently substantiated their argument and, as a result, had 
no legitimate interest in obtaining the items of evidence they requested. The plaintiffs also 
invoked their right to disclosure on the grounds of the principle of equality of arms laid down 
by Article 6 ECHR. Nonetheless, the District Court rejected such argument and held that the 
conditions under Article 843a were compatible with Article 6 ECHR and the principle of 
equality of arms.99  
 
The plaintiffs appealed this judgment. In September 2013, they also filed a new claim to 
produce documents pursuant to Article 843a. 100  They argued that they had a legitimate 
interest in accessing specific documents following the 2013 ruling of the District Court. 
Furthermore, they raised that new factual information, which became available as a result of 
disclosure in Bodo, the tort suit against SPDC in England, demonstrated the negligence of 
Shell Plc and SPDC in preventing the oil spills at stake in the Dutch court case.101 The case 
was pending at the time of writing. 
 
A legislative review of Article 843a is currently on-going. The Dutch legislator is 
considering various changes, such as allowing simple requests of documents or requests from 
third parties, or imposing a duty of confidentiality on the requesting party. Scholars and legal 
practitioners have expressed concern that changes would make ‘fishing expeditions’ easier. 
However, it seems that the Dutch courts would maintain the power to deny requests on 
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various grounds, including legal privilege and data protection. 102  Dutch scholars have 
suggested that this review provides an opportunity to remove barriers to the disclosure of 




Civil law countries are traditionally reluctant to discovery, which is mainly found in common 
law countries. 104  Nonetheless, the French Code of Civil Procedure allows a form of 
discovery. 105  Pursuant to Article 145, ‘if there is a legitimate reason to preserve or to 
establish, before any legal process, the evidence of the facts upon which the resolution of the 
dispute depends, legally permissible preparatory inquiries may be ordered at the request of 
any interested party, by way of a petition or by way of a summary procedure.’ As a result, a 
plaintiff can obtain any items of evidence from the corporate defendants if there is a 
legitimate reason to establish, before the proceedings start, the proof of the facts on which the 
ruling will be based. In the Netherlands, if discovery does not exist, it may be possible to 
order pre-trial hearings of parties as witnesses if a Dutch court is competent to hear the claim. 
 
3.2 Criminal proceedings 
The public prosecutor has the primary role in gathering evidence during criminal 
investigations and proceedings against MNEs. This can work to the plaintiffs’ advantage, 
especially when they cannot access evidence in the possession of the MNE or have limited 
financial resources to conduct an extensive investigation. At the same time, however, 
prosecutors often decline to prosecute MNEs based the lack of evidence or the difficulty in 
accessing information in a foreign country. For example, in Riwal, the Dutch prosecutor 
decided not to prosecute the corporate defendants on the grounds that the case was too 
complex and investigation would have required a significant amount of resources. Moreover, 
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investigation in Israel would have probably been impossible, given the lack of cooperation 
from the Israeli authorities.106 
 
4 Costs and funding of litigation against MNEs 
Transnational litigation against MNEs in France and the Netherlands is generally costly, even 
though litigation costs in those countries are perceived to be moderate compared to common 
law countries.107 For instance, Milieudefensie needs €180,000 per year to pursue its legal case 
against Shell in the Netherlands. The NGO has sought funding for the case through external 
donations on its website,108 but this has only partially covered its costs to date. 
 
Various reasons explain such high litigation costs. First, MNEs will forcefully fight against 
transnational claims against them to prevent the establishment of unfavourable precedent.109 
As a result, litigation is often lengthy, lasting at least several years, with limited chances of 
success for plaintiffs. Second, essential evidence, including documents and witnesses, is 
often located in the host country and bringing it to the home country where proceedings take 
place increases litigation costs. 110  Third, transnational litigation against MNEs is usually 
complex and requires specific legal and scientific expertise, adding to the costs. 
 
According to the UNGPs, barriers to accessing judicial remedy arise where ‘the costs of 
bringing claims go beyond being an appropriate deterrent to unmeritorious cases and/or 
cannot be reduced to reasonable levels through Government support, “market-based” 
mechanisms (such as litigation insurance and legal fee structures), or other means.’111 A lack 
of resources may also make finding legal representation difficult for claimants. 112 
Furthermore, rules of civil procedure, such as the loser pays principle, limited legal aid 
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schemes, and absence of funding arrangement options between plaintiffs and their lawyers 
may prevent victims and NGOs from accessing courts. 
 
4.1 Loser pays principle 
France applies the loser pays principle, whereby the losing party bears the costs pertaining to 
the legal proceedings.113 However, the judge may decide to impose whole or part of the legal 
costs on the other party. Furthermore, Article 700 French Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that the judge can order the losing party, or the party obliged to pay the legal costs, to pay an 
amount, which he determines, to the other party to cover the sums not included in the legal 
costs. Nonetheless, the judge must consider rules of equity and the financial condition of the 
party ordered to pay. On such grounds, he may free the losing party from paying other sums 
in addition to the legal costs.114 In Alstom, the plaintiffs lost and the Versailles Court of 
Appeal ordered them to pay the entire costs of the legal proceedings. In addition, the 
plaintiffs were ordered to pay €30,000 to each of the corporate defendants pursuant to Article 
700.115 Following the ruling, AFPS stated that those sums were substantial financial penalties 
for an NGO.116  
 
Similarly, the Netherlands applies the loser pays principle.117 Dutch courts will also order the 
losing party to bear the legal costs and the costs of the prevailing party, including registry 
fees, compensation of witness and experts, and lawyer fees.118 However, the losing party is 
not required to pay the full lawyer fees incurred by the prevailing party. As a rule, lawyer 
fees are calculated on the basis of a scale of costs set out in non-binding, but generally 
applied, court guidelines. In practice, this scale leads to a remuneration that does not cover 
the complete costs of legal representation and, as a result, the prevailing party will usually 
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recover only a small percentage of its actual costs.119 An important feature of Dutch civil 
procedure is that a claimant may request the court to order the defendant to pay the costs. The 
defendant can make the same request in his statement of defence.120  
 
In Shell, the District Court of The Hague ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants’ costs 
concerning the production of evidence during the legal proceedings following the dismissal 
of the plaintiffs’ request to obtain access to evidence. For each of the claims, the plaintiffs 
were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of €2,712 to the defendants within 14 days 
of the judgement.121 Furthermore, in 2013, the District Court ordered Milieudefensie and the 
plaintiffs who had lost in the first instance to pay the defendants’ costs, including their court 
fees and a fixed lawyer fee. However, the cost of the lawyer fees was relatively low due to 
the application of the abovementioned scale.122 
 
The application of the loser pays principle is particularly problematic when one considers 
that victims and NGOs often have limited financial resources, if any, to pursue legal 
proceedings compared to the large sums spent by MNEs. Ultimately, the loser pays principle 
reinforces the inequality of arms between plaintiffs and MNEs. It deters victims and NGOs 
from initiating legal proceedings to gain access to remedy and to hold companies to account. 
 
4.2 Legal aid 
A number of EU legislative instruments are relevant to plaintiffs in transnational litigation 
against MNEs with regard to access to legal aid in France and the Netherlands. 
 
4.2.1 European Union 
Article 47(3) EU Charter, on the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, provides that 
legal aid must be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice.  
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The EU also enacted Council Directive 2002/8/EC (Directive on legal aid)123 to promote 
access to legal aid in civil and commercial cross-border disputes for persons who lack 
sufficient resources, particularly where aid is necessary to secure effective access to justice. 
However, the Directive on legal aid applies only to cross-border disputes where the party 
applying for legal aid is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the 
Member State where the court is sitting or where the decision is to be enforced.124 As a result, 
the Directive on legal aid does not confer rights to individuals domiciled or residing in 
countries outside the EU, such as victims of abuse committed by EU MNEs in host countries. 
This situation creates discrimination against foreign victims and limits their opportunities to 
obtain effective access to civil remedy in the EU.  
 
Furthermore, the abovementioned Directive on the rights of victims of crimes requires 
Member States to provide legal aid to victims where they are a party in criminal 
proceedings.125 As a result, foreign victims should have access to legal aid in transnational 
criminal litigation against MNEs. Legal aid should at least cover legal advice and legal 
representation free of charge.126 
 
4.2.2 France 
In France, there are three main legal aid schemes: 1) legal aid (aide juridictionnelle); 2) aid 
to access the law (aide à l’accès au droit); 3) and aid to obtain a lawyer’s advice in non-
judicial proceedings (aide à l'intervention de l'avocat dans les procédures non 
juridictionnelles).127 Legal aid is the most relevant scheme in the context of transnational 
litigation against MNEs. It is available to natural persons who lack sufficient resources in 
order to secure their effective access to justice.128 The French State will cover the costs of 
legal assistance, including lawyer fees, and the costs of proceedings, including the fees to 
persons mandated by the court to perform acts during the proceedings, of the legal aid 
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recipient. One advantage for plaintiffs is that legal aid can be obtained for any type of legal 
proceedings, including civil and criminal.  
 
However, various restrictions apply to legal aid in France. First, the legal aid recipient may 
obtain either full or partial legal aid depending on his resources. Second, legal aid does not 
cover the costs that may be imposed if the plaintiff loses the case (eg the defendant’s legal 
costs, damages). Third, only a natural person, who is a French national, an EU national, or a 
foreign national legally and habitually residing in France, may receive legal aid.129 Moreover, 
legal persons are excluded from receiving legal aid. In the context of transnational litigation 
against MNEs, these conditions limit access to legal aid by foreign victims and NGOs. Only 
in exceptional cases could nationals of non-EU countries residing outside of France receive 
legal aid, for instance where their situation appears particularly noteworthy regarding the 
subject matter or the costs of the proceedings.130 Furthermore, only non-profit legal persons, 
which have their seat in France and lack sufficient resources, may exceptionally receive legal 
aid.131 
 
4.2.3 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has one of the most elaborate legal aid systems in Europe.132 Article 18(2) 
Dutch Constitution provides for the granting of legal aid to persons of limited means.133 In 
general, the Dutch State will cover a certain amount of the court fees and the lawyer fees paid 
by the legal aid recipient. Under the Dutch scheme, legal aid may be granted to both natural 
and legal persons with inadequate financial resources in relation to legal interests within the 
Dutch legal sphere of influence.134 Furthermore, depending on the recipient’s income, legal 
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aid may allow for a reduction in the court fees. 135  Moreover, there is no restriction of 
nationality or residence to obtain legal aid, as long as legal interests within the Dutch legal 
sphere of influence are involved though. In Shell, the Nigerian plaintiffs were able to receive 
legal aid. However, due to high litigation costs, legal aid has been insufficient to fund the 
whole case and other sources of funding have been necessary to engage and continue the 
lawsuit.136 Another limit of the Dutch system is that legal aid recipients must always cover 
part of their litigation costs according to their financial resources.137 Moreover, legal aid will 
not be granted if the party’s chance of winning is considered to be close to zero or if the costs 
incurred with the proceedings are not reasonable compared to the interest of the case.138 
 
4.3 Market-based mechanisms 
The UNGPs explicitly mention ‘market-based’ mechanisms, such as litigation insurance and 
legal fee structures, to fund legitimate cases involving business-related abuse. In contrast 
with common law countries, market-based mechanisms (eg contingent fees in the US or 
conditional fees in the UK) are less widespread in civil law countries. 
 
In France, the ‘no win, no fee’ agreement (pacte de quota litis) is generally considered to be 
‘shocking’ and ‘inappropriate,’139 and French law prohibits it.140 As a result, parties, and not 
their lawyers, must bear the costs of legal proceedings. Nonetheless, a party and his lawyer 
may agree a contingency fee or a success fee in addition to the remuneration for the service. 
 
In the Netherlands, parties and their lawyers are free to agree on how lawyers are to be paid. 
However, the Code of Conduct of the Dutch Bar Association imposes certain limitations.141 
As a general rule, a lawyer must take into account all the circumstances of the case when 
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determining his fee and he must charge a reasonable fee.142 Furthermore, US-style contingent 
fees are not permitted. A lawyer should not agree to charge a proportionate part of the value 
of the result obtained.143 Success fees are not allowed either. A lawyer should not agree that 
he would only charge for his services upon obtaining a specific result. 144  However, the 
Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal has accepted certain forms of success fees, such as charging 
fees at a higher hourly rate if the case is successful.145 Finally, WCAM settlements can be 
used by plaintiffs to pay their lawyers fees, which can be substantial.146 
 
5 Remedies 
The UNGPs provide that remedies may take various forms, including apologies, restitution, 
rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation, punitive sanctions, and injunctions or 
guarantees of non-repetition.147 In accordance with the UNGPs, France and the Netherlands 
offer various remedies, including damages and injunctions. However, in the context of 
transnational litigation against MNEs, French and Dutch domestic courts have rarely found 
companies liable for human rights abuse or environmental damage in host countries. Often, 
courts dismiss claims before they decide on their merits, or claimants and MNEs settle 
through an out-of-court agreement. Therefore, victims have had limited access to judicial 
remedy in France and the Netherlands to date. 
 
Moreover, the application of the Rome II Regulation in EU Member States directly affects 
remedies in transnational litigation against MNEs. The general rule is that the type of remedy, 
including the character and amount, must be determined according to the law of the host 
State.148 NGOs and scholars have criticized the effect of the Rome II Regulation on remedies 
available to plaintiffs.149 They suggest that available remedies in host States might not be 
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always appropriate to remediate corporate abuse of human rights or environmental pollution 
and that the maximum amount of compensation might be too low to cover the real costs of 
litigation in the home country.150 
 
Nonetheless, an overview of the available types of remedy in France and the Netherlands is 
noteworthy in the context of this study in order to understand the opportunities of redress for 
victims. Furthermore, the Rome II Regulation provides for a number of situations where the 
home State law may apply.151 
 
5.1 Damages 
Under French and Dutch law, the principle behind awarding damages is generally aimed at 
repairing the harm suffered by the victim rather than punishing the tortfeasor.152 In France, 
victims of corporate abuse can obtain damages153 before civil and criminal courts in order to 
repair and compensate the harm they suffered. French courts use a case-by-case approach to 
calculate damages and there is generally no maximum limit to damages. Courts assess 
damages at the time of the ruling on the basis of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. French 
courts can order the defendant to compensate the plaintiff the entire injury, which may 
comprise pecuniary loss (dommage patrimonial) and non-pecuniary loss (dommage moral), 
such as pain, suffering, or loss of amenities.154 Compensation for non-pecuniary loss may be 
granted for personal injury, for death or serious injuries to a loved one, or even for harm to 
feelings.155 French courts tend to award generous sums to compensate non-pecuniary loss.156 
Furthermore, an extensive list of relatives is eligible to claim damages for the loss of a close 
relative or a loved one.157 However, the benefits made by the defendant as a result of the harm 
are not taken into account in the assessment of the damages. In addition to reparation and 
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compensation, French courts may award a euro symbolique to recognize that the victim has 
suffered a wrong or that his right has been infringed.158  
 
In the Netherlands, damage to be repaired may cover loss to property, rights, and interests, 
such as loss incurred and the profit deprived, as well as any other damage.159 In personal 
injury cases, victims may claim damages for their recovery and for other pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damage, such as pain and injury.160 As a general rule, damages shall be paid in 
monetary form, although Dutch courts have discretion to award them in other forms.161 They 
also enjoy discretion to assess the amount of financial compensation and are not bound by 
rules of evidence in this regard. Nonetheless, the injured party should be placed, as far as 
possible, in the situation which he would have been in if the event that caused the damage 
had never occurred.162 Unlike France, the Netherlands allows the injured party to request that 
the damages be assessed according to the amount of the profit (or a part thereof) that the 
tortfeasor derived from committing the tort.163 This provision could potentially be useful for 
plaintiffs in the context of transnational claims against MNEs. For instance, MNEs may 
derive a profit from the sale of goods produced by employees who did not receive the 
minimum wage in violation with labour law requirements. 
 
Punitive damage awards do not exist under French and Dutch law. In France, courts continue 
to show distrust towards punitive damages, even though the French Court of Cassation 
recently held that they were not contrary to public policy.164 Nonetheless, foreign awards of 
punitive damage can be enforced in France when the amount awarded is not disproportionate 
with regard to the damage sustained.  
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5.2 Other types of remedy 
France provides for various types of injunctions, most notably to prevent or halt on-going 
infringement of the plaintiff’s rights, or to order the defendant to take positive action to 
further limit harm that has already occurred.165 Similarly, Dutch courts can issue injunctions 
to order the defendant to perform certain acts after the tort took place, or to abstain from 
certain acts before the tort takes place.166 As a result, plaintiffs in transnational litigation 
against MNEs may ask courts to order MNEs to honour any legally enforceable obligations 
or to grant interim injunctions or orders.167 However, it remains to be seen whether such 
remedies are applicable or effective, particularly as the harm usually takes place in host 
countries where there are limited means of enforcement.168 
 
To date, courts have tended to focus on the award of damages to injured individuals. In Shell, 
the plaintiffs requested the Dutch courts to order the corporate defendants to clean-up the oil 
spills in Nigeria. However, the District Court only ordered the subsidiary to compensate the 
plaintiff for the damage he suffered. There was no order to clean-up the pollution. Scholars 
and activists have generally called for home country courts to take into account other types of 
remedy than financial compensation, such as injunctions or clean-up operations. They have 
pointed out that excessive focus on financial compensation to injured individuals does not 
remedy long-standing social and environmental problems.169 
 
6 Conclusions 
Chapter 7 explored the French and Dutch procedural rules that affect the opportunities of 
plaintiffs to gain effective access to remedy in the context of transnational litigation against 
MNEs.  
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In civil proceedings, while foreign victims of corporate abuse can generally bring a claim 
against an MNE, NGOs face significant obstacles to bring similar claims. In France, NGOs 
can initiate a civil claim on behalf of the collective interests they seek to protect in their 
statutes, or when French legislation explicitly allows it. In the Netherlands, only NGOs 
which have legal personality and protect the public interest on which the action is based in 
their statutes may bring a civil claim against an MNE. While French courts take a restrictive 
approach to NGO standing in the context of transnational litigation against MNEs, Dutch 
courts accept more easily that NGOs can bring claims. 
 
In criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor enjoys a wide discretion to initiate prosecution, 
as a result of the application of the principle of opportunity in France and the Netherlands. 
This is problematic, as French and Dutch prosecutors are usually reluctant to sue MNEs for 
human rights abuse or environmental pollution taking place in host countries. However, 
French law allows victims and NGOs to initiate criminal proceedings, even when the 
prosecutor declines. One advantage of this procedure is that it allows, at the same time, for 
criminal punishment of the MNE and for victims to claim financial compensation. 
Nonetheless, the prosecutor does not have any obligation to continue the criminal 
proceedings after the preliminary enquiry stage. At EU level, the Directive on the rights of 
victims of crime recently created an obligation for Member States to ensure that victims have 
the right to a review in the event of a decision not to prosecute. Victims and NGOs may 
enjoy the benefit of this provision in the context of transnational criminal litigation against 
MNEs. 
 
France and the Netherlands have traditionally been reticent to allow collective redress 
mechanisms similar to those found in common law countries. As a result, collective redress is 
generally not available to plaintiffs in French and Dutch proceedings. Nonetheless, the 
Netherlands provides for a representative action where NGOs can bring a claim to defend the 
interests of a group of individuals. This action was directly relevant in the Shell case. 
Furthermore, the Dutch legislator recently created an action that allows courts to recognize 
group settlements. This action may provide a viable alternative to transnational litigation 




action on the issue of collective redress mechanism has to date been limited to consumer 
issues and, as a result, it provides no opportunities for victims of corporate abuse. 
 
French and Dutch rules on the production of evidence also affect how victims and NGOs 
effectively gain access to remedy. In civil proceedings, plaintiffs initiating a liability claim 
against an MNE usually bear the burden of proof. Furthermore, while French courts allow 
disclosure for the benefit of plaintiffs, Dutch courts are much more reluctant to require 
corporate defendants to produce evidence and have been wary of ‘fishing expeditions,’ such 
as in Shell. As a result, plaintiffs face significant obstacles to demonstrate the validity of their 
claims, especially since they often have limited access to crucial evidence possessed by 
MNEs. In criminal proceedings, even though the prosecutor has the main role in gathering 
and requesting evidence, the benefit for victims is limited because prosecutors are generally 
reluctant to prosecute MNEs.  
 
Transnational litigation against MNEs is also generally expensive. The application of the 
loser pays principle is problematic when plaintiffs with limited financial resources have to 
pay the MNE’s litigation costs. Legal aid may be available for foreign plaintiffs, but it is 
often not enough to cover the entire costs of litigation. Other types of funding, such as 
market-based mechanisms, are usually not available. French and Dutch civil procedure 
relating to remedy is more flexible than in common law countries.170 However, the Rome II 
Regulation generally imposes the application of the host country law to govern the choice of 
remedies. While various forms of remedy, whether damages or injunction, are available, 
punitive damages do not exist in France and the Netherlands, thus limiting the benefit of 
using litigation to deter MNEs from committing human rights or environmental abuse. In 
general, under French and Dutch law, damages aim to repair the harm and compensate the 
victim rather than punish the tortfeasor. 
 
The next chapter looks at the socio-legal context in which transnational litigation against 
MNEs is embedded. It describes the emergence of the corporate accountability movement 
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and its characteristics in Europe. It also explores the role of the European corporate 
accountability movement, including CSOs and cause lawyers, in the emergence and the 






Social movements and legal mobilization for corporate accountability in Europe 
 
1 Introduction 
Transnational litigation against MNEs has direct links to the broader civil society agenda on 
globalization and corporate accountability. 1  It supports general claims for improved 
regulation of business activities at both international and national levels. CSOs, including 
lawyers and legal NGOs, have also played an instrumental role in the emergence of 
transnational claims against MNEs before domestic courts. They not only seek effective 
remedy for victims of corporate abuse in host countries but also call MNEs to account for 
human rights and environmental abuse occurring in the context of their international 
activities. In the latter situation, litigation is a tool to raise awareness amongst the judiciary 
and policy-makers and to demand reform for improved corporate accountability. 
 
The aim of Chapter 8 is twofold. First, it seeks to trace the emergence and identify the 
characteristics of the corporate accountability movement in Europe. Particular attention is 
paid to the existence and the role of cause lawyers and their interactions with activist CSOs. 
Second, Chapter 8 aims to understand the interplay between transnational litigation against 
MNEs and the corporate accountability movement. It explores the strategic nature of this 
type of legal mobilization and questions its effectiveness to achieve conflicting objectives 
and to satisfy the demands of the various actors involved in claims against MNEs. 
 
The scope of Chapter 8 is not limited to France and the Netherlands and generally includes 
other European countries, such as the UK and Germany. Various reasons explain this scope. 
First, transnational litigation against MNEs has been undertaken in various countries 
throughout Europe over the last years. In most cases, lawyers and CSOs active in the 
corporate accountability movement were behind these claims. Second, national networks of 
organizations working on various corporate accountability issues are well established in 
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those countries. They regularly collaborate with each other on common campaigns at 
European level and, at times, on claims targeting specific MNEs in different countries (eg 
litigation against Trafigura or Shell). They may also face similar legal frameworks (eg EU 
private international law), and legal and procedural obstacles (access to evidence, litigation 
costs). Third, there is a need for further research on the interplay between transnational 
litigation against MNEs and social movements in Europe. 
 
Chapter 8 starts by providing an overview of the corporate accountability movement in 
Europe. It then describes the strategic nature of transnational litigation against MNEs and 
how this type of legal mobilization succeeds, or fails, in achieving the various aims it pursues, 
namely access to remedies for victims and corporate accountability reform. Finally, Chapter 
8 explores the use of lawsuits by MNEs to discourage plaintiffs, cause lawyers, and CSOs 
from raising corporate human rights or environmental abuse in courts. 
 
2 The corporate accountability movement in Europe 
This section explores the emergence and the characteristics of the corporate accountability 
movement in Europe. First, it describes the emergence of the corporate accountability 
movement at the end of the 1990s. Second, it explains the general features of the corporate 
accountability movement. Third, it provides an overview of the corporate accountability 
movement in Europe. 
 
2.1 The rise of the corporate accountability movement  
The corporate accountability movement at issue in this study is historically recent. Influenced 
by previous social movements concerned with human rights and environmental protection 
and the recent global justice movement, it emerged at the beginning of the 21st century.2 
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Traditionally, human rights and environmental CSOs were concerned with State violations of 
human rights abuse, and State territorial and extraterritorial environmental pollution. 
However, with the liberalization of the global economy and the increase in the number of 
MNEs operating across borders, they started to observe the negative impacts of corporate 
activities on humans and the environment, especially in developing countries.3 In particular, 
disasters caused by corporate activities, such as the 1984 Bhopal tragedy or the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill, triggered CSO campaigns against corporations.4 
 
Since its emergence, activism concerned with corporate impacts on humans and the 
environment has evolved considerably.5 These changes are directly linked to the evolution of 
the relationship between CSOs and businesses. In the 1980s, CSOs focused their activities on 
governmental commitments to regulate companies. However, they started to be critical of 
what they perceived as failed attempts by governments and international organizations, such 
as the UN or the OECD, to regulate MNEs.6 This led CSOs to direct their attention to private 
regulation by businesses themselves. During the 1990s, there was an evolution of the CSO 
strategy from ‘barricades’ to ‘boardrooms.’7 CSOs increased engagement with companies to 
solve social, human rights, and environmental issues. As a result, the concepts of CSR and 
private, or voluntary, regulation became prevalent in CSO discourse. However, towards the 
end of the 1990s, some CSOs and other activists began to question the effectiveness of CSR 
initiatives and private regulation. In particular, these actors were concerned about corporate 
control over the way the CSR agenda was framed, how some crucial issues related to global 
injustice remained largely out of bounds, and the general failure of CSR initiatives at 
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restricting the growth of corporate power.8 As a result, some CSOs shifted to a new type of 
activism and started to mobilize around the banner of ‘corporate accountability.’9 
 
It should be noted that the evolution of CSO demands for MNE regulation echoes the various 
phases through which the UN has engaged with corporate impacts on humans and the 
environment. As will be seen in Chapter 9, the recent decision of the UNHRC to create a 
working group to draft a legally binding instrument on MNEs and human rights demonstrates 
the growing international attention to the question of corporate accountability under 
international human rights law.10 
 
2.2 The characteristics of the corporate accountability movement 
The agenda of the corporate accountability movement is based on a distinction between 
corporate responsibility and corporate accountability.11 While corporate responsibility refers 
to any attempts to encourage companies to behave responsibly towards humans and the 
environment on a voluntary basis, corporate accountability refers to requiring companies to 
comply with legal norms or face consequences. 12  Utting suggests that the corporate 
accountability movement seeks to redirect ‘attention to the question of corporate obligations, 
the role of public policy and law, the imposition of penalties in cases of non-compliance, the 
right of victims to seek redress, and imbalances in power relations.’13  
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The tactics of the corporate accountability movement have focused on social contestation, 
critical research, and campaigns pushing for legal reforms.14 Amongst its portfolio of actions, 
organising public campaigns, and lobbying for legal and policy reforms, and testing and 
using soft and hard law to seek redress have developed.15 As a result, it has contributed to 
several regulatory developments.16 The corporate accountability movement also emphasizes 
the role of traditional regulatory organizations and institutions, including policy-makers, 
courts, and State enforcement bodies, in improving corporate behaviour.17 Importantly, it 
pays strong attention to the role of courts to punish companies when they do not comply with 
legally binding obligations and to provide victims with remedies.  
 
The corporate accountability movement does not adhere to the view that voluntary initiatives 
should be a preferred substitute for legally binding regulation. Instead, it reasserts the role of 
the law in social, human rights, and environmental domains. It also expands the terrain for 
hybrid regulation where voluntary and mandatory regulations merge. 18  Moreover, the 
corporate accountability movement has drawn attention to the need for an expanding body of 
hard and soft-law that target companies, especially in international law.19  
 
Ultimately, Utting suggests that ‘the corporate accountability agenda attempts to strengthen 
an arena of law that is sometimes referred to as “subaltern legality” or “counter-hegemonic 
legality”.’20 He explains as follows: 
 
This involves efforts on the part of social groups, individuals and communities whose 
livelihoods, identity, rights and quality of life are negatively affected by states and 
corporations, to use the existing legal apparatus to seek redress for injustice and 
participate in struggles and processes associated with accountability. A key feature of 
such struggles is transnational activism that connects actors at local, national, regional 
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and global levels. Prominent examples of subaltern legality include PIL in India and 
the approximately thirty cases that have been brought against corporations under the 
ATS in the US.21  
 
The corporate accountability movement involves a more representative cross-section of civil 
society actors and international, regional, and national coalitions, connecting actors and 
organizations that were previously disconnected or wary of each other’s agendas. Utting 
argues that the coalitions of the modern corporate accountability movement are overcoming 
the fragmentation and tensions that have divided CSOs concerned with MNEs.22 In particular, 
the movement has brought together CSOs from Northern and Southern countries in national, 
regional, and international networks. Such relations are visible in transnational campaigns 
and legal actions, such as transnational litigation against MNEs.23 Furthermore, the corporate 
accountability movement has used networking to enhance resource mobilization, political 
opportunities, and collective identity formation. However, a number of issues exist with 
regard to the potential of networks, including significant imbalances in power relations 
favouring CSOs from the North.24 Scholars have argued that CSOs from developed countries 
can marginalise the interests and the role of local CSOs from developing countries. 25 
Furthermore, campaigns for corporate accountability have been criticized for the 
marginalisation of victims of business-related abuse from developing countries. 
Transnational solidarity is often produced through socially thin relations and raises questions 
about the durability and potential of its agency for social change, and the practices of human 
rights and democracy that are locally routinizing within civil society.26  
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2.3 Overview of the corporate accountability movement in Europe 
The European corporate accountability movement is composed of various actors, including 
NGOs and cause lawyers, who regularly collaborate on transnational claims against MNEs. 
 
2.3.1 Characteristics 
Since its creation, the corporate accountability movement has grown across Europe. It is 
composed of a broad range of CSOs, including NGOs traditionally concerned with 
environmental and human rights (eg Friends of the Earth; Amnesty International), trade 
unions (eg TUC), scholars and universities (eg the Essex Business and Human Rights Project 
at the University of Essex), and lawyers and law firms (eg William Bourdon; Leigh Day). 
While some organizations focus on specific business sectors (eg extractive or garment 
industries), others target companies in general. The European corporate accountability 
movement is characterized by the existence of networks operating at national27 and regional28 
levels. There are close linkages between these various networks, which regularly collaborate 
on common issues, initiatives, and campaigns (eg global supply chains or oil activity in 
Nigeria). They take advantage of opportunities offered by transnational interactions, through 
the Internet, social media, and regional and international institutions, to achieve common 
aims. For instance, the annual UN Forum on Business and Human Rights in Geneva gives 
CSOs the opportunity to work together in order to raise awareness about specific issues and 
influence policy-makers.29  
 
Importantly, the presence of regional institutions contributes to the elaboration of common 
strategies around the topic of corporate accountability in Europe. In particular, the EU 
institutions have been the object of intense campaigning, as they have a major influence on 
the drafting of national policies and legislation governing business activities and access to 
justice. Furthermore, the excessive focus of the EU on CSR policies has contributed to renew 
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demands for corporate accountability from CSOs over the last decade.30 Finally, the EU is 
generally a major source of funding for NGOs in the region. As such, it may contribute to 
resources to corporate accountability NGOs, helping them fund, directly or indirectly, 
campaigns or projects related to corporate accountability and access to justice. 
 
2.3.2 Cause lawyers 
Within the European corporate accountability movement, lawyers, law firms, and legal 
NGOs have given the main impetus to transnational litigation against MNEs. For instance, 
the British law firm Leigh Day was one of the first law firms to bring human rights claims 
against MNEs in England at the end of the 1990s. Leigh Day is generally identified with the 
British corporate accountability movement, as a result of its litigation work against 
companies and its involvement in the CORE Coalition.31 In France, the legal NGO Sherpa 
was created in 2001 by William Bourdon, a French lawyer involved in human rights NGOs,32 
to prevent and fight ‘economic crimes.’33 Sherpa campaigns actively for the adoption of 
binding norms to govern MNE activities, and has been involved in most of the claims 
brought against MNEs before the French courts. In Germany, a group of human rights 
lawyers created the legal NGO European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
(ECCHR) in 2007. Since its creation, the ECCHR has been involved in most cases against 
MNEs in Germany and Switzerland. 34  In the Netherlands, Prakken d’Oliveira (formerly 
Böhler Advocaten) is a law firm specialized in international law and human rights.35 The law 
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firm’s name has been associated to a number of famous human rights and international 
criminal law cases. 
 
These actors are cause lawyers, meaning activist lawyers who seek to use the courts as a 
vehicle to achieve social change or social justice beyond the individual claim at stake.36 They 
are usually specialised in human rights and environmental law issues, and they regularly 
work with disadvantaged groups. They are often the only litigators to offer legal assistance or 
representation to foreign victims of corporate abuse. In general, law firms and lawyers are 
reluctant to take on transnational cases against MNEs, not only because of the costs and 
complexity of this type of litigation but also to avoid potential conflicts with other corporate 
clients.37  
 
Ward distinguishes between two main categories of cause lawyers involved in transnational 
litigation against MNEs. 38  The first category is composed of legal NGOs that work on 
strengthening MNE accountability. They receive support for their work from major 
foundations and see litigation as part of their broader work. In France, Sherpa was created to 
hold parent companies of corporate groups legally and financially liable for the activities of 
their foreign companies, and to support foreign victims in accessing courts.39 It engages in 
litigation as well as awareness-raising and lobbying. The second category is composed of 
profit-making law firms which take on cases that have strong public interest elements either 
on the basis of ‘no win no fee’ or legal aid. They work to obtain remedies for victims who 
would otherwise not be compensated for their injuries. 40  In the Netherlands, Prakken 
d’Oliveira represents individuals and groups which are oppressed or have difficulties gaining 
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access to law.41 Its lawyers are currently representing the plaintiffs in the Shell case on the 
basis of legal aid.  
 
2.3.3 Collaboration 
One can observe a constructive tactical alliance between CSOs and cause lawyers relative to 
the challenges and opportunities confronted at various stages of transnational litigation 
against MNEs.
42
 In general, the existence of networks facilitates collaboration between CSOs 
and cause lawyers in building, pursuing, and raising the visibility of claims.  
 
Cause lawyers benefit from their collaboration with CSOs regarding access to evidence, 
funding, and visibility. For example, Leigh Day built its legal case against the mining MNE 
Monterrico thanks to information provided by various American and Peruvian NGOs.
43
 
Similarly, Prakken d’Oliveira used various documents produced by other NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International and Platform London, to build its claims against Shell in the 
Netherlands.
44
 Milieudefensie has also played a decisive role in funding, collecting evidence, 
and raising the visibility of the case. In France, Sherpa strategically mobilizes a network of 
various actors, including lawyers, law professors, and NGOs, to work on specific cases or 
develop legal arguments on corporate liability or access to justice. Furthermore, the presence 
of international NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth, within the European corporate 
accountability movement is advantageous for lawyers, as these NGOs usually have a 
presence in host countries that allows them to have an easier access to information and to 
victims of human rights and environmental abuse. For instance, Milieudefensie collaborated 
with the Nigerian section of Friends of the Earth to collect evidence for Shell. 
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CSOs also benefit from collaboration with cause lawyers. They may lack the legal expertise 
to put together a legal strategy or bring a claim directly before a court. Therefore, cause 
lawyers are precious collaborators, as they are more willing to work on complex claims 
raising human rights abuse and environmental damage.  
 
At the same time, collaboration between CSOs and cause lawyers presents some challenges. 
Lawyers may perceive that such collaboration interferes with their relationship with their 
client. Furthermore, lawyers are bound by confidentiality vis-à-vis their clients, which 
complicates the possibility to disclose certain information to CSOs, and by their clients’ 
decisions during the proceedings. In this regard, settlement agreements may create tensions 
between CSOs and cause lawyers when their interests diverge. 
 
3 Legal mobilization for corporate accountability in Europe 
Transnational litigation against MNEs is indissociable from the corporate accountability 
movement. Legal mobilization is one of the strategies used by activist organizations and 
lawyers to achieve political and legal reform of MNE conduct in host countries. This section 
explores the strategic nature of transnational litigation against MNEs and questions its 
effectiveness to achieve conflicting objectives and to satisfy the demands of the various 
actors involved in claims against MNEs. 
 
3.1 Strategic litigation against MNEs 
The nature of transnational litigation against MNEs is twofold. First, it is a traditional form 
of litigation in the sense that it seeks to hold specific companies liable for the harm they 
caused while providing an opportunity for victims to obtain a judicial remedy for the damage 
they suffered. At the same time, it is a strategic form of litigation, as it also seeks to achieve 
broader goals beyond the success of a specific case. Scholars have argued that transnational 
litigation against MNEs is similar to public law litigation.45 Often, plaintiffs are not simply 
acting on their own behalf, but also serve as representatives of the larger community affected 
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by the company.46 More importantly, litigators use transnational claims against MNEs to 
encourage legal reform to strengthen corporate accountability and improve access to justice. 
 
On multiple occasions, European litigators have asserted the twofold nature of these claims. 
For instance, Sherpa insists that ‘the law can be a tool for rights advocacy, at the same time 
fighting against the impunity of economic (public and private) actors and providing a remedy 
for the damage suffered by the victims.’47 In Germany, the ECCHR claims to use strategic 
litigation to hold non-State actors accountable for human rights violations in selected ‘pilot 
cases’ which highlight structural problems, rise legal questions that have until now gone 
unanswered, and may provide a precedent for enforcing human rights in the future.48 Such 
litigation has for goal ‘to effect change above and beyond the individual case at hand.’49 
 
3.1.1 Goals 
As a strategic form of litigation, transnational claims against MNEs aim to achieve various 
goals. First, they invite home country courts to clarify specific legal concepts, such as the 
boundaries of corporate liability.50 For instance, the ECCHR has used litigation to ensure that 
clear guidelines exist on the extent of the parent company’s liability.51  
 
Second, transnational claims against MNEs raise the visibility of existing regulatory gaps and 
encourage legal and policy reforms at both national and European levels. This approach is 
particularly observable in France where Sherpa has brought transnational claims against 
MNEs to ‘concretely show decision-makers and legislators the difficulties which exist to 
hold companies liable for the harm they commit.’52 After several years of litigation and 
lobbying, in 2013, Sherpa and other corporate accountability activists achieved enough 
support in the French Parliament for the introduction of a legislative bill creating a duty of 
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care of parent and controlling companies.53 In Germany, the ECCHR has used litigation to 
point out loopholes in national criminal law and encourage the German legislator to 
introduce a regime of corporate criminal liability.54 Litigation against MNEs is also a test to 
evaluate the extent of legal and policy reform needed. A campaigner said that ‘the XX case 
was also a test case to check if it is possible to bring a claim against an MNE and if it 
would not be possible, then NGO would have to lobby to change the law.’55  
 
Third, transnational litigation against MNEs breathes new life into, or raises the visibility of, 
campaigns deemed unsuccessful. In the Netherlands, the Shell case was the result of a 
strategic decision by corporate accountability activists to make more effective a public 
campaign seeking Shell’s accountability for its activities in Nigeria. Ultimately, the rise of 
transnational claims against MNEs is linked to the absence of effective global mechanisms to 
hold corporations accountable. Until political leaders address the imbalance between 
corporate rights and obligations, NGOs and local communities will continue to call for 
further litigation against MNEs.56 
 
The existence of a hostile legal opportunity structure 57  and the strategic nature of 
transnational litigation affect the number of claims which end up in home country courts. To 
date, plaintiffs have faced a number of obstacles (eg high litigation costs, complex regimes of 
corporate liability, limited substantive legal victories, etc.). To improve their chances of 
success, litigators carefully select the claims they bring against MNEs.58 The claim must also 
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‘make sense’ in the context of the litigator’s aims and activities. In France, Sherpa brought 
the claim against Vinci at a time where it strategically coincided with the debate on the duty 
of care of parent and controlling companies in the French Parliament. Sherpa claimed that the 
human rights violations alleged in the claim demonstrated the need to enact a law which 
would regulate MNE activities abroad.59 Ability to collaborate with victims and CSOs in host 
States is also an important criteria for litigators. They will evaluate victims’ profile and 
motivations as potential claimants. A campaigner pointed out the need to find reliable 
partners in host countries ‘who were not just going for easy money but who were also 
dedicated to the case and to justice, even if it would take a long time.’60 Some litigators have 
developed specific procedures to select potential cases. In 2013, Sherpa created a formal 
procedure to select situations of alleged abuse that could potentially become claims based on 
their strategic importance and the amount of resources required.61 The case must comply with 
the mandate of Sherpa and it must give rise to judicial or non-judicial proceedings. 62 
Ultimately, the strategic benefit that the claim may provide appears to be the most important 
criterion to launch proceedings.63 The selection of cases is questionable from the perspective 
of victims, as it restricts the number of them who may obtain remedy in home country courts, 
regardless of the harm they suffered or their need to be compensated. 
 
3.1.2 Host country victims and CSOs 
The strategic nature of transnational litigation against MNEs raises a number of questions 
regarding the involvement of host country victims and CSOs on the one hand, and home 
country CSOs and lawyers on the other. Scholars have questioned the way litigation impacts 
host State victims and CSOs and, ultimately, defends and promotes their interests. Legal 
strategies often reduce complex social problems to questions of monetary compensation, and 
                                                 
 
59
 ‘Mondial 2022 au Qatar: Sherpa Porte Plainte Contre Vinci Construction et les Dirigeants de sa Filiale au 
Qatar QDVC’ (Sherpa, 23 March 2015) <http://www.asso-sherpa.org/mondial-2022-au-qatar-sherpa-porte-
plainte-contre-vinci-construction-et-les-dirigeants-de-sa-filiale-au-qatar-qdvc#.VkY3i7v81Og> accessed 30 
November 2015. 
60
 Interview with Campaigner 1 (n 55). 
61
 ‘Règlement du COPIL’ (Sherpa 5 April 2013), Préambule. 
62
 Petitjean (n 32) (author’s translation). 
63
 As seen in Chapter 3, Boon suggests that most lawyers build practices on the best business opportunities 




the interests and concerns of victims may be absorbed ‘within narrow strategic legal 
calculations driven by the desire to reap the largest financial return.’64 Scholars have pointed 
out how some lawyers may exploit ‘opportunities provided by the plight of the poor for their 
own ends.’65 In some cases, lawyers looked for victims to bring a case on their behalf on the 
condition that the lawyers would receive a substantial sum of any court award.66 Furthermore, 
victims who lack legal literacy or are unfamiliar with technical legal vocabulary can often be 
alienated from the process.  
 
Scholars have also questioned the involvement of home country CSOs and lawyers. 
Excessive foreign intervention, in terms of funding and expertise, may taint the case with the 
impression that ‘it is a proxy for foreign interests.’67 Moreover, CSOs from host and home 
countries may compete to gain access to financial and other resources to bring claims against 
MNEs, with host State CSOs being at a disadvantage compared to home State CSOs. 
Furthermore, they may not be able to make their voice heard in transnational claims against 
MNEs. Legal recourse may also be limited to groups from selected countries that benefit 
from CSO support and financial resources.68 For example, international CSOs and lawyers 
have unevenly supported plaintiffs from South Africa and Nigeria rather than those from 
other countries where corporate abuse is also taking place.69 They may also choose plaintiffs 
on the basis of available legal remedies and chances of success. As a result, some wrongs 
may be addressed at the expense of others.70 Finally, the interests and priorities of victims 
and home State CSOs may, at times, differ, thus prompting potential conflicts during the 
proceedings. This has been the case with the conclusion of out-of-court settlements in the 
past. At the same time, there is a role for foreign CSOs and lawyers where local activists are 
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The strategic nature of transnational litigation against MNEs is visible in the way lawyers 
and CSOs cultivate links with the media. William Bourdon, the founder of Sherpa, stated that 
‘the media are an instrument for lawyers.’72 They are ‘a tool to spark public debates, to create 
power relations, and, sometimes, to use as a strategy of intimidation of the opponent.’ 73 
Media attention reinforces public pressure on MNEs and adversely impacts their reputation. 
Lawyers and CSOs strategically use the media to raise the profile of claims.74 In England, the 
Monterrico case became highly publicized after the newspaper The Guardian published 
pictures of police and army officers brutalizing local demonstrators in Peru.75 Transnational 
cases against MNEs targeting companies with highly visible brands are more likely to 
receive media attention.76 For instance, litigation against Shell in England, the Netherlands, 
and the USA has received large media coverage, most notably due to campaigns running in 
parallel. In the Netherlands, Milieudefensie and VARA, a Dutch public broadcaster, 
produced a TV programme on the oil spills caused by Shell in Nigeria, which was 
broadcasted a few days before the first hearing in Shell. 77  Ultimately, the relationship 
between the media on the one hand and CSOs and lawyers on the other is mutually enriching, 
as litigators may benefit from broad public coverage while the media may have access to 
sellable stories.78  
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At the same time, litigators prudently use the media. Publicity can be detrimental to the 
outcome of a case and can influence the conclusion of a settlement agreement between the 
parties. 79  In the context of criminal proceedings, publicity can affect the outcome of a 
preliminary investigation or result in political pressure on the prosecutor. In addition, 
journalists can struggle to explain complex legal proceedings to a public unfamiliar with it. A 
lawyer pointed out: 
 
The topic of tax evasion is more attractive for the media. However, proceedings 
related to CSR are problematic. They are more difficult to explain, to schematize, and 
to simplify. These cases relate to issues of corporate groups, control, liability, […]. 
These proceedings are too technical to be understood and to receive media coverage.80  
 
3.2 Measuring the success of transnational litigation against MNEs 
This section questions whether transnational litigation against MNEs has been successful so 
far. As mentioned above, transnational litigation against MNEs aims to achieve various goals: 
victims seek to gain access to remedies, lawyers want to hold corporate actors liable, and 
CSOs seek to shed light on corporate human rights abuse and the need for legal and policy 
reform. Legal mobilization may successfully achieve one or several of these aims while 
failing to attain others. 
 
The concept of ‘success’ is subjective and various actors, including corporate defendants, 
have different readings of success depending on the result they expect to obtain. At times, 
both plaintiffs and corporate defendants may see the outcome as a success from their own 
perspective. In Shell, the District Court of The Hague rejected all the allegations against the 
parent company and recognized that the Nigerian subsidiary was liable for oil pollution in 
only one claim. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs, Milieudefensie, and corporate accountability 
activists hailed the judgement as a landmark case. One of the Nigerian plaintiffs whose claim 
had been rejected expressed his happiness for the village that won compensation. He stated, 
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‘For my colleagues who succeeded, that is victory. […] Shell is brought to book. I believe 
this is a revolutionary case.’81 At the same time, Shell also saw the judgement as a success. 
Allard Castelein, of Shell, declared, ‘We are very pleased with the verdict. […] First of all I 
should say that we were never pleased with the court case in its own right but we are very 
pleased that the parent company is not liable under any of the complaints issued.’82 
 
3.2.1 Legal and non-legal benefits 
Legal mobilization theory shows that there are multiple ways of assessing the ‘success’ or the 
‘failure’ of litigation for law reform.83 In transnational litigation against MNEs, success may 
be interpreted in terms of legal and non-legal benefits.  
 
To date, few cases have reached the merits stage and, when they did so, home State courts 
have rarely found MNEs liable for human rights or environmental abuse taking place for 
their activities in host countries. As a result, one could suggest that legal mobilization has 
accomplished little towards achieving corporate liability. Furthermore, plaintiffs have rarely 
been awarded financial compensation for the harm suffered or other remedies, such as clean-
up of environmental pollution. At the same time, litigators have won on some legal and 
procedural issues, such as jurisdiction or NGO standing. In the Netherlands, the plaintiffs and 
their lawyers, as well as corporate accountability activists saw the District Court’s decision to 
hear the claims against Shell as a victory. For a lawyer, ‘it was a victory when the court said, 
“Indeed it is very well possible that a mother company is responsible for what is going on in 
Nigeria,” even when the system of corporate law does not foresee such liability.’ 84  A 
campaigner also saw the court’s acceptance of its own jurisdiction over the claim and of 
Milieudefensie’s standing as ‘a big step.’85 
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Scholars have suggested that the most important benefits of transnational litigation against 
MNEs are its indirect effects. In some instances, plaintiffs and litigators may pursue litigation 
for reasons other than winning legal arguments or obtaining financial compensation. 86 
Victims may get the mental satisfaction of obtaining ‘justice’ by having an official 
acknowledgement of the corporate wrongs or crimes. 87  Litigation may also buy time to 
mobilise resistance around a project.88 In one case, the ECCHR stated that: 
 
[T]he acts of investigating the circumstances of what happened and drafting a legal 
complaint can in themselves represent important steps for victims in voicing their 
complaints, overcoming their trauma, and fighting for their rights. Irrespective of 
whether an action succeeds before a judge, legal proceedings can play a significant 
role when it comes to the political debate on responsibility for human rights abuses.89 
 
The impact of bringing or threatening to bring cases may also be more important than the 
legal outcomes.90 Litigation may affect corporate behaviour in host countries by incentivizing 
companies to pay attention to the impacts of their activities on local communities, employees, 
and the environment. However, it is difficult to evaluate how exactly litigation changes 
corporate behaviour. 91  Since litigation may play a key part in larger activist campaigns 
against a specific company, ‘it is often impossible to disaggregate the impact of litigation 
from the impact of other forms of activist campaigning on the firm’s public perception or its 
share price.’92  
 
Holzmeyer also explains that legal mobilization in Doe v Unocal93 had four principal indirect 
effects on the corporate accountability movement: organizational growth and capacity 
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building; growth of transnational advocacy networks and potentials for boomerang effects; 
broadening tactical repertoires of activists and litigators, including possibilities for synergy 
among different tactics and movements; and cultivation of symbolic and communicative 
resources for movement building and mobilization.94 Therefore, transnational claims against 
MNEs can bolster the organizational strength, tactical repertoires, and discursive resources of 
activists.95  
 
Transnational litigation against MNEs can also be an efficient public education and reform 
tool.96 It may demonstrate inequities in existing laws and point out to the need for legal and 
policy change, such as the case against Vinci in France. Therefore, the success of legal 
mobilization against MNEs is linked to the capacity of its participants to create an alternative 
discursive space where hegemonic discourse on neoliberal globalization and legal norms 
sustaining inequality and corporate impunity are challenged.97  
 
3.2.2 Out-of-court settlements  
Increasingly, plaintiffs and business defendants are reaching out-of-court settlements. In 
general, MNEs agree to compensate the claimants or to create a fund to develop local 
projects to help host country communities. For instance, in France, Total and the plaintiffs 
reached a confidential out-of-court settlement in 2005.98 Total agreed to pay €10,000 to each 
plaintiff in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint. In addition, the company pledged 
to create a fund of €5.2m to implement humanitarian and development projects.99  
 
Settlements offer advantages to both claimants and corporate defendants. Transnational 
litigation against MNEs is expensive and time-consuming, and its outcome is uncertain for 
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both parties, especially plaintiffs. Therefore, settlements offer victims a negotiated resolution 
of the conflict and improve their opportunities to obtain remediation in a much faster way in 
comparison with litigation. 100  Litigation can also damage the MNE’s reputation and 
negatively impact business opportunities. Settlements limit such risks by ending the legal 
proceedings, since plaintiffs generally agree to withdraw their claim. Furthermore, 
settlements can influence the dismissal of criminal complaints, such as in the case against 
Total in France.101 Scholars have suggested that Total’s settlement in France has allowed the 
company ‘to buy a certain peace of mind by ending the embarrassing proceedings and 
limiting the subsequent publicity.’102 
 
Litigators usually present out-of-court settlements as great successes. Following the 
settlement with Total, William Bourdon, the founder of Sherpa, stated:  
 
The agreement reached is an innovative, pragmatic, and generous solution that solves 
problems related to the conditions that an industrial group sometimes faces when 
operating in certain developing countries. […] [B]eyond the financial compensation 
for the damage alleged by the complainants, for acts which the Total Group has 
always said it had not been informed of, the agreement brings concrete remedies for 
some citizens of the concerned States whom face difficult situations. […] [T]his 
exemplary agreement heralds, for the future, what could be the resolution of this type 
of situations.103 
 
Scholars and lawyers have argued that settlements may be the favoured way to solve disputes 
in the future, as part of ‘the contemporary trend to “privatize” justice.’104 In particular, they 
would provide a ‘pragmatic’105 approach to achieve the ideals behind transnational litigation 
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against MNEs in comparison with judicial proceedings, especially since courts are reluctant 
to remedy corporate human rights and environmental abuse. 106  Future settlements could 
include ‘the creation of pre-emptive codes, the aggressive monitoring of those codes, the 
involvement of communities and local NGOs, and efforts to persuade consumers, NGOs, and 
judges to give force to the norms expressed in those codes.’107 
 
At the same time, settlements raise a number of issues. First, claimants and MNEs may 
struggle to reach an out-of-court settlement. In Bodo, despite SPDC, the corporate defendant, 
formally admitting liability for the oil spills in 2011,108 the plaintiffs and the company were 
originally unable to reach an agreement regarding various aspects of a potential settlement 
(eg the quantity of spilled oil, the extent of the damage to the Bodo community and the 
ecosystems of the Bodo region, and the amount of financial compensation owed by SPDC).109 
After four years of intermittent talks, SPDC and Leigh Day eventually agreed to a £55m 
settlement in January 2015.110  
 
Second, settlements are usually confidential. Apart for the parties’ press releases, it is very 
difficult to know how those agreements are negotiated and what they contain. NGOs and 
scholars have suggested that the lack of transparency prevents the rights of victims to justice, 
truth, and remedy. 111  Furthermore, the confidentiality of these agreements may have a 
negative impact on other victims of corporate abuse. Following the settlement between Leigh 
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Day and Trafigura, medical expert evidence could not be seen by other victims or used to aid 
effective health interventions.112  
 
Third, in most cases, MNEs refuse to recognize their involvement, or liability, in the human 
rights abuse or environmental pollution raised by the claimants. For instance, Trafigura 
rejected any responsibility, stating that it did not foresee, and could not have foreseen, the 
illegal dumping of toxic waste in Abidjan.113  
 
Fourth, the conclusion of settlements does not ensure that all victims will obtain financial 
compensation, especially in the context of group actions, or that the MNE is not exposed to 
more litigation risks. Despite Trafigura and Leigh Day reaching an out-of-court settlement 
for 30,000 victims, more than 100,000 Ivorian victims brought a new tort claim against 
Trafigura in the Netherlands in February 2015.114 They demanded compensation for ‘bodily, 
moral and economic injury’ caused to them as well as a clean-up of the toxic waste in Ivory 
Coast. This highlights that settlements often neglect to remediate long-term social and 
environmental issues.  
 
Fifth, settlements prevent the set of legal precedent or the adoption of legal and policy reform 
of corporate liability standards for MNEs. 
 
Out-of-court settlements between plaintiffs and corporate defendants may prove a stumbling 
block to the aims of the corporate accountability movement and may create potential 
conflicts between cause lawyers and activists. While cause lawyers tend to praise these 
agreements for allowing victims to gain effective access to remedy, corporate accountability 
activists have sometimes condemned them for preventing the emergence of strong corporate 
liability standards. For instance, Total’s out-of-court agreement in France sparked tensions 
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amongst the different activist groups campaigning against the MNE for its activities in 
Myanmar.115 While some activists welcomed the settlement,116 a number of NGOs, lawyers, 
and academics criticized it for ‘ignoring responsibilities for the commission of serious 
violations of human rights in favour of a financial transaction allowing the Total group to 
clean up its acts.’ 117  In particular, the position of Sherpa received a lot of criticism for 
‘endorsing Total’s version of its lack of responsibility for the acts alleged against the 
group.’118 It should be pointed out that, in parallel, Total’s lawyers also tried to reach an out-
of-court settlement with another group of victims who had brought a criminal claim against 
the MNE in Belgium. However, the plaintiffs refused the offer on the grounds that their 
complaint aimed at holding Total accountable for its behaviour in Myanmar.119  
 
Similarly, a number of international and Ivorian CSOs criticized the settlement between 
Leigh Day and Trafigura for exonerating the MNE from its responsibility for the ‘social, 
health, and environmental disaster’ caused in Abidjan. In particular, FIDH, LIDHO and 
MIDH stated: 
 
[W]hile respecting the right and the wish of the victims to be compensated for the 
significant damage they suffered, [FIDH, LIDHO and MIDH] consider, that in the 
presence of a decision by a British civil court simply approving a settlement 
agreement between the parties, and in the absence of an impartial ruling on the 
criminal liability of Trafigura, this latter cannot be exonerated from liability by the 
mere fact that it settled with the victims. FIDH, LIDHO, and MIDH can only 
denounce the indecent attitude of Trafigura, which has built, in the French and 
international media, an institutional operation of communication and public relations 
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on its lack of accountability, and in defiance of the families’ pain and the victims’ 
suffering.120 
 
On the other hand, for Leigh Day, ‘the claims were successfully settled out of court.’121 It 
acknowledged, in the light of expert evidence, that ‘the slops could at worst have caused a 
range of short term low level flu like symptoms and anxiety.’122  
 
The conclusion of out-of-court settlements may also create tensions between plaintiffs and 
their local community.123 In the Monterrico case, the MNE made compensation payments to 
33 of the victims, without admitting liability.124 It appears that ‘the decision by the victims to 
settle was seen by many as “selling out” and preventing the communities from having their 
day in court, although that was never the claimants’ intention.’125 Furthermore, in Peru, the 
settlement ‘resulted in a significant division among some previously tight-knit communities, 
resulting in a number of the victims feeling the need to move away.’126 It also created tension 
amongst the claimants. Some victims felt pressured into settling to support the others, and 
others felt guilty for receiving larger sums of money. In addition, a number of victims did not 
receive any compensation.127  
 
The tensions created by out-of-court settlements shed light on the dual nature of transnational 
litigation against MNEs, and the constraints imposed on cause lawyers and corporate 
accountability activists by legal mobilization and the politicization of the law. Settlements 
may prevent the achievement of aims linked to the corporate accountability movement, such 
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as punishing MNEs for human rights or environmental abuse, or triggering policy and legal 
reform. 
 
Settlements also challenge the twofold positions of cause lawyers as private practitioners 
acting in their client’s best interests and as activists seeking to establish a precedent that will 
improve the legal position of the cause.128 Speaking of out-of-court settlements, a lawyer 
stated: 
 
In general, as a law firm, we do whatever is necessary to create the best outcomes and 
that is not always doing the whole civil procedure because it is very demanding on 
the people involved. Therefore, I could imagine that we will be willing to talk to [the 
MNE]. But, on the other hand, it very much depends on what is under discussion. 
Because it is not only a matter of money and because there has been so much of a 
principle question, I am not sure whether you could solve it in settling.129 
 
Legal practice also imposes a number of financial and other constraints on lawyers. In some 
countries, the cost of litigation is exorbitant and lawyers, who work on the basis of market-
based mechanisms, are exposed to high financial risks when they take on transnational claims 
against MNEs. When the legal rules governing liability and procedure limit their chances of 
success, cause lawyers may be under pressure to reach a settlement with corporate defendants 
to avoid failure and not recovering any costs. Furthermore, lawyers must protect their clients’ 
interests and are normally bound by their clients’ decisions. As a result, they cannot prevent 
them from opting for a quick and easy way to obtain financial compensation. Ultimately, the 
tensions created by settlements reflect the conflict between the private interests of plaintiffs 
and, at times, of lawyers on one hand and the public interest that drives corporate 
accountability campaigns and claims against MNEs on the other. Cause lawyers understand 
the limitations of legal mobilization as a political tool to achieve reform.  
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4 Strategic litigation against corporate accountability activism 
One major challenge for corporate accountability activism is the increasing use of libel and 
compensation lawsuits by MNEs to discourage plaintiffs, cause lawyers, and CSOs from 
raising corporate human rights or environmental abuse in courts.130 Such lawsuits are also 
called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs).131 SLAPPs generally refer 
to civil lawsuits or counterclaims (for monetary damages and/or injunction) filed against 
individuals and groups for having raised a public interest issue to a government body or 
official, the electorate, or a court.132 SLAPPs may target individuals and groups supporting 
various types of claims and actions, including plaintiffs to public interest and law reform 
lawsuits. The goal of SLAPPs is ‘to stop citizens from exercising their political rights or to 
punish them for having done so. SLAPPs send a clear message: that there is a “price” for 
speaking out politically.’ 133  SLAPPs can take various forms: defamation; business torts; 
judicial torts; conspiracy; constitutional-civil rights violations; or nuisances.134 In recent years, 
the main instigators of SLAPPs have been corporations, but they may also be governments, 
officials, or high profile business people.135 SLAPPs are well recognized as challenging free 
speech and public participation in the US, Canada, and Australia. However, the concept 
remains largely ignored in Europe, despite the existence of SLAPPs in various European 
countries.136 In England, SLAPPs gained some notoriety in the McLibel case, which resulted 
in an intense debate on libel law.137 In 2005, the ECtHR ruled that English libel law was 
contrary to Article 6 ECHR.138 
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SLAPPs have become a major risk for plaintiffs, cause lawyers, and CSOs in transnational 
litigation against MNEs. In England, Trafigura brought libel proceedings against Leigh Day, 
The Guardian, and the BBC following comments in the media139 alleging that the illegal 
dumping of toxic waste in Ivory Coast involving the MNE had caused a number of deaths 
and miscarriages. 140  In France, SLAPPs also pose a significant threat to human rights 
activists.141 In 2015, the French MNE Vinci sued Sherpa and its staff members following the 
criminal complaint brought by Sherpa alleging that Vinci was involved in forced labour in 
Qatar.142 However, French courts dismissed Vinci’s claims.143 
 
SLAPPs are problematic because they attack activist CSOs and individuals, discouraging 
them from raising human rights or environmental abuse. They also add additional pecuniary 
costs to CSOs with already limited financial resources. The law may, nonetheless, provide 
activists with defence. In the Netherlands, for example, courts may grant an anti-suit 
injunction when it can be shown that the party bringing a claim is abusing the legal system. 
However, Dutch courts usually grant this on an exceptional basis.144 
 
5 Conclusions 
Chapter 8 described the dynamics between social movements, cause lawyering, and legal 
mobilization in transnational litigation against MNEs in Europe.  
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For several decades, civil society actors concerned with business abuse have alternated 
between various strategies to influence corporate conduct, ranging from pressure to 
collaboration. However, increased corporate power and limited results of voluntary initiatives 
to effectively prevent business-related abuse of human rights and environmental pollution 
resulted in the emergence of a distinct social movement at the turn of the 21st century. The 
corporate accountability movement focuses on the role of policy-makers and courts to 
effectively regulate corporate conduct through binding obligations and punishment. If this 
movement is global, it has also developed specific characteristics in Europe. Various national 
and regional coalitions specifically dedicated to the pursuit of corporate accountability have 
emerged. They focus on legal and policy reform, awareness-raising, and advocacy. The 
existence of a regional institutional and legal framework, most notably the EU, has triggered 
the development of collective strategies and campaigns on corporate accountability between 
activist groups, organizations, and networks. The last two decades have also seen the 
emergence of law firms and legal NGOs fully or partly dedicated to corporate accountability 
litigation in Europe. The interaction of these cause lawyers with actors of the corporate 
accountability movement has triggered the use of legal mobilization as a strategy to hold 
MNEs accountable and shed light on the need for legal and policy reform.  
 
Transnational litigation against MNEs is therefore a strategic type of legal mobilization 
which aims to achieve various objectives, including remediation of corporate abuse, 
corporate group liability, and legal and policy reform. If victories on issues such as MNE 
liability or access to remedies have been rare in courts so far, litigation has produced various 
other legal and non-legal benefits. Litigators have obtained successful judicial clarification 
on a range of legal and procedural issues, such as court jurisdiction to hear claims raising 
transnational issues of corporate liability. Furthermore, legal mobilization has contributed to 
improving the visibility of the corporate accountability movement, especially in the context 
of campaigns against specific MNEs. Moreover, cause lawyers and CSOs have revealed the 
need for legal and policy reform, such as in France where CSOs have been able to gain 






However, the conclusion of confidential and out-of-court settlements between plaintiffs and 
corporate defendants has been a source of conflicts within the corporate accountability 
movement, revealing the constraints that legal mobilization imposes on both cause lawyers 
and activists. Such conflicts may be detrimental to the cohesion of activist networks and to 
the efficiency of broader campaigns on corporate accountability. Furthermore, the increasing 
use of libel and compensation lawsuits by MNEs to discourage plaintiffs, cause lawyers, and 
CSOs from raising corporate human rights or environmental abuse in courts needs to be 
addressed. Without legislative intervention, it is likely that such a practice will increase in the 








This thesis provided a comparative socio-legal analysis of transnational litigation in Europe 
against MNEs for harm resulting from their involvement in human rights abuse and 
environmental damage in host countries. It assessed how the limited responses by public 
international law and host States partly led to the emergence of litigation in home countries. 
This thesis also identified how the substantive and procedural laws of two civil law countries, 
namely France and the Netherlands, affect the opportunities to gain access to civil and 
criminal justice for business-related abuse. Moreover, it explored the socio-legal dimension 
of this type of litigation by examining its links to social movements and cause lawyers. In 
particular, it describes the emergence and characteristics of the European corporate 
accountability movement and how its actors have used legal mobilization as a political 
strategy to hold MNEs to account and trigger legal and policy reform. 
 
1 Summary 
An internationally coordinated approach appears as an appropriate way to provide an 
effective normative framework to regulate MNE activity and offer judicial redress in 
situations of corporate human rights abuse and environmental damage. Under the current 
state of public international law, home States have the obligation to protect the enjoyment of 
human rights against interference from MNEs. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether such 
an obligation extends extraterritorially. Furthermore, while States have international 
obligations to prevent transboundary pollution, it is unclear whether such an obligation 
applies to MNEs operating abroad. Under the traditional State-centric approach to 
international law, non-State actors, such as MNEs, do not have international legal personality. 
Therefore, they have neither rights nor obligations, and they cannot be held liable for breach 
of international law standards, such as human rights or environmental standards. At the same 
time, scholars, lawyers, and CSOs increasingly challenge such a view, and international 
bodies have occasionally accepted that non-State actors should have international obligations 
in specific circumstances. Victims of corporate abuse enjoy a number of international and 




environmental damage. In Europe, however, it is unclear how the existence of various 
instruments may ensure that foreign victims of corporate abuse gain access to justice in home 
countries. To date, States have favoured the adoption of international soft-law instruments to 
regulate business impacts on human rights and the environment, such as the UN Framework 
and the UNGPs. Nonetheless, various academics and CSOs have criticized the nature and 
content of such documents, especially the pillar on judicial remedies, and have called for 
obligations on MNEs through binding international instruments. The failure of public 
international law in offering clear or adapted solutions to address issues raised by the 
transnational activities of MNEs has contributed to increase demands for corporate 
accountability at the domestic level. 
 
It has been argued that transnational litigation against MNEs emerged from the need to 
compensate for the lack of access to justice in host States. However, this thesis has pointed 
out that access to remedies for corporate abuse varies amongst host States, depending on 
their level of economic and social development, and the nature and the stability of the 
political regime in place. Access to justice is particularly limited in fragile, conflict-affected, 
and post-conflict States, such as the DRC. In other countries, the legal framework may offer 
potential avenues to hold companies liable for human rights abuse and environmental 
damage. Furthermore, some host States have innovative laws and procedures in place to 
promote the sustainable role of companies in society and ensure access to justice. However, 
several common obstacles subsist in many host countries, including the absence of 
enforcement or execution of judgements, State dependence on foreign investment, and the 
lack of independent and impartial judiciaries. Ultimately, the emergence of transnational 
litigation against MNEs cannot be explained solely on the basis of the lack of effective 
access to remedies in host countries. Other reasons, such as the possibility to gain high 
financial compensation in home countries (eg the US) and opportunities to build campaigns 
for corporate accountability in home countries, seem to play an important role. Nonetheless, 
transnational litigation against MNEs may slow down efforts in host countries to reform their 





In Europe, transnational litigation against MNEs first emerged in England in the shape of tort 
claims brought against the English parent companies of foreign subsidiaries operating in host 
countries. Flexible standards of disclosure and group actions have facilitated such claims. To 
date, the conclusion of out-of-court settlements with MNEs has been the favoured way to 
gain access to financial compensation. Since the turn of the 21st century, transnational 
litigation against MNEs has expanded to European civil law countries, in particular France 
and the Netherlands. However, it has adapted to the legal tradition and litigation culture 
existing in those countries. For instance, criminal proceedings have been the favoured way to 
seek corporate accountability and remediation through courts in France. 
 
Transnational litigation against MNEs poses a number of legal challenges as to whether the 
home State is competent to hear the claims, and whether the home or the host State law 
applies to the proceedings. In France and the Netherlands, the EU harmonization of private 
international law has had a direct effect on the domestic rules governing court jurisdiction 
and applicable law in civil matters. Under the Brussels I Regulation, plaintiffs can bring a 
civil claim against a parent company domiciled in the EU. The situation is different for 
claims targeting foreign subsidiaries, in which case EU law remains silent. However, French 
and Dutch courts have agreed to hear civil complaints against foreign subsidiaries of EU-
based MNEs in case of co-defendants or based on the forum necessitatis doctrine. Under the 
Rome II Regulation, the host State law applies to transnational civil claims against MNEs. 
Nonetheless, the Rome II Regulation provides for a number of exceptions, including in case 
of environmental damage. In criminal matters, the territorial principle is surprisingly relevant 
to justify the jurisdiction of French and Dutch courts over the extraterritorial offences 
committed by MNEs. Moreover, French and Dutch criminal laws provide for alternative 
principles of jurisdiction based on extraterritoriality, which may allow the prosecution of 
MNEs in various circumstances. Nonetheless, specific procedural requirements, such as 
double criminality or a foreign court ruling, and the reluctance of public prosecutors to bring 
corporate offenders to trial limit the opportunities offered by the French and Dutch criminal 
systems to gain access to justice. One advantage of criminal proceedings, however, is that the 





The existence of liability standards punishing abuse occurring in the context of corporate 
group activities is crucial to the success of transnational claims against MNEs. Despite the 
existence of statutory rules providing for the application of separate legal personality and 
limited liability to specific companies, French and Dutch courts have occasionally held 
parent companies liable for harm caused by their subsidiaries based on either statutory rules 
or jurisprudential theories. However, the parent company must have generally committed a 
fault. Courts are willing to punish fraud and abusive arrangements where the parent company 
seeks to avoid liability by subsidiarizing an activity. At times, French and Dutch courts have 
also taken voluntary commitments of parent companies into account to determine their duty 
of care and hold them liable in the context of group activities. Nonetheless, French and Dutch 
courts make a careful and sporadic use of voluntary norms to hold companies liable. 
 
French and Dutch procedural rules also affect the opportunities of plaintiffs to gain effective 
access to remedy. In civil proceedings, in France, while foreign victims can generally bring a 
claim against an MNE, NGOs face significant obstacles in bringing similar claims. In 
criminal proceedings, the French and Dutch public prosecutors enjoy a large discretion to 
initiate prosecution. Such a situation is problematic, as they are usually reluctant to sue 
MNEs. However, French law allows victims and NGOs to initiate criminal proceedings, even 
when the prosecutor has rejected this option. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, victims and 
NGOs can appeal the prosecutor’s refusal to prosecute. In general, collective redress 
mechanisms are unavailable to plaintiffs in French and Dutch proceedings. Nonetheless, both 
France and the Netherlands are progressively allowing representative mechanisms and group 
settlements in specific situations. Plaintiffs also face a number of obstacles related to the 
production of evidence. For instance, strict disclosure rules affect their ability to demonstrate 
the validity of their claims, especially since they often have limited access to crucial evidence 
possessed by MNEs. Moreover, transnational litigation against MNEs is generally expensive, 
and the application of the loser pays principle and limited access to legal aid create further 
barriers for plaintiffs. Finally, French and Dutch civil procedures relating to remedy are more 
flexible than in common law countries. However, under the Rome II Regulation, the host 





The turn of the 21st century saw the emergence of a global corporate accountability 
movement, as a result of perceived increased corporate power and limited results of CSR 
initiatives to effectively prevent MNE human rights and environmental abuse. In Europe, 
CSOs have created various national and regional coalitions specifically dedicated to the 
pursuit of corporate accountability through legal and policy reform, awareness-raising, and 
advocacy. The existence of a European institutional and legal framework has triggered the 
development of collective strategies and campaigns on corporate accountability between 
various activist groups and networks. The existence of law firms and legal NGOs dedicated 
to corporate accountability has provided the main impetus for the development of 
transnational litigation against MNEs in European countries. Cause lawyers and CSOs have 
used legal mobilization not only to gain access to remedy and hold MNEs liable for human 
rights abuse and environmental damage but also to raise awareness and trigger legal and 
policy reform. If legal victories in courts have been rare so far, litigation has produced 
various other legal and non-legal benefits. However, the conclusion of confidential out-of-
court settlements between plaintiffs and corporate defendants has been a source of conflicts 
within the corporate accountability movement, revealing the constraints that legal 
mobilization imposes on both cause lawyers and activists. Such conflicts may be detrimental 
to the cohesion of activist networks and to the efficiency of broader campaigns on corporate 
accountability. Finally, the use of SLAPPs by MNEs to discourage plaintiffs and activists 
from raising corporate human rights or environmental abuse is a worrying trend that might 
increase in the future. 
 
2 Principled conclusions 
This thesis demonstrated that transnational litigation against MNEs is not solely a tort law 
phenomenon limited to common law countries. On the contrary, it has spread to European 
civil law countries where litigators have creatively used the various opportunities offered by 
their legal systems to bring claims against MNEs. Litigation culture and legal tradition are 
significant factors to explain the different legal strategies used to seek corporate 
accountability. If tort proceedings appear to be the favoured way to seek remedies and 
encourage reform in common law countries, criminal and specialized civil proceedings are 




This thesis also showed that the argument of the lack of access to justice in host countries, 
frequently used by litigators, is not solid enough to entirely justify the emergence of 
transnational litigation against MNEs. Although uncontested obstacles to access justice exist 
in host countries, other legal and social factors play a crucial role, such as the legitimization 
of corporate accountability campaigns in home countries. This argument is strengthened by 
the fact that, to date, litigators have had limited success in obtaining remedies and holding 
MNEs to account in home countries. However, transnational litigation against MNEs has 
been a successful strategy to trigger the debate on corporate accountability.  
 
Furthermore, the existence of cause lawyers, who understand the benefits of using legal 
mobilization as a political strategy to achieve legal and policy reform, and their interactions 
with activist networks, which pursue a corporate accountability agenda, are crucial factors 
explaining the emergence of transnational litigation against MNEs. In particular, 
transnational claims against MNEs are more likely to emerge in countries where both cause 
lawyers and activist networks are active and have developed transnational collaborative 
relationships with similar actors in other countries.  
 
Ultimately, transnational litigation against MNEs is less a way to obtain remedies for victims 
of corporate abuse than a strategy used by insurgent cosmopolitans to resist corporate power. 
Therefore, it contributes to the counter-hegemonic dimension of globalization. 
 
3 Potential future developments 
The lack of satisfying solutions to solve issues raised by corporate abuse and the lack of 
effective access to remedies has led to various calls for further binding and non-binding 
regulation at national, regional, and international levels. It appears important that legislators 
and policy-makers take into account lessons learnt from transnational litigation against 
MNEs. Furthermore, they should be aware of, and learn from, parallel initiatives in other 
countries and/or international organizations, complementing each other to create a more 
coherent legal framework to reduce the occurrence of corporate abuse and improve access to 





In Europe, the adoption of the UN Framework and the UNGPs triggered efforts by the CoE 
and the EU to consider how their work could address business-related human rights abuse. 
An important step in this process was the CoE’s acknowledgment that the ECHR presented 
serious limitations to prevent human rights violations by private companies and to guarantee 
access to remedies to victims of corporate abuse.1 Recently, the CoE has been active in 
developing policies and legal documents on business and human rights and access to justice. 
In 2014, the Committee of Ministers called on the Member States to take appropriate steps to 
ensure that when corporate human rights abuses occur within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.2 A Drafting Group on Human 
Rights and Business (CDDH-CORP) is currently preparing a non-binding instrument on the 
subject, which should be finalised during 2015.  
 
In the EU, the EC published a long-awaited staff working document on the implementation 
of the UNGPs (staff working document).3 However, the staff working document is not a 
policy document and only describes the current division of competences between Member 
States and the EU institutions to implement the UNGPs, and the EU policy and legal 
provisions supporting the implementation of the three pillars. Several observations can be 
made. First, the EC sees a limited role for the EU to implement the State duty to protect 
while it barely elaborates on the role EU policies and legislation can play in relation to the 
corporate responsibility to respect. This is a missed opportunity in view of the EU 
competences in the field of company law. Second, the staff working document is more 
detailed regarding the access to effective remedy pillar, as a result of increased EU 
competences in the field of justice over the last years. Third, the EC continues to put a strong 
emphasis on voluntary and CSR-based initiatives to address business and human rights 
related issues. This position appears in line with the EU’s cautious approach to mandatory 
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regulation of corporate behaviour towards human rights and the environment.4 Ultimately, 
both the CoE and the EU remain averse to enacting mandatory standards to improve 
corporate accountability. 
 
At the international level, a number of countries, CSOs, and academics have pushed for the 
adoption of an international legally binding instrument to regulate MNE activities over the 
last decades. 5  In June 2014, the UNHRC decided to establish an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group with the mandate to elaborate an international legally 
binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.6 While this decision has received 
support from a number of CSOs and developing countries, it has received little support from 
business actors and various home States, including France, Germany, the UK, and the US. 
Beyond the lack of political adherence to this new process, the nature and the content of the 
future treaty are sources of concerns, in particular with regards to access to remedies. 7 
Ultimately, the future and the success of an international legally binding instrument on 
business and human rights remain uncertain. 
 
4 Avenues for future research  
During this research, a number of questions emerged which deserve to be further explored. 
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First, transnational litigation against MNEs does not guarantee systematic access to remedies 
by victims of business-related abuse. Therefore, it is crucial that future research looks into 
alternative ways to gain access to remedies. The UN Framework and various authors have 
suggested that cooperation and assistance between host and home States could enhance the 
chance of victims to effectively gain access to remedies.8 Such cooperation could focus on 
the execution of judgements of host State courts in the home State. Another solution may be 
to create an international or regional ombudsman who would deal with allegations of human 
rights and environmental abuses by businesses. 9  Authors have also suggested that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC could be extended to legal persons.10 In this case, the criminal liability 
of companies would be, however, restricted to international crimes. 
 
Second, it remains unsustainable for the international community and for lawyers to defend 
the absence of corporate obligations towards human rights and the environment. Such a view 
ignores that the law should be a flexible instrument that must evolve to solve contemporary 
issues and balance the rights and obligations of all actors, including businesses. In particular, 
academics and lawyers should reflect on pragmatic and realistic alternatives to traditional 
concepts, such as international legal personality, separate legal personality, and limited 
liability. Some authors have already called for innovative legal provisions on liability within 
corporate groups. Dine suggests that the recently enacted Albanian company law contains 
innovative provisions, which provide for a promising legal framework for the construction of 
MNE accountability for human rights and environmental abuse.11 
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Third, the current efforts to develop various legal and policy frameworks at national, regional, 
and international levels provide an excellent research opportunity. In particular, the 
elaboration of an international treaty on business and human rights raises a number of 
challenging questions regarding the respective obligations and responsibilities of States and 
companies under international law.  
 
Fourth, this research originally started as an inquiry into the role of courts to regulate 
corporate actors where statutory rules remain silent. While this thesis went in a different 
direction, research on the subject remains needed. As this thesis demonstrated, courts can 
become creative actors to regulate private behaviour, correct inequality and abuse between 
parties, and encourage the legislator to enact needed regulation. However, it is important to 
understand the opportunities and constraints they face when doing so.  
 
Fifth, the accountability of CSOs and cause lawyers involved in transnational litigation 
against MNEs and, more generally, in the corporate accountability movement also deserves 
to be further explored. 12  It appears important to assess the success and failure of their 
strategies to hold MNEs to account and help victims of corporate abuse gain access to 
remedies. In particular, there should be further research on the impacts of these strategies on 
local communities, victims of corporate abuse, and local CSOs in host countries, as well as 
on the economic, social, and legal development of host countries. Ultimately, research is 
needed on the interplay and the power relationships between CSOs and cause lawyers in 
home countries on the one hand, and victims, CSOs, and other actors in host countries on the 
other. 
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